**Deleuze Conference - Abstracts**

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<tr>
<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Dialectics of Multiplicity</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Against the popular image of Deleuze as an “anti-dialectical” thinker, the first paper aims to demonstrate that there is in fact a rigorous conception of dialectics that lies at the heart of Deleuze’s thinking, and that it in fact forms the kernel of what he understood by the “completion of the Critical project.” Secondly, it demonstrates that this reading of Deleuzian dialectics is itself already an image of politics, one that presents an important challenge to any voluntarist vision of politics at the same time as it opens onto an entirely different one, one whose existential fulcrum lies in a novel two-fold concept of “eviction” and “secession” which this paper attempts to diagram.</td>
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Deleuze’s Theory of Religion</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>In their retrospective What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari reflect about the nature of philosophy as they practice it and the ways in which it differs from other creative endeavors, such as science and art. Philosophy is the creation of concepts, and the ground on which philosophy creates its concepts is the prephilosophical plane of immanence. The great danger that continually haunts philosophy is taking the plane of immanence and making it immanent to something else, substance, being, or God, for example. Making immanence immanent to something other than itself transforms immanence into transcendence. At precisely this moment, philosophy ceases to be philosophy and becomes religion. “Whenever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is Philosophy whenever there is immanence…” (WIP, 43). While this contrast defines religion negatively in its relation to philosophy, I would like to explore what a positive account of religion might be in relation to the fuller accounts of philosophy, science, and art.</td>
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Braidotti (2008) argues that the postsecular turn has been taken within feminism. Postsecular feminism is connected with a shift towards Spinozist monism and more integrated ways of thinking subjectivity as flows of inter-relationality.

My argument is that some Indian philosophies are in many ways kindred with nomadic postsecular spirituality and Deleuzian thought in general. I am interested in the transformative capacity of these traditional, intellectual perspectives and aim to engage in a trans-cultural dialogue between Deleuzian feminism and Indian Shakta philosophy. I argue that this encounter can provide new molecular horizons for feminist thought and sustainable ethics. I will draw attention to one Indian philosophical concept, shakti (the feminine, dynamic energy, which is the primal creative principle underlying the cosmos). Non-dualistic Shakta tradition share the Deleuzian elevation of immanence and the ways of thinking about the body and subjectivity as a non-individualistic process of energetic forces. Furthermore, they share a monistic understanding of existence as a continuing transformation (bios/zoe/shakti power as immanent life force). I argue that the dialogue between Shakta philosophy and Deleuzian feminism is one potential source for producing interesting ontological possibilities for feminist theory.
Gilles Deleuze & Helmut Lachenmann: The conditions of creation and the

Abstract

Between 1966 and 1993 German composer Helmut Lachenmann (born 1935) developed a complex set of concepts (‘theses’, ‘conditions’ and ‘typologies’) around the ideas of “What is composing?”, “Which are the conditions of the music material?”, “What is art making?”, and “What are the political implications of Art?”. More than a closed system on contemporary esthetics, Lachenmann envisaged the concrete practice of composing – defining his own route, and giving insight into his “musique concrète instrumentale”, a music that ought to liberate the energetic potential of concrete (immanent) sound bodies and processes. Several aspects of Lachenmann’s theories point to an understanding of the conditions of creation, and an idea of radical immanence of the music material that approaches some of the key concepts of Gilles Deleuze. In spite of the fact that references to Deleuze’s Philosophy do not appear in Lachenmann’s writings (his main references being Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno and Georg Lukács) it is our aim to enable an encounter between Deleuze’s ideas on Creation and Haecceity of the material and Lachenmann’s typologies of New Music. Starting with Lachenmann’s “three thesis on composing” and proceeding to the “Four conditions of the music material” our presentation will focus on the following Lachenmann (HL) – Deleuze (GD) contiguities: • “Reflection upon music material”(HL) / “Diagnostic function of rt”(GD);
  - “To build an instrument”(HL) / “Write for a people still to come”(GD);
  - “Let oneself come” (HL) / “Desiring machines”, “Affects”, “BwO” (GD);
  - “Tonality” (HL) / “Opinion”, “Cliché” (GD);
  - “Corporeity” (HL) / “Capture of forces”, “Corporeity” (GD);
  - “Structure” (HL) / “Fold”, “Un - fold” (GD);
  - “Aura” (HL) / Semiotics, Psychoanalysis (GD & FG).

Urban Diagnostics

Abstract

While the discourse between “top down” and “bottom up” urban development strategies grows in the disciplines of architecture and urban planning, issues of methodology regarding urban planning are under question. Traditional urban regeneration projects are compared with interdisciplinary urban projects that are conducted in contemporary cities. The investigation of different approaches from the field of architecture and art can provide an overview of the field range where urban development strategies can take place today. The works of the Center of Urban Pedagogy, Atelier Bow Wow, Heath Bunting, Zbyněk Baladrán provide an understanding of the urban condition that is related to the specificity of a place. Built environment, urban infrastructures, social networks, the recent history of a place or collective memory is defined as the frame of observation, documentation and intervention.
The fish dissolved in water: A Deleuze-Guattarian experiment with Calvino

For Deleuze, the time of thinking in terms of “I” or “self” has already ended. Now, philosophy and much before it literature has started a novel thinking, one which rather attends to experimental possibilities of impersonal individuations. In Desert Islands, as a respond to the question posed by the Interviewer, he declares that people have long been away from thinking in terms of I and Self: “What we’re uncovering right now, in my opinion, is a world packed with impersonal individuations, or even pre-individual singularities…”

Novelists, according to Deleuze, have already recognized this. What these new novelists have realized is simply the way to elude control, a new intuition to develop unidentifiable means of resistance. Deleuze emphasizes that “This is really important, especially politically; it’s like the ‘fish dissolved in water’; it’s the revolutionary struggle, the struggle for liberation.”

Who are these novelists? What struggle have been made in their work for liberation? In what sense these fictions are revolutionary? And what does it mean to think as impersonal individuators?

I argue, in this piece of work, that Italo Calvino is one of those novelists, in fictions of whom one might find truthful answers for most of the questions above and trace revolutionary insights of the kind Deleuze implicitly fosters. The Deleuzian concept of becoming seems to be the point of departure if we are to explore the potential power of Calvino’s fiction in making sense out of Deleuze-Guattarian non-program of Schizoanalysis. Political promise of becoming lies in its natural resistance against representation. You cannot represent something which has been in constant becoming!

Thinking in terms of becoming, however, is being in a special kind of delirium. Idiots are philosophically worthwhile, not because we praise them romantically. Rather, they are worthwhile for inspiring us new lines of escapes. The lines which are accessible only to becomingers, a distinguished group of Eudoxus, that is, ordinary characters of Calvino.

What I call ordinary characters of Calvino are in a sense the minor language operating through pages of the fiction. The way they are not in focus give them their power to resist representation. The elusive force run through the fiction might clearly be read as Deleuze-Guattarian body-without-organs. Accomplishing a reading of this kind requires a machinic thinking. What I attempt in this work is to try performing such an experimental reading.
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Relating social practices to Deleuze's concept of territory as artistic expression provides the opportunity to translate artistic framing into academic expression, resulting in a political debate of human encounter and engagement. The premise I would like to discuss is that, often the closer one academic field is topographically to another, the stronger the urge emerges to demarcate the 'own' territory. This happens i.e. through caricaturising other fields, disciplines or practices assuming that it would strengthen the own position [Borgdorff 2009]. A political system, or theoretical territory, is being created and sustained by persons. Thus it can be seen as an interrelation between those 'living in it', and its framing standards, arrayed by people within the system [Barnbeck 2010]. If art, philosophy or science are to be combined productively, its result depends on a person's attitude and connections within these systems [Dressler &amp; Langreitner 2003]. I would like to reflect on social practices of higher educational institutions as their agenda shift more and more towards interdisciplinarity. Persons affiliated with an institution, show the urge to strengthen a collective set of values by marking out a territory with arguments that are based on emotions rather than research results. What are the social conditions in academia or in the arts that produce boundaries which are (not) productive for the system they are framing? What are examples of 'boundary work' that result in an engaged exchange?</td>
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<td>A form that thinks: the cinema</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>“It would be a catastrophe to believe that Kant and Ozu are the same thing,” warned Deleuze in one of his seminars. Despite a certain affinity, the same holds for Deleuze and Godard, who nonetheless writes: “the cinema, a form that thinks.” In my presentation I will try to bring into focus questions this claim for the “form” raises for thinking the cinema, that is, going “naturally from philosophy to the cinema” but also “from cinema to philosophy” (Deleuze). What form of (thought) may be said to be unique or proper to the cinema? If neither the association of images nor the movement of l’esprit – the one rejected, the other proposed by Deleuze – how this form is to be thought and how this thought is experienced? I will try to develop this problematic by turning neither to Godard nor to Deleuze’s writing on the cinema, but by staging an encounter between Difference and Repetition and found-footage cinema, as a genre of film wherein the cinema re-invents itself as an apparatus of repetition</td>
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Theatre of terror, theatre of cruelty: schizophrenia in The Logic of Sense

The concept of schizophrenia is a definitive motif in Deleuze’s work in the 1970s, promising a politics, an ethics, an ontogeny, and a therapeutic model. Yet while numerous studies have been devoted to Deleuze and Guattari’s monumental Capitalism and Schizophrenia, there has been little engagement with Deleuze’s first systematic theorisation of this topic, found in The Logic of Sense. In my paper I will give an account of this theorisation, locating it at the heart of Deleuze’s project in LS. This account will follow three interrelated lines: firstly I will explicate the ontogenetic role that Deleuze accords to schizophrenia in his reworking of Melanie Klein’s ‘paranoid schizoid position’; secondly I will give an account of the collapse of the transcendental field, which hurls the subject back into the schizoid depths; thirdly I will situate the schizophrenic in LS in relation to the pervert and the alcoholic, as an exemplar of one way of subverting the conditions that regulate our generic neurotic consciousness. I will conclude with a consideration of the significance that an engagement with LS has for our understanding of later developments in Deleuze’s theorisation of schizophrenia.

Peter Eisenman and Gilles Deleuze on Space and Architecture

There is a traditional connection between architecture and philosophy; they share a common conceptuality that shows a deep affinity and favours passages from one to the other (foundation or archè, structure, constructivism, deconstruction, finality, function, modern/postmodern, etc.). The relationship between philosophy and architecture took a decisive turn over the last decades with the encounter of different architectural projects and poststructuralist thought. Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze thus became new sources of inspiration for architectural reflections and ambitions. One of the most fascinating of these encounters is that which took place between the architect Peter Eisenman - famous for his controversial Holocaust-Mahnmal in Berlin - and the philosopher Gilles Deleuze. We will see how Eisenman presents his Rebstockpark project - a residential and commercial development destined to 100 hectares space in the suburb of Frankfurt - with the use of some notions developed by Deleuze (singularity, event, groundlessness, virtual, fold, repetition, becoming, etc.). This will show how Eisenman exemplifies the “intensive” type of space described by Deleuze.
Is Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology really non-anthropocentric? What possibilities does it offer, what tools does it provide in order to dismantle anthropocentrism? What is the position of empirical, ‘molar’ nonhuman animals in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy? Are they merely there to function as the second, subordinated term of becoming, understood as human, all too human adventure? What animals are and what can they become?

I will try to answer all these questions on the ground of one, rather specific example: the dog, referred to by Deleuze and Guattari as ‘the Oedipal animal par excellence’. In order to do this, I will look closely on the category of becoming-animal, and juxtapose it with Donna Haraway’s concepts of ‘co-evolution’ and ‘companion species’. History of humans’ and dogs’ co-evolution is of course also a history of oedipalisation, as well as a history of biopolitical practices and simple abuse; but it also is, can be, something more – mutual, though asymmetrical, becoming.

The art of education, for Freud, was one of three professions whose failure is guaranteed in advance, the other two being psychoanalysis and the art of politics. These three “impossibilities” increasingly collide in the area of adult or “lifelong” education, where science and the humanities often conflict in contradictory models and practices. Rather than enriching learning by interfering in complex, productive ways, these failed encounters, certainly in the Anglo-Saxon world, are clouded by practices which still have much to learn from Deleuze and Guattari’s “schizoanalysis”. Furthermore, behind its pastiche and provocation lies a productive restructuring of the interfaces between the three “impossibilities” and some important lessons for educators today. This presentation explores therefore incompossible discourses within education and asks to what extent they can meet and interfere, sketching a critical and clinical methodology for education which encourages connections, continuity and, above all, creativity.
Nomads upset assemblages incapable of anticipating them. This sometimes causes the reformulation of existing assemblages in productive ways. Just as the catastrophic risk of the terrorist precipitates a new attitude of responsibility, the nomad effects the production of new knowledges and practices. This paper uses Deleuze’s concept of the nomad (and nomadology) to make sense of Ewald’s argument that ‘science today provides interest less by the knowledge it produces that by the doubts that this knowledge introduces’ (Ewald, 1999, p. 67). The case this paper makes is that science’s capacity to control is put into doubt by the (nomadic) terrorist. This nomad, I argue, elicits certain transformations in contemporary practices of security – none better known than the War on Terror – that signal the debasement of science and the rehabilitation of imagination. Hence, an existing assemblage is reformulated in a productive way. This paper explains that this reconfiguration is possible because the threat of the catastrophic terrorist attack has made precautionary practices of security a necessity. Like the society of control, precaution works in much the same way as modulation. Equally, it induces the search for ‘new weapons’ (Deleuze, 1990). This paper continues this effort by recognising how science and imagination are part of the same problem.

Since the mid 70-s the politics of language has been one of the key topics of Deleuze’ common work with Guattari. Their iconoclastic studies – Kafka: toward a minor literature and Thousand plateaus offered us a unique interdisciplinary perspective of the relations between power and language, depicting a vivid tension between totalizing linguistic planning and erosive influence of so called minor literature. Our primary concern is to create a new methodology that allows us to scrutinize the main approaches to language policy (with the special emphasis on those realized in France and Russia/Soviet Union), describing it in deleuzogattarian terms of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. We will refer to chapter 3 of Kafka and fourth Plateau of TP in order to clear up the meaning of “tetrolinguistic” pattern in the context of correlation of forces in specific linguistic situations. The aim of our paper is to present our project that consists in introducing a new subdomain of social sciences, that we will call Micropolitics of language, laying on the crossways of Philosophy, Political science and Sociolinguistics.
This paper connects Deleuze’s concepts of control and surface to his reading of Spinoza’s philosophy of affectus. It develops a concept of “control surface” as an assemblage that modulates affective resistance. Control surfaces come in many configurations and serve different functions. My interest is in those that adjust message periodicities (as opposed to contents) to produce affective responses. These assemblages integrate affective resistance to information into their operation, and capitalize on that integration. Control surfaces, in their role as machinic and enunciative supports of networked Capital, manage the speed and rhythm of messages in relation to calculated mixtures of fear and greed, the affective energies that historically sustain capital accumulation and remain central to its organization in the digital economy.
Like most science fiction writers, Octavia Butler was interested as much in the human past and present as in the lives of alien beings from the future. Indeed, all of her novels are explorations of the limits of the human, and the interactions between humans and aliens always raise significant questions about human dynamics of power, desire, racism, sexism, and so on. Throughout her works, she is especially concerned with sexual relations between humans and aliens, both in the more immediate sense of the actual, physical experiences of having sex and in the larger sense of the emotional dimensions of personal bonds formed and sustained through regular sexual interaction.

It is this aspect of her work that seems especially Deleuzian, in that sexuality for Butler is always a becoming-other (becoming-child, becoming-animal, becoming-molecular), and in the Xenogenesis trilogy, that becoming-other entails an expansion of sexes involved in sex acts from two to five, with the limits of sexual relations implicitly extending to embrace all living entities in a general becoming-molecular. Despite the fact that Butler shows no sign of ever having read or even heard of Deleuze and/or Guattari, she provides fictional counterparts of Deleuzian polysexuality and becoming-other that are as startling as they are revelatory. A close juxtaposition of Butler and Deleuze not only illuminates Butler’s novels, but also helps expand our sense of the implications of Deleuze’s thought in the area of sexuality. In some ways, Butler’s novels present a utopian view of interspecies sex, in which humans, by engaging in a becoming-other, find ways of escaping the limitations of gender categories, prejudices and pathologies, but in other regards, such interspecies sex merely reconfigures human problems. Family sizes grow (instances of polygyny and polyandry occur in some novels), the number of sexes involved in having sex varies (five being the maximum), the relations among sexual partners change, usually becoming decidedly less violent than among humans, but ultimately the same set of human problems remains, simply with different emphases. Throughout her work, addiction is a prominent theme, and sex is consistently linked to a pleasurable relationship of co-dependence that becomes reassuring and erotic for the participants, one that has a basis in the biological needs of alien species and the chemical/neurologically induced needs of the humans. A peaceful, communal social order exists among the interspecies families and communities, but its stability is grounded in the bonds of addiction that constitute a form of gentle slavery. When analyzed from a Deleuzian perspective, the ambiguous nature of alien-human sexual relations in Butler suggests something of the dangers of polysexuality and becoming-other—dangers of which Deleuze and Guattari are constantly aware throughout A Thousand Plateaus, where they repeatedly stress that there are no guarantees in becomings, no inherent assurances that engaging the forces of deterritorialization will result in a better future, or even one that is no worse than the present. The only certainty is that whatever the result of becoming-other, it will be different, and in Butler, instances abound of the complexities that may arise in any confrontation with otherness, especially in those confrontations that involve humans who have sex with aliens.
In the conclusion of Time-Image, discussing Syberberg’s cinema, Deleuze opposes the time-image and the creative fabulation to the realm of information. Quite surprisingly, this opposition is placed under the sign of redemption: “redemption, art beyond knowledge, is also creation beyond information.” This passage finds a strange – one might say apocalyptic – echo toward the end of Difference and Repetition, where art’s highest possibility is defined as the production of a repetition or “contraction”, that is, “a freedom for the end of a world”. In Logic of sense, this dramatic contraction will be called counter-effectuation.

Incidentally, when they want to discredit the political relevance of Deleuze’s thought, Hallward considers counter-effectuation as a “redemptive gesture”, and Rancière describes Deleuze’s history of cinema as a “history of redemption”. Each time, redemption refers pejoratively to a form of apolitical passivity, in an attempt to reduce Deleuze to be a mere “spiritual” thinker. But is it all that simple? How should we think the relationship between creativity and “redemption”, politics and passivity in Deleuze’s work? In this presentation, I will try to characterize a certain (badiousian) trend to conceive of a “redemptive” Deleuze, so as to highlight, in a speculative perspective, a dramatic politics of contraction, on the threshold of the virtual.

Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy explores the complex relationship between science and the humanities, and their work on nomadic, “hydraulic” science examines the interconnectedness of science and social systems, expressing the tension between change and continuity in both fields. Their philosophically reconfigured account of fluid mechanics, supported by Michel Serres’s conceptualisation of turbulence, can be used to read Kathy Acker’s novel Empire of the Senseless (1988) as an exploration of the dynamics of social change. This interdisciplinary reading connects the fluid physics of turbulent and laminar flow, speed and slowness, chaos and order, nomad war machine and apparatus of capture to the oscillation between the two extremes: continuity and change. Acker presents a multiple and foldable version of an Algerian revolt where the temporal and spatial coordinates rather than progressing in a linear fashion, are seen to be dispersed and composed of a co-existence of modes stretched out on a global plane. Thus, in Empire Acker imaginatively merges histories, social and geopolitical realms so that Haiti, Algiers and Paris become a global turbulent space that can be seen as a trope of resistance against stable State-forms and a stimulus for the formation of a new world.
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**Abstract**

The Deleuzian thought invites to experiment becomings: woman, child, homosexual, up to the becoming-imperceptible. In this time of gay studies, gender studies, queer studies and post-feminist studies, a whole set of questions has to be tackle: how do work these becomings, who is concerned with them, and have they a concrete outreach at the level of thought. In other words, I would like on the one hand to take into account the place of sexuality in the work of Deleuze at the level of its content as well as its philosophical gesture. On the other hand, I would like to circumscribe the principal receptions and critiques gender studies, feminists and other minorities summoned since Anti-Oedipus had produced.
A Virtual Space of the Populous Desert

“Make the desert, the steppe grow; do not depopulate it, quite the contrary” --Gilles Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 417 We will seek to literalize the metaphor of the populous desert in Deleuze’s writings by creating a virtual desert in GoogleMaps, situated in the coastal fjords of Greenland’s northern tundra, as a collaborative space through which a text can grow from the middle through the proliferation of nodes with multiple points of entry for any process of reading. This conceptual desert will serve a space of play for Deleuze’s thought, where the relations between different concepts can be inferred ludically, as the eye and cursor move from one location-node to the next, revealing/concealing a spontaneously reader-constructed narrative of ideas in a rhizomatic flow. This space of play will be collaborative rather than competitive and the presentation at the conference will create a visibility incentive for users to join a virtual community of play to combine and juxtapose Deleuzian concepts and programs, not in theory but in the actual building of virtual pathways; as the fjords bifurcate along the satellite photographs of the melting ice-flows we will situate moments to think the undecidability of a philosophy of pure terms and relations. Drawing on Todd May’s writing on genealogy and employing literal forms of nomadic thought to populate our desert, our presentation will chart the growth of the map itself as it overtakes and yields to the smooth space of becoming even as we are re-assert a meshwork of immobile striation. Our paper will be in the form of this map, our presentation will be a nomadic tracing. This project will further seek to provoke reflection on the process of visually translating text into a digital map-space through a community of play in order to gauge the possibilities of creating a virtual hypertext-meshwork translation of Capitalism and Schizophrenia onto a GoogleMap or Sid Meier’s Civilization mapspace. This translation would serve as a reflexive bibliography-genealogy, assembling the text’s source-material alongside fragment chunks of the works themselves at different nodes through inter-spliced hyperlinks in non-linear combinations with its progeny; works of art, architecture and textual philosophy inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s writing in these two volumes. Our presentation will thus seek a critical response from panelists and audience members to design and smooth the contours of such a community of play among interested critical academics, artists and activists.
This paper inserts its tongue into Deleuze; discerning a singular Möbius surface ever conditioning one side of swallowing corporeal edibility and, the other, of talking incorporeal language; i.e., between to eat to speak. In terms of the Third Series of LS, taste is degree Z, ever conditioning the infinite hypothetical syllogism of Deleuzian propositions. Though sad it is to be fed up with “swallowing with your mouth, talking with your tongue,” (TP 150-1) there are yet inexplicable tastes still accessible to BwOs, schizophrenics, and minor science. Deterritorialized BwOs move “according to tastes it has succeeded in abstracting from a Self” (TP, 157). There is a “schizophrenic taste” (TP, 403) for tools/ weapons and minor science continually enriches major science with “its sense of and taste for matter.” The paper reads the Fourth Series of LS alongside The Descent of Man; emphasizing the differences between Carroll’s duck and Darwin’s duck (both of which find frogs and worms) in order to find a taste that doesn’t eat. Thinking things as tastable rather than edible, along with the taste of (oneSelf; one’s mouth/teeth) the phenomenon of speaking, further illuminates the simultaneity of corporeal denotation and incorporeal expression; as well as the impossible oralities of the anorexic and the BwO.
In Cinema 2, Gilles Deleuze puts forward the notion of the time-image, which, broadly speaking, involves a cinema in which planes of time are seen to co-exist simultaneously. The emphasis in Deleuze’s work seems to be on the co-existence of past and present, an analysis of time that finds its roots in the work of Henri Bergson.

Bergson’s conception of time is one based upon difference and becoming; that is to say, time itself is an open process that sees the present-actual come into being from an immanent-virtual, which itself is amorphous and undetermined. In a couple of footnotes in Cinema 2, Deleuze also relates his consideration of the time-image to Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers’ work, Order out of Chaos.

In Order out of Chaos, the authors present a similar conception of time, in which time can be understood as a process of becoming à la Bergson. And in the same work, Prigogine and Stengers mention but give little space to Hugh Everett’s many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.

In this paper, however, I should like to take up Everett’s interpretation of time as it has been deployed in the work of other scientists (Davies; Kaku; Greene), which sees not just past and present co-exist, but also multiple/infinite possible futures. By adopting this many worlds interpretation as it applies to time, we can begin to challenge Prigogine and Stengers and Bergson’s seemingly shared notion that the future is indefinite and put forward a theory of all possible times as (pre-)determined.

In turn, this allows us to reconsider the time-image in cinema as one involving the co-existence of not just past and present, but also that of multiple/infinite ‘possible’ futures. This notion might have particular importance when we try to theorise the ‘spatial montage’ of digital special effects as a new kind of time image.
Histories of Feminism as a Plane of Immanence:

Feminist philosophy has produced some powerful critiques of Hegelian dialectical accounts of history. Yet, when it comes to the history of feminism itself, the predominant organizing metaphor - of different ‘waves’ of feminism - re-inscribes a dialectical structure of oppositions, subsumption and linearity. The story goes like this: first wave ‘equality feminism’ gives way to second wave ‘difference feminism’, and both become subsumed within the postmodern rhetoric of the contemporary third wave. The ‘wave’ model has recently been subject to much feminist interrogation; however, few alternative historical models and methodologies have been proposed.

This paper will critically explore the possibilities of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of ‘rhizomatics’, and ‘planes of immanence’, for approaching, narrating and archiving histories of feminism. For example, conceiving of the history of feminism as a plane of immanence may work as a form of theoretical resistance to being folded into mainstreaming history, contemporary zeitgeist politics, and myths of postfeminism. We might thus conceive of feminism as operating according to the trajectories and speeds of its own logics, concepts and problems. A rhizomatic approach may also engender encounters and alliances, within feminist thought and practice, across generational and historical lines. These possibilities will be considered in relation to concrete historical events and archival projects.

Fashion: identities-in-becoming

This paper explores the dynamic relationship between fashion and identities from a deleuzian perspective, focusing on the concept of “becoming”. On the one hand, fashion provides the possibility to play with fluid, formless identities and to continuously become-other and transform the self by changing clothes. On the other hand, fashion has the potential to ‘solidify the fluid, to give form to the formless’ (Bauman 2000), and to create semi-fixed identities – temporal beings as a momentary status of becoming (Holland 2009).

Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a “facial machine” (Deleuze & Guattari 2004 [1980]), which functions as an abstract machine that produces prefab faces that individuals slip into, gives a fruitful perspective on fashion as a potential “identity machine”. This paper views the self as ‘forever being “caught”, frozen, temporally fixed by fashion’ (Entwistle 2000), while simultaneously looking at fashion as a phenomenon that is continuously playing with the creative potential and fluid dimension of identities. The weekly columns by Aynouk Tan, a Dutch fashionista who dresses up differently every week - expressing the desire to temporarily become someone else, function as an illustrative case study of the process of identities-in-becoming through fashion.
The Videogame Image: A Phenomenological reading of Deleuze's Movement-image

Within the last couple of years, attempts have been made to use the work of Gilles Deleuze to study computer games. Authors make use of theories of virtuality, becomings and affect to describe game play, progress through games and build-up of game space as very fluid elements. This contrasts the general tendency within game studies to analyse games as formal systems that present themselves to the player through pre-set rules and representations. Attention for the work of Deleuze offers a more open understanding of games. This facilitates studies of their unpredictable nature and embodiment of players.

An Affair of Perception: Deleuze and the Visual Field.

This paper investigates Deleuze and Guattari’s assertion that schizoanalysis is an affair of perception. It first of all asks what this means and then traces the implications of this statement for the development of schizoanalysis as a method for doing critical and cultural studies. The overall aim of the paper is to begin to map out a set of methodological principles for a ‘practical Deleuzism’.
Are there pictures of the immanent in organisms?

The understanding of physiological processes depends on the scientist’s image of interaction and the type of abstraction he uses to map the relations between organic elements. The concept and connection of the movement and time image tries to bring consciousness and dynamics into theory of reactivity and higher phenomena. The creative image renders time-body-space relations sensible and visible. A particular analogical, associative or ‘agogic’ logic or relation is necessary to expand our atomic view into an archetypical perspective. Like in the imagery of Jakob Böhme, Nicolaus Cusanus or Robert Fludd, certain sacral neoplatonic geometries allow us to look behind the screen of structured material and have a glance at the productive immanence of becoming and unfolding. ‘Relations of time are never seen in ordinary perception, but they are seen in the image, as long as it is a creative one’ (Pisters). The body–soul system should be looked at atomistically and associatively – just these dual foci enable us to dissolve the broader perspective between inner and outer worlds or between body and spirit. To see relations allows imagination to take control. That this is no contradiction, the tradition of imagination has shown in history. Can Deleuze’s concepts of the movement and time image therefore lead to a holistic physiology?

Interdisciplinarity and the ‘Girling’ of the Academy

Gilles Deleuze could be writing about interdisciplinary scholarship when he describes the contestation of Alice’s personal identity and loss of a proper name in Logic of Sense: “Which way, which way?” asks Alice, sensing that it has always been in both directions at the same time” (3). We may embrace the trend toward interdisciplinarity and the exciting opportunities to connect, continue and create scholarly work across disciplinary boundaries, yet at times it seems as though we have fallen down the proverbial rabbit hole. What is an interdisciplinary scholar, and what is our role as scholars of ‘the in-between’ in an academy divided into disciplines? In this paper I explore these questions in light of Deleuze’s concept of the ‘girl.’ Indeed, I argue that the interdisciplinary scholar is a girl, in the sense of a vanishing line or line of flight in her loss of identity, ceaseless becoming, pure haeccty and breakneck speed. “Girls” moreover, “do not belong to an … order, or kingdom; they slip in everywhere” (Thousand Plateaus, 277). If these are terms by which we might understand scholars trained in interdisciplinary programs, then what is our relation to the academy and to academic disciplines?
Why a repetition of becoming-woman? The answer is simple and may be posed in the form of another question: how is it that so many commentators who duly stress Deleuze and Guattari’s stipulation that becoming has nothing to do with imitation, reproduction or mimesis, nonetheless end up referring the notion of becoming-woman and the conceptual persona of the girl to "stereotypes" of femininity, understanding the creation of a molecular or micro-femininity to consist—to quote one exegete—"in reproducing the characteristic features, movements or affects of what passes for 'the feminine' in a given form of patriarchal society"?

Making becoming-woman fundamentally a process of mimesis or, say, a form of "feminine masquerade" to the second degree which would ultimately effect a revaluation of the very category of the feminine, such an interpretation bears, as a result, a similarity to positions such as that of Judith Butler advocating deconstructive gender performativity as a way of revealing gender norms, or "molar feminine traits", to be socially constructed constraints presupposing and pre-empting the possibilities of imaginable and realizable gender configurations within culture. Yet this is to basically attribute to singularities a status of "micro-repetition" of molar traits of femininity—whereby the same traits are reiterated on a molecular level—which is equally to say that becoming thereby assumes a certain status of repetition.

Such a positioning of becoming-woman must be seen to not only to radically misunderstand the spatio-temporal determination of the ‘singularities’ proper to becoming-woman but, equally, the very notion of becoming as a mode of repetition constitutive, not of the past, but of the future.

We need, then, to return to the category of becoming-woman to clarify the very concept of becoming and not to content ourselves with including difference as a variant within (an enlarged field of) the Same.
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Title paper Colonial Pasts – Differential Futures
Abstract Relegated to a brief section in the introduction to Absolutely Postcolonial, Hallward claims that, like fellow Caribbean writer Édouard Glissant, the novels of Wilson Harris ought to be read as decidedly ‘singularising’; ‘anticipat[ing] Deleuze’ even. This paper interrogates Hallward’s account of these two postcolonial writers by rereading their theoretical and literary writings along Deleuzian lines as a positive differentiation of an immanent totality that is at once both actual and virtual. Drawing on Hallward’s later critique of Deleuze in Out of This World, I argue that it is precisely the profound creativity and drive towards the new associated with differentiation that marks the real significance of Deleuze’s thought for postcolonial studies. Far from remaining ambivalent to the role of past trauma in shaping the postcolonial present, Glissant and Harris see in trauma and oppression a potentiality to re-dress historical antagonisms and create something new: a ‘prophetic vision of the past’ (Glissant). Elaborating a transformative vision of a future that maintains the ability to become something new, Glissant and Harris engage with Deleuze at a fundamental level and challenge Hallward’s criticism. Rereading postcoloniality as a differential actualisation of the (virtual) past offers a means to conceive of a genuinely original present/future in which the colonial past co-exists as a disjunctive factor, understood as a caesura or break.

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Title paper Electric musictheatre and open forms
Abstract Introduced by Dick Raaijmakers at the interfaculty ArtScience in The Hague, the term electric musictheatre emerged from collaborations with the theatre-group Hollandia in the beginning of the 1990s. Raaijmakers’ oeuvre covers a wide variety of genres and styles, varying from sound animations for films to extremely abstract pulse structures, from “action music” to infinite voice patterns, from electro-acoustic tableau vivants to extracts of music theatre. He is considered as someone who combines disciplines such as visual art, film, literature and theatre with the world of music. Raaijmakers has created numerous electronic compositions, “instructional pieces” for string ensembles, phono-kinetic objects, “graphic methods” for tractor and bicycle, “operations” for tape, film, theatre, percussion ensemble, museum and performance, artworks for offices and conservatory, and many soundscape compositions and music theatre productions, including some for the Holland Festival and for theatre company Hollandia. His theoretical essays are evidence of his profound interest in special intermedia connections.

As author, Dick Raaijmakers published texts (‹M›, ‹Method›) describing relations between open forms, art forms, technologies and society. For this conference, I will relate Raaijmakers perspective on electric musictheatre to Deleuze and his writings on film.

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Title paper: The Expression of Time: Deleuze, Spinoza, Cinema

Abstract: In this paper I argue a) that Spinoza is the foundational philosophical reference point of Deleuze’s two-volume study of the cinema, b) that in this study Deleuze produces the Spinozian theory of time which Spinoza himself was not able (i.e., was not yet in a position) to conceptualize, as well as c) that it was only with the emergence of the cinema that such a theory of time could be at all produced. Rather than denying or minimizing the undoubted importance that Bergson has for Deleuze’s understanding of the cinema, my argument, rather, aims to complement existing scholarship on Deleuze’s two-volume study by tracing the veritably ubiquitous presence not only of Spinoza’s thought but also of Deleuze’s earlier work on Spinoza (i.e., Spinoza et le problème de l’expression) in it. Through close readings of exemplary passages in Deleuze’s study of the cinema—as well as by referring to crucial moments both in his study of Spinoza and in his Logique du sens—I show how what Deleuze calls “expression” constitutes the conceptual foundation of his approach to the cinema. I argue that expression is structuring of both the movement-image and the time-image, as well as that what is expressed differently in both types of images is time (understood as the unchanging form of all that changes). Put schematically: in Spinoza et le problème de l’expression, Deleuze articulates two triads of expression (a virtual or substantial one, and an actual or modal one) which may be encapsulated in the following manner: 1) substance expresses itself, attribute is its expression, and the essence of substance is that which is expressed; 2) attribute expresses itself, mode is its expression, and a modification of substance is that which is expressed. The latter becomes the matrix of Cinéma 1, where we find the actual or historical triad of time: time expresses itself, the movement-image is its expression, and a modification of time is that which is expressed (namely, change, diachronicity, history). And in Cinéma 2, we find a reformulation of the former as the virtual or ontological triad of time: time expresses itself, the time-image is its expression, and the essence of time is that which is expressed (namely, form of change, synchronicity, eternity). Last yet not least, these two triads (i.e., these two different procedures of expressing time) are also immanent to one another and are to be found implicit in any image whatever as its temporal tendencies, but could not become fully available and even dominant (phenomenologically or otherwise) without the advent of cinema in the first place.
Amores Perros, the debut feature film of Alejandro Gonzalez Inarritu in 2000, is a breakthrough film in Mexican film industry. Its commercial and critical success can be attributed to its freshness, timing on release, advertisement campaign and spatial aesthetics which visually and thematically merge the local and the global, places and non-places, and striation of different degrees. Amores Perros was released just two weeks before the election, which brought an end to more than seventy years of the PRI government. Mexicans were enthusiastic by the prospects of a new government, and the campaign for Amores Perros as being a “change” from previous Mexican films undoubtedly also appealed to local audiences. In this film, a car crash in Mexico City results in the clash of three perspectives drawn from three diverse socio-economic milieus. Each characters’ existence leaks into one another’s milieu and segment. The bringing-together of the protagonists also brings the characters closer to their dogs, to the extent of becoming-animal. It is through becoming that physical bodies of the protagonists are empowered to occupy space differently and to have the potential of transcending the confinement of space.

Octavio becomes the dog Cofi in the process of transforming Cofi into a killer. In a different manner, after the car accident, Valeria becomes her poodle Richi. Among these three characters it is only El Chivo who is able to take lines of flight from becoming and deterritorialises himself. Having abandoned the “place” that he shares with his wife and daughter for idealism, he wanders in various non-places as a guerrilla fighter and latterly as a prisoner. Through becoming, El Chivo and the dog Cofi form a block and coexist on the two sides of a plane. In Deleuze’s framework of the intensive and the extensive, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, the nomad is the person who constantly creates spaces through the trajectories of their journeys from one place to another (Tom Conley 258-9). El Chivo is this kind of nomad, who transcends social classes by transforming himself from an elite college teacher into a guerrilla fighter, then a vagabond who lives on collecting recyclable trash and a hired killer. This paper aims to discuss El Chivo’s body transformation and deterritorialisation on screen, and investigate the mapping of becoming between the socio-political context and El Chivo in the diegetic world.
The past one and a half centuries have seen growing importance placed on research in Lewis Carroll’s Victorian nonsense texts. Many dominant strands of current Carroll scholarship have seen, as Carroll did in his comic discussion of language, the paradoxical problem that slippage between things and names might arise when nonsense speaks against meaning. In the wake of the Nonsense School of Criticism, Jean-Jacques Lecercle and Gilles Deleuze apply different approaches to their respective studies of Carroll’s works of Victorian nonsense. In Lecercle’s Philosophy of Nonsense, Carroll’s intuition is highly credited with its powerful dissolution of sense and multiplication of meaning, and synchronic, diachronic accounts of nonsense as a literary genre are given to deal with intuitions of nonsense, and to explain the emergence of nonsense in the Victorian context. On the other hand, Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, first published in 1969, is a study of a philosophy of events being played out along one after another series, and its critical theory of sense is built around Lewis Carroll’s paradoxical playfulness with language. According to Deleuze, an event proceeds by virtue of its interaction with the paradoxical two-sided series from which a convergence with or a divergence from the next series can take place. The purpose of this article is to examine Carroll’s paradox through Lecercle’s study of intuition and Deleuze’s theory of sense.

This presentation makes an assemblage of Deleuze-Guattari’s thought and Harold Pinter’s drama. Analysts of Pinter’s plays often attend to the interplay between spoken language and physical gesture, striking analogies between theatre and music via the language of rhythm, motif, cadence and movement. In order to endow this critical discourse with the force necessary to reorient ourselves to Pinter’s aesthetics, I will screen and read brief selections from Pinter’s plays through the lens of Deleuze-Guattari’s conception of rhythm in Chapter 11 of A Thousand Plateaus. Using ‘1837: Of the Refrain’, I will reassess the notion of rhythm in Pinter and argue that the rhythm(s) of both his stage dialogue and his characters’ bodies are not separable, parallel or hierarchized – as most critics treat them – but mutually immanent vectors; and as such they suggest the possibility of a Deleuzian in-between. Pinter’s aestheticisation of the rhythm, movement and intensity of speech and of the bodies on stage forms a unique dramatic constellation and style that establishes conditions propitious for the engenderment of affective experience. Assembling Deleuze-Guattari and Pinter in this way bolsters the nascent project of bringing Deleuze to performance and theatre and, for the first time, brings Deleuzian thought to Harold Pinter’s drama.
This proposal grew out of a desire to explore the seeming contradiction between a genetic code that determines the characteristics of an entity and the idea of a real inorganization, as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari envision in Anti-Oedipus, in which “the partial objects do not refer in the least to an organism that would function phantasmatically as a lost unity or a totality to come” (324). In Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, Deleuze affirms the same idea from the term “pure immanence,” which, as John Rajchman explains in the introduction he writes for the book, “immanence is pure only when it is not immanent to a prior subject or object, mind or matter, only when, neither innate nor acquired, it is always yet “in the making” (13). One might wonder how these conditions of dispersion, of real distinction, and of the absence of a link permit any machinic regime or a code to exist. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, “a code implies two things—one or the other, or the two together: on the one hand, the specific determination of the full body as a territoriality of support; on the other hand, the erection of a despotic signifier on which the entire chain depends” (Anti-Oedipus 327). In the paper I will use translation from DNA to protein to tackle issues surrounding the above ideas, linking them particularly to body.

According to Deleuze, peripheral cinemas—as the Thirld World Cinemas-, were always cinemas of memory. South-american films, and film studies, are at this moment a very intense and important field in the way of thinking how and why a philosophy of cinema and memory, as deleuzean, is applied and reinvent to construct an epistemology of visual in peripheral cinemas and theories. After the last dictatorship in Argentina (1976-1983) the emergences of a new memory cinema (with authors like María Luisa Bemberg, Lita Stantik, Héctor Olivera, Luis Puenzo) had a different perspective and experience that one of the Third World Cinema (or New Latin American Cinema) that Deleuze evokes in Time-Image as the cinema of the becoming people and that was interrupted. Today, with young directors like Albertina Carri, Lucrecia Martel, Lucia Puenzo, and the important documentary movement and colectivos, a new multiplicity of challenges is present. Memory images, where the question of the cinema as a language and philosophy of the body always remind us to the problem of the missing people, or desaparecidos, are becoming a space of new subjectivities, new minorities, where bodies, gazes, diversities, and memories, configure new subjects of a cinema enunciation or fourth personal singular.
Globalized Violence and Intensity – The Case of Israeli Close-Combat

How is globalization actually achieved? How do we all come to watch the same soap operas, eat the same hamburger, and how do we all come to feel threatened by world terror? More often than not globalization reduces content to intensity. Intensities of violence, sex, suffering and money travel well between cultures. Globalization flattens many aspects of life, albeit through subtle means, to mere intensities stripped of all symbolism, representation, specificity and content. Correspondingly, much of globalization is practiced through reducing complex issues into somatically bound affects produced by shifts in intensity. Tour and Train brings together participants from all around the world to visit Israel and train in Israeli close-combat techniques, developed by the Israeli Defense Forces, particularly to counter terror. Yet, how can a beaten house wife from California, and policemen from Trinidad and Croatia – participants of Tour and Train – train together in an Israeli military expertise, while describing their predicament, and the solutions to it, as being of the same type? This feat is achieved through radical, unexpected, violent shifts in intensity. Through these transformative forces all participants come to share a human body placed in a situation of vulnerability, susceptible to injury, and ultimately to death.

Deleuze’s Unfinished Project: Sets and Multiplicities.

From the 1980s onwards Deleuze began increasingly writing about sets. Just prior to his death in 1995 he was writing Sets and Multiplicities, which addressed logical sets in Frege and Russell’s work. The Actual and the Virtual survives from this unfinished project. In this essay Deleuze makes it clear that a set for him is a multiplicity in the Bergsonian sense. There are quasi-closed extensive sets, and open intensive sets – actual and virtual multiplicities.

This paper proposes a re-reading of Deleuze’s major work Logic of Sense (1969) in the light of his more explicit later engagement with sets. I will identify in this book what I see as a Bergsonian methodology re-working the Fregeian and Russellian notions of sets.

I will conclude by asking to what extent Deleuze can be credited with thoughtfully connecting with the discipline of modern logic, and to what extent it can be argued that this is just another case of him over-coding and “capturing” a discipline in his philosophical net.
This presentation combines three components of making and thinking about art and territory. Firstly, Lorna Collins will give a presentation which explores why and how art helps us think about territory, using the painting event as a territorial gesture, drawing on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and the paintings of Xéna Lee. Secondly, Xéna Lee will produce a painting in response to this presentation. Xéna's painting will be made on a scroll of paper on the wall using charcoal and pastel. Thirdly, we will invite the audience to make an artwork in response to both the presentation and the painting. The audience will be asked to observe, reflect, and consider what mark they will make in response to the presentation, the painting, and the territory which arises from this encounter, with a coloured marker on a small piece of transparency (approx. 4”x 6” each). This mark can be a dot, a line, a curve, or a shape, but the audience is asked to summarise their response into a simple mark at the end. These transparencies will then be collected. After the talk, Xéna’s large drawing will be removed and then fixed onto another wall. The transparencies will then be arranged in a composition over three projectors and be projected onto Xéna’s composition on paper. All three components of this presentation then meet in this installation, which forms an encounter with territory joined by rhizomatic connections across three plateaus of participation (audience, speaker, painter) and method (presentation, painting, collective artwork). Together we begin to make sense of the haecceity of territory and art through geophilosophy.
Life is primarily a machine of thinking and manufacturing disorder. Deleuze & Guattari’s concept “machines” becomes clear in Milles Plateaus’ mathematical, physical and aesthetic models. Yet, Deleuze’s continuously unfolding monad “complexity” can be traced as an immanent seed that permeates all his work. Considering the proposition that life emerged because open systems constantly exchange mass and energy while pulled by an unpredictable or differentiating time, every new creation will only be used by life if connected to this unpredictable time. Structured Beings then, in order to stay connected to the continuous unfolding of space and time need to reconfigure, through iteration and differentiation, their relation with time and resolve structure’s tendency (once formed) to sedentarization. But human consciousness, in order to persevere, manipulates this complex machine and adds Oedipalization. Smoothing itself will not solve this colossal problem, “never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us.” While matter differentiates space-time in order to recreate itself, life makes use of complexity to connect all forms of models (real and virtual). In the human case, Deleuze proposes the Spinozist spirited-body solution, which survives (as the focus of this essay) on a production of intensity centered in an overconcentration of willpower from a chaotic and creative relation with art, science, and philosophy.

In his book, New Philosophy for New Media, Mark Hansen argues that Gilles Deleuze has disembodied the ‘centre of indetermination’ by setting the cinema as homologous with the flux of images from which selection takes place, therefore locating perception and affection outside the subject and in the machine assemblage of cinematographic images. Hansen argues that ‘the montage cut and the frame – both central in the first volume of Deleuze’s study remain homologous to the diminution that constitutes perception on Bergson’s account’. In turn, Hansen foregrounds the rubric of the ‘Bergsonist vocation’ which focuses on deploying Bergson’s embodied understanding of the centre of indetermination and redeeming it from the ‘assault Deleuze wages against it.’ Hansen takes this as the theoretical basis for his exploration of new media art. Here, our aim is to show that Hansen has departed the Bergsonism theory that is central to his book, and that his work is fundamentally influenced by the phenomenological perspective seen in the work of Francisco Varela whose approach is in turn indebted to Merleau-Ponety. As the paper will go on to argue, in effect, Hansen has misinterpreted Bergson’s theory of perception in Matter and Memory.
Between 1966 and 1993 German composer Helmut Lachenmann (born 1935) developed a complex set of concepts (‘thesis’, ‘conditions’ and ‘typologies’) around the ideas of “What is composing?”, “Which are the conditions of the music material?”, “What is art making?”, and “What are the political implications of Art?”. More than a closed system on contemporary Aesthetics, Lachenmann envisaged the concrete practice of composing – defining his own route, and giving insight into his “musique concrète instrumentale”, a music that ought to liberate the energetic potential of concrete (immanent) sound bodies and processes.

Several aspects of Lachenmann’s theories point to an understanding of the conditions of creation, and to an idea of radical immanence of the music material that approaches some of the key concepts of Gilles Deleuze. In spite of the fact that references to Deleuze’s Philosophy do not appear in Lachenmann’s writings (his main references being Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno and Georg Lukács) it is our aim to enable an encounter between Deleuze’s ideas on Creation and Haecceity of the material and Lachenmann’s typologies of New Music.

Starting with Lachenmann’s “three thesis on composing” and proceeding to the “Four conditions of the music material” our presentation will focus on the following Lachenmann (HL) – Deleuze (GD) contiguities:

- “Reflection upon music material”(HL) / “Diagnostic function of art”(GD);
- “To build an instrument”(HL) / “Write for a people still to come”(GD);
- “Let oneself come” (HL) / “Desiring machines”, “Affects”, “BwO” (GD);
- “Tonality” (HL) / “Opinion”, “Cliché” (GD);
- “Corporeity” (HL) / “Capture of forces”, “Corporeity” (GD);
- “Structure” (HL) / “Fold”, “Un - fold” (GD);
- “Aura” (HL) / Semiotics, Psychoanalysis (GD & FG).
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Title paper: Segmentary Lines of Chineseness and Tozer Pak's Micropolitics of the Mundane
Abstract: My paper takes as its object of study “Chinese” contemporary art, aligning this with the writings of Rey Chow and Gilles Deleuze. Prices of Contemporary Chinese art have skyrocketed over the past five years. I aim in my paper to show, first, how the performance of ethnic difference is played out in the Chinese artistic field, and, second, how the Chinese nation-state skilfully accommodates critical voices as to further strengthen its global position. Chineseness has become a crucial segmentary line, an ethnic trading card that lubricates the financial and ideological flows between the global art world, the Beijing cultural scene and the Chinese nation-state. In the third part of my paper, I will show how Hong Kong complicates this picture, given that the claim to ethnic difference for Hong Kong artists is bound to be incomplete and impure. The work of conceptual artist Tozer Pak explores artistic lines of flight out of the issue of Chineseness and its intricate links with an enchanted mode of global capitalism. It does so by engaging in what I like to term a micropolitics of the banal and the mundane that are firmly located in the here and now – which may help to move away from the overcoded language of ethnicity and Chineseness.

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Title paper: 'The Laws of Creation: Following Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy of Law
Abstract: An old cliché must die: the one stating that Gilles Deleuze's philosophy was hostile to law. On the contrary, from its very early age, Deleuze always nourished a strong admiration for the practice of law, and never ceased to elaborate on the kind of contrast that law offered towards philosophy. He even went as far as to state that law might very well be the actual realization of what philosophy was only the virtual program. That is: law might very well be the future of philosophy - a future already present. Why? Simply because the everyday reality of law is precisely the kind a casuistic longed for by Deleuze under the heading 'transcendantal empiricism'. Starting from cases in order to proceed to a free and savage creation of principles (Leibniz' 'Universal Jurisprudence'), the practice of law subverts not only the transcendant understanding of Law which is too often defended by philosophers (and lawyers alike), but also the entire pretence of philosophy to be able to formulate the truth of law through its own language. Except, of course, if one assumes - as Deleuze did - that such a recognition of law's irreductible creativity can only be performed by philosophy itself. Law is the future of philosophy? Yes. But only if there is a philosopher to pretend that, if philosophy cannot pretend reach the truth of law, law may well be the incarnation of the truth of philosophy. And this philosopher, of course, was Deleuze himself.
As it explores the theme of madness in a mental institution, Samuel Fuller’s Shock Corridor (1963) levels off culturally produced differences between sanity and insanity by identifying desire as a thoroughly schizophrenic activity in both sane and insane subjects. A forceful example of Fuller’s practice of cinema as war, Shock Corridor performs the synthetic process of non-Oedipal desire by highlighting the connective ties between psychic and social desiring machines. In this film, the protagonist’s rational story of murder detection and professional advancement is hijacked by his fellow inmates’ manifold delirious stories/images and by the rhizomatic, potentially infinite, connections these stories draw with the world. The inmates’ images of delirium enact a deterritorialized flow of global history as it intersects with 1960s American history. These hallucinatory images function as part-objects, rings in chains of machinic connections that the inmates establish between American historical events such as the Civil War, the Korean War, racial segregation and the nuclear arms race, and other cultures both connected and disconnected from American history.

The inmates’ schizo consumption of historical names passes through a distillation of the affective forces that circulate in history, and in that process, they liberate the affects from the paralyzing formations of the capitalist social machinery. The private event of the murder under investigation opens up in a rhizomatic way to the multiple brutalities of American history, accomplishing a mutual schizophrenization of psychic and social desiring-machines. Shock Corridor thus transmutes the US paranoiac mission of war and colonialism into a schizo-revolutionary cinematic event.

The chaotic scrambling of national, temporal and spatial codes in this film speaks to a refusal to rationalize violence or to contain it within the moralizing binary of action-reaction. This lack of temporal, spatial, or moral containment allows me to draw an interesting contrast between the schizodynamics of violence and desire in Shock Corridor and the repression of libidinal forces involved in our contemporary war machines.
Deleuze’s metaphysics and metaphilosophy is informed as much by a series of visionary and experimental modern artists as it is by the perspectives of Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Bergson. In particular, the works of Artaud, Lawrence, and Michaux indicate that to write, to think, to create, and indeed to live in modern times one must undergo powerfully transformative personal experiences, from which one returns, as Deleuze and Guattari put it in What is Philosophy?, “with bloodshot eyes.” In this presentation I will attempt to trace some of the ways in which Deleuze’s key concept of expression in metaphysics and metaphilosophy is cultivated in the context of a life-long encounter with the literature, anthropology, and indeed with the personal experiences of intense ordeal such as those shamanistic, magical, and ritual traditions Deleuze’s modernist comrades underwent. As Deleuze’s concept of expression evolves through considerations of symbols, ideas, and signs, he explores possible strategies for diagramming the transformative possibilities of the virtual in its immanent potentiality, a potential that is always as much spiritual as material. My purpose here will be to suggest that the question of spiritual experience in
Abstract

In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze suggests that: ‘Writers, poets, musicians, filmmakers—painters too, even chance readers—may find that they are Spinozists; indeed, such a thing is more likely for them than for professional philosophers’ (PP, p.129)

Whether we accept this rather provocative claim, or simply put it down to the French enthusiasm for Spinoza in the late sixties and early seventies, I believe that Deleuze does attempt to support this position in his own writing on the arts. Perhaps it is in the writing on music in A Thousand Plateaus where this is most explicit. Here, it is proposed that music’s interest in rhythm is an aesthetic concern that it shares with painting, one that informs the act of aesthetic composition. I believe that it is this interest and conception of rhythm that brings us closer to understanding what Deleuze means when he describes various kinds of artists as ‘Spinozists’.

In the so called ‘physical digression’ of Ethics (E 2 P13), Spinoza adumbrates his account of individuation and suggests that individuals arise when modes of extension move at the same rate. What is radical about this account, and why it departs decisively from other early modern accounts of individuation, is that it conceives individuation as taking place exclusively at the level of modes. Moreover, as it is only ‘motion and rest’ that is able to individuate extended modes, bodies can be only individuated by the movement of their basic elements.

This paper will examine Spinoza’s conception of motion and rest and will compare this with Deleuze’s notion of rhythm. Although rhythm clearly forms an important part of Deleuze’s account of music, its use in his conception of painting has remained relatively unexplored. Perhaps it is in Deleuze’s most sustained engagement with painting, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, that this neglect is most apparent.

While Spinoza’s name does not appear in this text, the concept of rhythm is constantly used to show how the paintings are able to connect diverse, individual rhythms and to explain the function of the triptych in Bacon’s work. First, I will give a brief, expository account of Spinoza’s ‘physical digression’, noting the connection with the account of the infinite immediate mode given in Letter 64; second, I will explore how ‘rhythm’ and ‘motion and rest’ may be comparable concepts in Deleuze and Spinoza’s texts; finally, I will examine how Deleuze’s conception of rhythm is used in his account of Bacon’s work.
With the eleventh of his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’—“Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”—Marx produced the infinitely glossed formula of left wing voluntarism, one that still survives even in the most heterodox restates of Marxism. On the commonplace “it’s possible to change the world”—see Obama’s successful and perhaps misleading slogan “Yes We Can”—lays the clarifying statement of voluntarism as a program, in which becomes clear the predetermination of action as a plan or according to a goal. In what might be the most brilliant essay concerning Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy, the late François Zourabichvili announced the yet unseen powers of a left wing involuntarism. Involuntarism should be understood as based on a profound and persistent divergence about the actualization scheme, in which the possible, whose realization is taken as exhausted, has to be conceived differently, as something to be created...

Giorgio Agamben has developed, especially in the ‘Homo Sacer’ series—and closely following Michel Foucault’s first exploits on biopolitics and archaeological method—what is by far the most striking contemporary political theory. Such biopolitical theory has the decisive advantage of revealing extreme and marginal figures of contemporary democracies—such as euthanasia, refugees, closed gate communities, security devices, animal research, biometrics, temporary detention centres, bioethics, etc.—to be after all confluent phenomena of a true biopolitical order reigning among us, and ultimately showing the profound ineffectiveness of the political spectrum not only to ascertain these problems but also to grasp the possible answers political action might give them. Notwithstanding the comprehensive capacity of biopolitical theory, Agamben’s intrinsic penchant for paradoxes and paradigms—much to the dissatisfaction of some anxious readers—cannot seem to surpass its “negative” stance and (finally?) suggest “positive” lines of action, i.e., concrete political hypothesis or solutions to the biopolitical state of the world. Agamben’s obsessive playfulness with the concept/category of possible should be taken as one more hint to the growingly necessary theoretical interference between Deleuze’s ontology of involuntarism and biopolitics.
Abstract
The mouth, in Deleuze, comes back in a series of relations. The mouth is linked to the brain, to language, to the mother's breast, to the anus. It can be the incorporeal crack that deterritorializes, that opens up the body and nourishes it with every possible world. Yet all too often the mouth is coded, overcoded and disciplined by (outside) forces that set themselves to delimit and distribute its power, that set themselves to shutting it up. Focusing primarily on how the mouth is at work in the Logic of Sense (and in its references to Melanie Klein) this paper sets itself to finding out how the mouth can be released from “excremental food and withdrawn voices” (LoS: 223), from all of those machines in which it usually functions. In search for the mouth as pure desire, as the locus of the necessary incompleteness of life, our goal would be to find out how the mouth produces succession through a reciprocal exteriority, and at the same time, an internal duree. Our manifesto will revitalize the mouth by moving between two of Mike Parr’s performances (A Hundred Breaths and From the Water to the Mouth) eventually allowing us to release the mouth, from the bodies in which it works, into pure independence. Only thus it can reveal us the secrets of creation crucial for life to take place.

Abstract
Our aim is to link Deleuze’s concept of “face/close-up” (visage/gros plan) to the machine (mask-face-eyes) that Franju establishes in “The eyes without a face”. If, as Deleuze remarks in “The Movement-Image”, every close-up is already a “face”, probably Franju’s goes a step further: in the aforementioned film, Franju doesn’t looks after a face, he rather searches for what lies underneath a face and beyond all prosthesis. Deleuze wrote in “Logic of sensation” that every suffering man is animal flesh (viande), while Franju’s suggests in “Blood of the Beasts” that animal glance at the moment of its sacrifice is like an human agony. Hence, in both works, suffering is the “zone of interference” between man and beast. Nevertheless Franju’s doesn’t want to humanize animals, he asks instead for the forces and becomings of eye and glance. The answer might come in a new type of image: the wound-image, thus an image beyond a face. Our final purpose is to link these suggestions to the problem of chirurgical power and the broader field of cosmetics in a kind of Deleuze-inspired aesthetical-politics. In order to make a sort of desire-machine in progress, along with our intervention, we will display a Franju’s films slideshow.
This paper aims to chart and explore the infiltration of desert warfare imagery in recent Hollywood cinema. Films directly ‘about’ the Iraq invasion of 2004 (such as The Hurt Locker) have become commonplace in recent years and are testament to a rapid ‘memorializing’ function of Hollywood cinema. However, more interesting are those film texts that are not war films per se, but nevertheless contain images of desert warfare. Taking Michael Bay’s Transformers cycle (2007 and 2009) as a test case this paper will go beyond a traditional ideological reading to suggest that such digital action cinema is prone to reconfigure such an event as the Iraq invasion in ‘schizophrenic’ ways, harbouring a kind of thought that exceeds ‘cultural memory’. Using Deleuze’s Bergsonism I contest that the imbrication of desert war imagery instead speaks of a ‘digital memory’, one that glimpses the virtual whilst dissolving the linear categories of past, present and future.

This paper seeks to mind the gap within and between haptic and scopic modes of perceiving as vital and potent ground between two potential opposites. Instead of such a binary, this paper proposes a space of becoming where mutuality and mutability are foregrounded. In its ubiquity textile is often taken to be fine art, craft and industrial product, a model which does not allow for the plasticity of textile as language, metaphor, signifier, maker of meaning and matter. This paper will explore the potential for textile to hold in tension an ambiguity, being simultaneously concept and stuff. This paper, through discussion of my own art practice, will consider the interactions, interweavings and/or interrelationships evident within and between the elements that constitute the broader notion of woven cloth, taking Deleuze and Guattari’s technological model of weaving as striated space as a point for departure. Necessarily, the art practice referenced is multi-disciplinary, covering video, installation, the handmade and conceptual practices. In considering the model, this paper proposes that text, textile and textile production can be said to enter into a process of cathexis. Such a relationship potentially transforms them in active participation with each other and artist/author.
Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism: Toward a Minor Science of Multiplicities

Deleuze’s distinctive philosophy presents a sustained engagement with the history and practice of empiricism. Addressed in relation to a novel set of interests and problems, Deleuze offers a characteristically inventive empiricism deeply antagonistic to the foundational assumptions of traditional empirical inquiry. Rather than denounce empiricism for its ‘naive’ grounding of all knowledge in sense impressions, Deleuze proposes a ‘transcendental empiricism’ more alert to the ‘the concrete richness of the sensible’. Deleuze draws from diverse sources in developing these themes including Hume, Bergson, Whitehead and Leibniz. Yet Deleuze largely avoids a definitive statement of the principal features of transcendental empiricism, rather these features must be pieced together from various passages and fragments. This paper seeks to identify the key facets of transcendental empiricism and their relevance for contemporary research in the social sciences. The exegesis of Deleuze’s empiricism will emphasise the conceptualisation of events, relations and affects. It will be argued that the analysis of events, relations and affects opens up the plurality of lived experience, offering new ways of exploring culture and subjectivity. The paper will close with a discussion of the application of Deleuze’s empiricism to select problems in the study of health and illness.
Abstract

How are we to understand the contemporary relation between physics and metaphysics? Over a century ago, Henri Bergson barely succeeded in articulating a harmonious, logical co-existence of metaphysics with the most advanced physics of his day. Yet by the first decades of the 20th century, the explosive rise of nuclear physics, configured by a statistical ode of knowledge, would shatter any philosophical pretensions to coherence. By 1922, in a public debate with Bergson, Albert Einstein famously declares that physics has no use for philosophy. Writing toward the end of the century, Deleuze and Guattari concede that if there is a philosophy for science, or a metaphysics for physics, it is really a matter for scientists hemselves. And yet, the stakes of contemporary physics is precisely to cosmological, religious, and metaphysical problems. In the case of the Large Hadron Collider, the world’s largest science experiment currently under way at CERN outside Geneva, physics re-enacts its constitutive paradox: limiting itself from the traditional claim of metaphysics while simultaneously intensifying and extending it through a logical framework of mathematical universality. In this sense, I argue, grappling with this situation involves considering the sciences primarily in their action — as political actors in the production of cultural knowledge.
Les malentendus …How to think along dotted lines?

Perhaps in every field but most of all in language, use is a polar gesture: on the one hand, appropriation and habit; on the other, expropriation and nonidentity. And ‘usage’ (in its whole semantic field, as both ‘to use’ and ‘to be used to’) is the perpetual oscillation between a homeland and an exile -- dwelling.

I’ve heard about something that builds up….

When we think of a residential building, what comes to mind is a ramshackle set of unruly inhabitants each having their own positions – strengths and weakness, desires and psychotic disorders … humeurs. All of whom are united, however undisciplined and chaotic their life are, by their belonging to that building, By their belonging to a particular situation.

Now, let us consider stripping a residential building of all its attributes, to the extent that even its identity and unity are removed; That is leaving all of a situation’s properties aside and considering only the basic relations which holds throughout its multiplicity.

Perhaps in every field but most of all in language, use is a polar gesture: on the one hand, appropriation and habit; on the other, expropriation and nonidentity. And ‘usage’ (in its whole semantic field, as both ‘to use’ and ‘to be used to’) is the perpetual oscillation between a homeland and an exile -- dwelling.

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An assemblage…like a multiplicity that contains many heterogeneous ends and establishes links, relationships of different kinds. The only thing holding the assemblage together is co-functioning, or in other words symbiosis, “sympathy” in the original sense. What matters are not filiations but alliances and alloys, not inheritance and descent but contagion and epidemics…An assemblage comprises two segments, one of content and the other of expression. On the one hand it is a mechanical assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another, on the other hand it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the assemblage has both territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and cutting edges of deterritorialization, which carry it away.

4
Contemporary audiovisual art works address the viewer and call her into a senseless conversation. The paper makes this argument with a focus on speech as orientation rather than signification. This demands for the viewing of visual culture to be rethought in other terms than the conventional modes of either detachment or immersion. Moreover, active spectatorship appears then no longer simply as an involvement in the production or deconstruction of meanings. As a respond to a call, it is a rupturing encounter where the viewer also takes part in the processes of becoming and may be affectively de-centred in, for example, empathy. This argument brings Deleuze’s and Guattari’s thoughts on the senseless operations of language into a dialogue with, in particular, Irigaray’s ideas on communication built on the ethics of irreducible (sexual) difference.
The rhizome is the structure Deleuze and Guttari conceptualize to get out of the aborescent hierarchial structure that seems to a controlling force in all aspects of life, arts, and sciences. Literary studies has for a long time been in need of new ways to think about literature to prevent what Deleuze calls interpretosis, the readings confirming preconceived (transcendental) ideas.

Rhizomatics, which finds its first early (non-)formulation in Kafka-Towards a minor literature, shows a possible way. Formulated in full, rhizomatics would 'ground' literature on the plane of immanence, immanent only to itself, followed by the necessary surface-reading beginning from the middle, the non-hierachical enunciation of the collective assemblage of enunciation, analyzing series connecting and proliferating. It opens up for the thinking of multiplicities, analyzing lines-offlight and differing trajectory-lines: The series of Kafka connect to larger series and diverge with still other series: "This coexistence of the two states of movement, two states of desire, two states of law, doesn't signify hesitation but rather an immanent experimentation that will open up all the polyvocal elements of desire, in the absence of any transcendental criteria" (Kafka, p. 61)—and is thus clearly challenging traditional narratology.

Is it possible to formulate—or maybe even formalize—a rhizomatic narratology, given the lack of preformed logical order but only criteria(A Thousand Plateaus, p 277)? What are these criteria? How does superlinearity and the collective assemblage of enunciation interact? These are some of the many questions that begins the search of formulating a full-fledged theory of rhizomatic narratology.
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>The Aesthetic Formalism of Computational Interaction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>This paper addresses the ontology and aesthetics of computational interaction. It looks at examples from the history of computation and media art to illustrate how, from a mathematical formalist paradigm, we have moved towards a theoretical and applied interest in ‘anti-symbolic’ and ‘situated’ conceptualizations of computing machines. This perspective, I argue, underpins an essentially ‘phenomenological’ aesthetics of digital media, articulating perception and experience as questions about intentionality, participation and embodiment. Contra this phenomenological interpretative outlook, the paper affirms a different entry point to the poetics of digital interaction, calling for a re-engagement in media practices with the algorithmic character of computation. The creative potentiality of computing is thus understood as being partly bounded to the axiomatic of symbolic languages and mathematical logics, and partly worked out on the problematic limits of all these factors of primary analytical interest. The paper proposes a renewed attention to the ontological nature of the logical yet experientially charged ‘forms’ of computation via an anti-reductionist speculative approach. This investigation of machine formalism unfolds the discreteness of digitality and the continuity of experience as mutual sides of the same aesthetic coin, shifting the focus from the normativity to the relational processuality of the algorithmic method.</td>
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Deleuze and Neoliberalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Deleuze never used the term neoliberalism, but if he had, he surely would have done so in the context of “control,” with which he describes the emergent social diagram of contemporary western societies. Indeed, Deleuze begins to elaborate the concept of control in his later work, almost always in relation to Foucault, whose own lectures at the College de France embarked on a broad elaboration of neoliberalism (in particular his lecture from 1977, now published as The Birth of Biopolitics). In a sense, then, this talk traces the emergence of Deleuze’s control in relation to Foucault’s neoliberalism—not as a parallel development but as the a critical extension. Where Foucault poses neoliberalism as the most contracted point of the logic that no doubt extended beyond an economic formulation, I want to suggest that Deleuze’s elaboration of control constitutes a subtle reorientation. Control describes the social transformation within which the eventualities of late capitalism, far from being an original or rarefied instance, constitute but one of so many dimensions through which the new regime of power passes. Beyond disciplinary societies, which effectively confined bodies, control designates the supply diagram of a new and “diffuse conspiracy” that Deleuze anticipates and that remains for us to analyze.</td>
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The Curious Case of Benjamin Button (dir. David Fincher 2009) is an action-image cinema where a bifurcation of time emerges through the locus of the eponymous character’s body. Born as an octogenarian in 1918 Benjamin (Brad Pitt) ages backwards throughout his life to eventually die as an infant within the contemporary world. Graham Fuller argues that Pitt’s performance “can seem as elusive as a dream in its evocation of ‘time out of joint’” with “there being a disconnect between its Hollywood realism and the Borgesian ambience that flows from the surreal premise.” Whether or not it is correct to attribute the entire performance to Pitt becomes a pertinent issue mobilised within the discourse of this talk. Indeed, various actors were employed to provide Benjamin’s body at different periods, and were utilised to perform the appropriate aged movements and rhythms of the character. Fincher later replaced their heads with a digitally aged Pitt: whose “inscrutable performance” was realised by a combination of actual and virtual images. Some of the performance was also achieved and ‘performed’ by a computer that had memorised a “library of Brad Pitt’s facial expressions” that were subdivided into thousands of “micro-expressions”.

Within his work on cinema, Deleuze distinguishes between a cinema of action and a cinema of the body. These become interesting distinctions I put to work and investigate alongside the emergence of a new form of virtual computer generated body and actor. For Deleuze, the body can be understood as an assemblage of forces and affects that enter into composition with a range of other bodies and affects. We find an interesting variation of this phenomena within Benjamin Button with computer technologies and new ‘motion capture’ being utilised to create “an animated digital human character” that is a truly affective assemblage of different bodies: including heterogeneous actors and performances (actual and virtual, human and machine). Here, we find the emergence of a unique cinematic body which can be understood as an affective assemblage of different bodies that affectively include the embodied spectator.
Deleuze and Badiou: Spaces of Politics, and the Case of Transnational Public Spheres

Abstract
What kinds of space/place are needed for counterhegemonic politics at the local, national, and global levels today? That is the question! Deleuze would advocate ‘lines of flight’ at all levels; Badiou maintains that ‘politics today is by necessity an international one.’ To Deleuze, thinking (which is always political) takes place ‘in the relationship of the territory and the earth’, hence his myriad spatial concepts: ‘geophilosophy,’ ‘smooth/striated’ space, ‘territory’, etc.; To Badiou, thinking takes place on the plane of the ‘infinite/axiomatic,’ hence his concepts of ‘politics without place,’ ‘void,’ etc. Deleuze advocates ‘assemblages’; Badiou proscribes ‘institutionalization’ and ‘unionization.’ Deleuze revels in relations; Badiou grudgingly makes them ‘appear’ (apparaître). That, if I may, is a problem.
I will engage the two philosophers in yet another conversation (this time not the two of them alone, as enough of that has been done, but) by inviting two other interlocutors: David Harvey and Henri Lefebvre, two philosophers of space, whose triadic conceptions of space (Harvey: space as absolute, relative and relational; Lefebvre: space as perceived, conceived, and lived), when combined, I would argue, complete and uplift each other. I will first touch upon Badiou’s critique of Deleuze in terms of ‘the one and the multiple,’ and then will address the issue of space in radical politics in the two philosophers, with a focus on ‘transnational public spheres’ (TPS), by drawing on Harvey and Lefebvre. The focal point of conversation between the four philosophers would be ‘how to go about determining the parameters of emancipatory politics in general and TPS in particular at different spatiotemporal levels.’ The objective of the paper would be to see how/if Deleuze and Badiou can contribute to political theory and IR with respect to spacetime in politics.
The Executable Image: Deleuze, Cinema and Software Studies

Abstract

“We do not claim to be producing an analysis of the new images, which would be beyond our aims, but only to indicate certain effects whose relation to the cinematographic image have yet to be determined.” Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2

While Gilles Deleuze’s description of the control society has been central to the formation of theoretical approaches to digital culture, there has been little attention paid to the way in which his work on cinema prefigures ideas about the relationship between executive formal systems and the era of control. Deleuze’s brief discussion of the ‘electronic image’ in Cinema 2, alongside his depiction of the control society in ‘Having an Idea in Cinema’, points towards a tentative engagement with the prospective political terms of the digital in his cinema work that the historical and social context in which he works prevents him from fully developing, despite the references to cybernetics and computation that are scattered throughout his writing. While there have been attempts to establish a relationship between software and cinema in much recent scholarship, most clearly seen in Lev Manovich’s The Language of New Media, what existing approaches lack is a serious engagement with the political terms of the digital, most significantly the issue of execution. Taking as a starting point Manovich’s claim that the new media object is “digital on the level of its material...computational (i.e. software driven) in its logic...and cinematographic in its appearance” this paper develops concepts from Deleuze’s work on cinema in order to theorise a cultural politics of the executable.

Through an examination of Deleuze’s writing on cinema alongside the notion of executability in relation to software and its visuality, this paper moves towards the location of the final, unresolved problem in Cinema 2—that of how to think the cut in itself (the moment of transition between shots without the interpretable meaning of the two shots that it connects)—as a crucial theoretical figure in the political analysis of software. Considered from within the context of software studies, a field largely inaccessible to Deleuze at the time of his writing, it becomes possible to consider the cut-in-itself as pure execution without interpretation – or, in other words, computation.
This paper will investigate the connective tissue of creative concepts that can be mapped between the disciplines of architecture and philosophy. I will present an aesthetics of the infinitely small – as well as the immeasurably large – that is to be discovered in the creases and pockets, the material pleats and immaterial inflections of Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the fold. I will also briefly follow Michel Serres’s involutions in insisting that we still do not yet know what a fold can do. Serres famously uses the material of a baker’s dough to talk about the seemingly inexhaustible pliability of folding tactile stuff. The dough is stretched out and folded over, again and again, so that the relation of the material to itself becomes increasingly complex. No doubt given dough’s material constitution it arrives at a limit when folding will no longer benefit the bread that is to be baked! Throughout the 1990’s the philosophy of Deleuze was popularised for architects and influenced their formal explorations of the fold and the process of folding. Even though many of the aesthetic results remained mechanical or reified versions of the fold, which obscured the infinitely porous peristaltic movements, whorls and maelstroms, and worlds within worlds, as well as the pliable materiality offered up by this concept, the fascinating architectural forms that sometimes emerged from all this activity should not be discounted. These early mechanical folds gave way to folding experiments that digitally invested in new combinations of computation and biology, or unexpected admixtures of silicon and carbon. Now the name of Deleuze is rarely heard amongst experimental (post)digital architects, but the affects, percepts and concepts of his and Félix Guattari’s creative philosophy still quietly circulate. In part the legacy of Deleuze has resulted in what can be identified as a new biotechnological paradigm for architecture, as today an investment in a logic of the living, a physiology of forms and behaviours is being made as architectural avatars of computation such as Biothing and Terraswarm weave evolutionary algorithms into webs of affect and percept without apparent scale or purpose, but with an increasingly recognisable aesthetic or ‘feel’ that appears to inaugurate posthuman landscapes for a new earth, even a coming people. I will conclude by investigating this feel or atmosphere of the fold by way of Deleuze’s concept of the ‘superfold’, an operation that inaugurates novel relations between forces toward the creation of new forms of labour, language and life.
In his recent book entitled Introduction à une phénoménologie de la vie (2008), Renaud Barbaras proposes a new solution of the problem of the status of the human subject in relation to animality, based on the concept of “privative anthropology”: instead of being an animal “plus” something else (rationality, for example), the human subject is a limitation of the original transitivity of life. Our aim is to show that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s treatment of the same topic (especially in Mille plateaux and Kafka) is based on similar premises. In the chapter on the refrain, for example, the art as produced by the human subjects is regarded rather as a special case of a much wider “artistic“ activity common to all living (and possibly even inorganic) beings, even though both authors – unlike Barbaras – do not base their approach on the concept of privation or negation (for obvious reasons given by the general character of their philosophy). We will attempt to show that such a treatment of the question of animality is a new way of solving a very old philosophical problem of animality and humanity, or to be more precise, it is an attempt to show that the problem itself is a „wrong“ one. Some correspondences will also be shown with a remarkable commentary on animality in ancient cynicism presented by Michel Foucault in his last seminar.
Deleuze and Guattari write in the affirmative, actively looking for and offering ways in which life may proceed as a joyous enterprise, outbursting the rigidity of stratification or evading it altogether during processes of formation. But myriads of ways in which local, alien, schizo, micro, stratal ecologies may evolve to life beyond anguish may open themselves to people on visiting terms with sadness. Guattari mentions despair as a motif his life repeatedly offered to tune into, while Deleuze seems to have had a more sustained enthusiasm for life. At the same time, Deleuze and Guattari hardly, if ever, wrote about anguish. They warned of dangers, of traps, of addictions and sad passions, but there are also moments when enthusiasm for escape and inventiveness flicker into a wry line of anticipation of capture, of drying up, of monotony, of warning. Perhaps this could be thought through further, to sense a machinic life as it comes into composition with dynamics that are commonly thought of as being corrosive of life.

We suggest looking at anguish as a force that does not necessarily actualize in paralytic depression, a rather common and limited interpretation linked to the image of Freudian loss (Kristeva, Black Sun), but as a primary force that works itself through in parallel to the processes of formation, both necessary and disastrous, to recognise and be repelled by life forms undergoing stratification, to seek spaces of clearance. In Russian, one, now antiquated, meaning of “oredom” is that of anguish and pain; the boredom of life (the title of a short story by Chekhov) is here exactly the anguish of being immersed in or anticipating the appalling routines of normality.

Found in technocratic contemporaries and disciples of Bergson, but also pronounced in the Book of Job, dark vitalism may perhaps be epitomised in the moments, that may be aeons, when the forces of fecund life are unbearable in their vitality, recognisable with a clinical eye as only providing a series of voids and concussions varied by their degree of pointless inevitability. Vitalism compels not simply a mode in which we can celebrate becoming animal or becoming woman, but becoming normal, becoming mediocre, it is a means to register abysses of self-organised misery and dependency, the cognitive and ideational vortex of dark ages.

Dark vitalism is an ethico-aesthetic condition widely explored, mainly in art, through the spectacle of the maintenance of emmiserated conditions and the recursive loops that are part of its creative repertoire. Certainly, Chekhov and Dostoevsky, but also Kira Muratova, a Ukrainian film director, practice dark vitalism without concepts. Is there a dark vitalism sufficiently attuned to the lived experience of entropic times, to recursively institutionalised moronisation, and vitality-sapping events, in all their mundane, spectacular, machinic and ecological dimensions?

This panel aims to gather together accounts of a number of ways in which the events and dynamics of the “oring” (see above) nature of life are sensed in a manner that allows for the recognition of the forces of anguish that run in parallel to them, for the working out of those forces and for detailed rehabilitatory conceptualisation of them.
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>The Mathesis of Esoteric Monism</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Taking seriously the Badiouian critique of Deleuze as a Pre-Socratic physician of the One-All, I want to consider how such a “monist Deleuze” opens avenues for reconsidering the relationship of semiotics and mathematics in his thought (roughly, the relationship of the Stoic sense-events of Logic of Sense to the metaphysics of the calculus in Difference and Repetition). In particular, building on the work of Simon Duffy and others, I want to examine how the influence on Deleuze of Albert Lautman’s mathematics and philosophy – especially Lautman’s striking investigations into global/local relations which in many respects anticipated (in the 1940s) later developments in category theory – lends credence to the growing minor consensus that Deleuze’s thought remained more bound to the esoteric/hermetic line of his early studies of Malfatti than his later disavowal would suggest. Linking Lautman’s mathematics to Deleuze’s esoteric strain makes visible a potential contemporary analogue to Middle Platonic and Renaissance understandings of the unity of formal mathesis and material transformation. This line of thought, if valid, would have important consequences for</td>
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Gilles Deleuze and Theater, or The Philosophy and its ‘Other’</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Many critical works have established links between Deleuze’s philosophy and Art. Art became the “Other” of philosophy, using affects and percepts to understand intellectual questions, working toward investigations of other regions beyond the philosophic field and construction of a logic of multiplicities. But, in these critical works which studied this question, theater was always absent. Why? Maybe, because his readers believed Gilles Deleuze's words in L’Abécédaire, which assert a disinterest for theater: &quot;Theater is too long, too much disciplined&quot;, &quot;to stay four hours sit in an uncomfortable armchair, I cannot do this any more&quot;. Nevertheless, when we read Deleuze, theater is everywhere present in his corpus. Difference and repetition is a criticism of representation, Anti-Oedipus repeats that the unconscious mind is not a theater, but a factory and denounces any form of mimesis... It seems that theatre is the “Other” of the Deleuzian works neglected by critics. A new virtuality is created, embodied in the meeting of Deleuzian thought and theatrical practices. When philosophy exits from itself, center has moved, and this escape creates a virtual line, towards theatrical practices which are a new &quot;Other&quot; of philosophy. But the presence of theater is inseparable from the second &quot;Other&quot;: Félix Guattari. It is in the unpublished plays by Félix Guattari (The Moon master, Socrates, Psyche-ghost town, Night is the end of means...) that we can uncover the realization of the movement of virtuality in the completely nomadic spirit, moving toward new manner of dramatic expression.</td>
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“WHO’S AFRAID OF RED, YELLOW AND BLUE?”: GILLES DELEUZE, BARNETT

Largely due to the critical legacy of Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried, New York School painting is traditionally read through a combination of neo-Kantianism — the artwork as a disinterested entity artificially divorced from the multiplicitous deterritorialization of real-world contexts — and Gotthold Lessing’s Laocoon: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry, which argues that painting must remain true to its own inherent properties (i.e. flatness and the spatial limits of the picture plane). With a particular focus on Barnett Newman’s seminal Onement I (1948), Vir Heroicus Sublimis (1951) and Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue (1966), this essay will advocate an alternative philosophical lineage for Modernist painting. This genealogy is rooted in Newman’s own self-confessed interest in Spinoza and Gershom Sholem (the Messianic possibilities of an explosive Creation wrought from within the immanent temporality of the painterly text itself) and Deleuze’s overt break with Kant. In the latter case, the non-conceptual event-as-rhythm (Newman’s famed vertical stripe or ‘zip’) is born out the chaos of the expansive color field as a suprasensible ‘logic of sensation,’ whereby line no longer serves as a static demarcating agent, dividing the picture plane into self-contained fields of activity, but becomes a dynamic force of becoming, a stuttering zone of creation in-itself, the ‘genetic’ element of the pictorial order yet to come.

Cixous on a Plateau: Reading Cixous with Deleuze and Guattari (from Partie to Si

Although almost exclusively read through Derridean lenses, in the light of thanatopraxy and deconstruction, Hélène Cixous’ writings “for life” enter into a zone of proximity with many Deleuzian/Guattarian concepts/affects, with the life-bound procedures of Deleuze and Guattari’s smooth spaces of thought. In the 514 dense pages of Brian Massumi’s landmark translation A Thousand plateaus, the smoothness of such spaces runs the inevitable risk, however, of solidifying into what might appear as impassable terminological walls which keep off—bounds what was never meant to qualify as territorial. Concepts such as “becoming” or “line of flight” seem to lack the signifying vibrations of their French opposite numbers “devenir” and “ligne de fuite”, both of which stylistically operate as boundary-swaying terms: a “deux” [de] bifurcates here, a “leakage” [fuite] is implied there. Cixous’ “style” offers, as this paper hopes to show, a “plateau-ed” regime of signs, one that aborts the discrete format of the book and leaks from one text to the next in a series of schizo-informed linguistic agencings and emergent, non-Wakean word formations. Her 1976, as yet untranslated “schizoid” production Partie (contemporary with Henri Laborit’s Eloge de la fuite) is a strangely felted text, a reversible, upside-down, reformatted “plateau” of writing, an ex-text or “hexed” text written in the minor tongue of a “writrix” who reinvents the format of the book into a trickling or seeping artifact, one that alters or “hexes”.
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Made by many. Tracing and mapping the affective topologies of co-creative brands.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Within my paper I will explore how the disciplines of social sciences, digital methods and economics connect in order to explore the affective &amp; productive topologies of co-creative brands. Co-creative branding refers to branding strategies which are based on the active and productive participation of consumers. Instead of only looking at social dynamics and interactive processes as main drivers of co-creation, this project claims that co-creation is based on complex, affective topologies. These topologies - sets of online and offline spaces in which consumers encounter, use and negotiate brands such as stores, new-sphere, social media or places of everyday life- can be considered as highly affective as they enable particular experiences, events and modes of becoming. From this perspective brands are introduced as assembled and productive objects that are shaped by n-actors across n-spaces and evolve into n-directions – and at the same time affect actors and spaces too. In order to explore these multiple processes of co-creating brands, actors and spaces the paper introduces a Deleuze inspired methodological concept that creates productive links between social sciences, digital methods, topology and economy. I will reflect on the methodological implications of researching processes of experience, relationality, value creation, difference and repetition in co-creative brand management. Moreover I will trace the ways companies have increasingly incorporated such disciplinary encounters when researching, planning and evaluation co-creative branding strategies. Finally, the paper will discuss the potentialities of inventive visualisation of co-creation and introduce digital topological maps as mode of presentation which allows for accounting for the heterogeneous findings of a multi-disciplinary research approach.</td>
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Deleuze and Guattari write in the affirmative, actively looking for and offering ways in which life may proceed as a joyous enterprise, outbursting the rigidity of stratification or evading it altogether during processes of formation. But myriads of ways in which local, alien, schizo, micro, stratal ecologies may evolve to life beyond anguish may open themselves to people on visiting terms with sadness. Guattari mentions despair as a motif his life repeatedly offered to tune into, while Deleuze seems to have had a more sustained enthusiasm for life. At the same time, Deleuze and Guattari hardly, if ever, wrote about anguish. They warned of dangers, of traps, of addictions and sad passions, but there are also moments when enthusiasm for escape and inventiveness flicker into a wry line of anticipation of capture, of drying up, of monotony, of warning. Perhaps this could be thought through further, to sense a machinic life as it comes into composition with dynamics that are commonly thought of as being corrosive of life.

We suggest looking at anguish as a force that does not necessarily actualize in paralytic depression, a rather common and limited interpretation linked to the image of Freudian loss (Kristeva, Black Sun), but as a primary force that works itself through in parallel to the processes of formation, both necessary and disastrous, to recognise and be repelled by life forms undergoing stratification, to seek spaces of clearance. In Russian, one, now antiquated, meaning of ‘oredom’ is that of anguish and pain; the boredom of life (the title of a short story by Chekhov) is here exactly the anguish of being immersed in or anticipating the appalling routines of normality.

Found in technocratic contemporaries and disciples of Bergson, but also pronounced in the Book of Job, dark vitalism may perhaps be epitomised in the moments, that may be aeons, when the forces of fecund life are unbearable in their vitality, recognisable with a clinical eye as only providing a series of voids and concussions varied by their degree of pointless inevitability.

Vitalism compels not simply a mode in which we can celebrate becoming animal or becoming woman, but becoming normal, becoming mediocre, it is a means to register abysses of self-organised misery and dependency, the cognitive and ideational vortex of dark ages.

Dark vitalism is an ethico-aesthetic condition widely explored, mainly in art, through the spectacle of the maintenance of emmiserated conditions and the recursive loops that are part of its creative repertoire. Certainly, Chekhov and Dostoevsky, but also Kira Muratova, a Ukranian film director, practice dark vitalism without concepts. Is there a dark vitalism sufficiently attuned to the lived experience of entropic times, to recursively institutionalised moronisation, and vitality-sapping events, in all their mundane, spectacular, machinic and ecological dimensions?

This panel aims to gather together accounts of a number of ways in which the events and dynamics of the ‘oring’ nature of life are sensed in a manner that allows for the recognition of the forces of anguish that run in parallel to them, for the working out of those forces and for detailed rehabilitatory conceptualisation of them.
Title paper: “The Question Contains Its Own Answer”: Transversality and Dialectical Criticism.

Abstract: What happens to a concept if it changes its former environment, for instance from literary criticism to literary production? How is it de-, re-, or informed by the passage of transformation, the metamorphosis of its codes? The code and the territory are both terms that lie at the heart of the later writings of Gilles Deleuze. They are contained in his and Félix Guattari’s model of “double articulation.” This model sets the terms for any understanding of how different modes of philosophical thinking or artistic creation come into being and relate across disciplines. It serves as a methodological device to expose and analyze the cultural and natural forms that come before us, as critics, in each “milieu,” may it be philosophical or non-philosophical, artistic or not. Demystification, the task of critical thinking according to the earlier Logic of Sense, reveals itself as nothing else but asking this question: How do these forms or artefacts translate from one milieu to the other? What are the stakes and conditions of these translations? How are the materials carried across different territories?

In this paper I want to argue that in terms of literary criticism (being one of the multiple code-systems), this form of demystification uncovers the quality of all movement that relates different code-systems to each other. In Deleuze and Guattari, this particular quality is called “transversality” - the crucial feature of every “veritable transcoding,” which makes possible that the condition of the critique itself is taken into account to evoke a thorough multiplication of horizons.

Title paper: Information Technology, the Societies of Control and Creative Processes.

Abstract: Many universities in the United States have succumb to an impendent invasion of 'Information Technology' (IT) administration practices prevalent in corporate-america. At the administrative level, 'Information Technology' allows administrators to dictate pedagogical discourse to students and faculty alike, through a top-down, hierarchical penetration, thus drastically altering the flow of machinic mutations and delicate emerging creative expressions. This paper presentation introduces a case that artistic creativity at the university level, creative pedagogy, student/teacher collaboration, and general technological experimentation in the arts, is greatly hindered through corporate-style 'Information Technology' and perseverance of administration and control of all networked-systems that inhabit the university geographical space. I will present as a case study, subjectively observed at the university level, that Deleuze's essay, a "Postscript on the Societies of Control", is relevant when discussing and understanding the emergence of new technological practices within the discourse of art and creative learning. I will also insist that Guattari's micro-system activism has the potential to create soft-subversions at the internal level to counteract these potential threats to artistic concept building.
Figure is Deleuze's term for the process of stylistic permutation and variability in the cinema, a sign of "deformations, transformations or transmutations" as he puts it in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (178). In this paper I would like to develop the notion of a transdisciplinary and transaesthetic force, at once diffusive and integrative, by drawing on a Deleuzian conception of the figure and figurality. The starting point for my discussion is the observation that aesthetic theory is lagging behind developments in the aesthetic field, so that the rift between theory and practice extending back to Kant is becoming increasingly precarious. Thus, a pivotal question that needs to be posed is whether the organization of aesthetic knowledge that the traditional disciplines facilitate either promote or prevent insight into meta-aesthetic and transaesthetic concerns. My premise here is that the aesthetic is always something more than its particular instantiation within the frames of a given discipline. This "something more" is the transaesthetic, a nomadic, rhizomatic effusion that surges through individual aesthetic media, in the process altering them. A process that creates disunity within the single medium but a kind of unity among the different media, the transaesthetic, I propose, is perhaps most productively addressed in the context of Deleuze's conceptualization of the figure.

What exactly are Deleuze and Guattari talking about with reference to materiality? Is there an alternate concept of general material relations being proposed here, against or perhaps even beyond the traditional form-matter binary? If we take seriously the proposition that all becoming occurs in smooth spaces and all progress is made in striated spaces, what implications might this have for a radical revision of thinking about space and its architectural production? Moreover, if one of the answers to this problematic field is being suggested through an appeal to the following of material traits of expression, what does this say about Deleuze’s general theory of materiality, that is, matter–energy relations, and what might the architectural implications of such a proposition be? It is against the background of this problematic field, that I want to extract, analyse and discuss D&G’s concepts of the monument & the house as presented in A Thousand Plateaus and refined in What is Philosophy?
This paper stems from interdisciplinary and comparative research into the ideational innovation of projective geometry and its relations with computational technology, the objectile, multiplicity and the virtual. Specifically the paper focuses on intersecting lines in the development of projective geometries evident in Deleuze’s thought. In doing so it makes connections with Deleuze’s appropriation of projective geometry and how projective geometry figures in the work of Leibniz and Whitehead. These connections are then used to further address the concept of the objectile. The paper will outline a history of projective geometry in its relation to differential philosophy. To do this it will provide a diagrammatic explanation of the operation and construction of projective geometries via Desargues, Poncelet, Leibniz (and the application of the calculus to geometry), Whitehead’s Axiom’s of Projective Geometry and Klein’s Erlangen Programme of projective ‘differential’ geometry. These diagrams illustrate differential geometries meeting the plane of consistency: Thus, through the paper, connective lines will (literally) be drawn, running through a projective space and along vectors of the objectile to fall back onto (se rabat sur) their surface of production.
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Sembene’s <em>Guelwaar</em>: The religion and politics of space, gaze, and movement</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>The films (and novels) of Ousmane Sembene cut into cultural arguments about the viability and challenges of African nationality with various strategies of circulation through space and gaze. Gilles Deleuze notes, e.g., that Ceddo (1977) deploys storytelling as a circulating and collective utterance, thereby distinguishing this indigenous practice from the myths of Islamic colonizers and suggesting through the film’s form a potential praxis of national resistance (Cinema 2, p. 222). Similar circulations organize the form and content of Sembene’s other films. The circulation and entrapment of the African mask in La Noire de… (1966), for instance, function as a sequence of movements and pauses that parallel Diouana’s (Mbissine Thérèse Diop) relative freedom in Dakar and her virtual enslavement in Paris; and in Camp de Thiaroye (1987), the soldiers’ repetitive assertions of worth and autonomy circulate from barrack to barrack, but their tragic outcome is foreshadowed by the fact that they are physically and metaphorically ‘fenced in’ by the white French military leadership. This paper examines the circulations of gaze and bodies in Sembene’s 1992 release, Guelwaar (“Noble One”). Ostensibly a film about a Christian man who is mistakenly buried in a Muslim cemetery, Guelwaar presents a tight, circular nexus between Islamic, Christian, French, rural, government, activist, and international aid factions, all of whom claim to ‘know’ or ‘see’ what is best for Senegal, and all of whom forget the historical contingency of these religious and political forces. Drawing on Deleuze’s notions of optical and sound images, as well as his suggestion that the “screen itself is the cerebral membrane where immediate and direct confrontations take place between the past and the future, the inside and the outside” (Cinema 2, p. 125), the paper will expound the circulations across space by foot and car, as well as the movements across space and time by the relations of gaze, especially those positioned as Christian ‘witnessing’—here, not the witness of evangelization, but the witness of simply and patiently gazing at the contested space of a misburied body.</td>
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Fighting the use of binaries to describe space in computer games</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Within the last couple of years, attempts have been made to use the work of Gilles Deleuze to study computer games. Authors make use of theories of virtuality, becomings and affect to describe game play, progress through games and build-up of game space as very fluid elements. This contrasts the general tendency within game studies to analyse games as formal systems that present themselves to the player through pre-set rules and representations. Attention for the work of Deleuze offers a more open understanding of games. This facilitates studies of their unpredictable nature and embodiment of players.</td>
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Surname Harper
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Title paper The Deleuze Game - making play creative
Abstract I would like to use my time at the conference to explore the ways in which play can facilitate a deeper understanding of Deleuzean concepts. I feel the ideal way to approach this issue is to try and think about how Deleuze’s project can be modelled as a game and thereby give rise to playful encounters with his work. Deleuze’s work almost begs for playful engagement and while it is my belief that reducing Deleuze’s work to a game instrumentalises his project somewhat, it should also open up a new realm of interaction between those who participate in the Deleuze game. Through the creation of an assemblage which can be seen as developing lines of flight or capture, play can be seen as conducive to developing interdisciplinary study of Deleuze.

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Affiliation
E-mail
Title paper Cosmic Vibrations: Teilhard’s Noosphere and Deleuze-Guattari’s Mechanosphere
Abstract I want to explore the mystical side of Deleuze and Guattari’s materialism, via reading the Mechanosphere in relation to the Noosphere. The comparison is suggested by Deleuze and Guattari’s acknowledging the difficulty in “elucidating the system of strata without seeming to introduce a kind of cosmic or even spiritual evolution,” and then insisting that “there is no biosphere or noosphere, but everywhere the same Mechanosphere” (A Thousand Plateaus, 69). I will examine how Deleuze and Guattari’s clearly drawn distinction between the Mechanosphere and Teilhard’s Noosphere holds up under close scrutiny of both concepts, especially in terms of the cosmology they depict.
We propose to look at a key notion within the work of Deleuze: the image of thought which refers to the whole range of subjective presuppositions, without philosophical founding, used by philosophy to give the signification of thinking. We will highlight in particular the relationships linking the image of thought to the concept of image and the cinematographic image. It seems that the image, and the cinematographic image in particular, could be considered as the “other” of the philosophical concept. But, as always with Deleuze, it is the very existence of this “other” that allows the creation of “new” concepts: The Movement-Image and The Time-Image offer new concepts of cinema despite the fact that cinema is far from being philosophical thought.

With this in mind, we would like to pay particular attention to the following point: after the publication of two books on cinema, the question of image mysteriously disappears from Deleuze’s work. It then reappears however for one last time in “L’épuisé”. In this work, the author puts aside almost all the concepts worked out in Cinema; and now strives towards the “pure image”. Here, image becomes a sort of indefinable point between matter and spirit; an event in itself, a pure virtuality. “The image is not an object but a process”. “L’épuisé” lays down a persistent insistence on a new characteristic within the work of Deleuze, directly linked to image: its auto-dissipation. This stems from the idea that the image is an expression of limitless energy, a potentiality that is never achieved and which is doomed to disappear. “What is key to the image is not its feeble content, but rather the uncontrollable, ready-to-explode energy which is captured and which prevents it from lasting. Images are mixed with the detonation, combustion, dissipation of their own condensed energy”. In short, the image contains the method of its own self-destruction. This is without doubt a unique appearance of the theme of combustion, within the work of Deleuze.
Deleuze on Fetishism and Generative Time Images: A Body Like an Electric Blur

Abstract
Fetish objects and images are increasingly an acknowledged part of contemporary sexuality and media. Many theories explain sexual fetishes as substitutes for a lost object or disavowal of a traumatic (narcissistic) difference, including sexual difference. Others regard them as products of habit, perhaps neurologically ingrained. All imply that, as an object to lose or disavow, the meaning and nature of difference exist prior to desire rather than being incessantly produced through desire; and that fetishism channels aggressive energies tending towards repetition or aversion, blocking people’s ability to take emotional pleasure in each other.

While some fetishists lack social practices enabling them to engage emotionally with others or avoid abuse, their desires share the same sources as normative heterosexuality. Using examples from Coldness and Cruelty and Thousand Plateaus, I argue that the one who desires is involuntarily implicated in an ethical and aesthetic task: identifying the repeating singularity beneath apparent visual, tactile or other sensory generalities. While every sexual experience can appear as a representation, the peculiar hold of sexual scenes, images, and objects involves more than simple cliché or habit. Such phenomena share properties with Deleuze’s “time image,” potentially linking the one who desires to the open-endedness of Becoming.

Such stuff as Dreams are Made on’

Abstract
Until 2002, anyone throwing their arms in the air and screaming their head off in a listed building in the UK would probably have been summarily ejected. But in March 2002 the wooden scenic railway at Margate’s Dreamland amusement park was Grade II listed by English Heritage – the first time that a fairground ride had ever been listed. Dreamland, home of working-class play, boasted several world-firsts during its 100-odd years of ‘vulgar’ activity and is now on track to become the world’s first Heritage Amusement Park.

I problematise the heritage dispositif as valorising the present’s picture of an archival past in which heritage creates forms as stratified, immobile mythical entities. Instead, I aim to re-situate and re-member Dreamland and the rollercoaster as an architecture of folding rhythms, speeds and slownesses which folds together expressivities and materialities.

I challenge the notion of heritage conservation as psychological ontological security, seeking to preserving an ‘authentic’ ‘real’ and find in Dreamland’s dream-image the power of the false and the impossible real of the plane of experience. In discussing memory as a function of the future in a world of incompossible presents related to not-necessarily true pasts, I emphasise the generative power of a past that conserves itself.
Deleuze, in common with other contemporary French thinkers who are identified under the rubric of post-structuralism (Derrida and Foucault will be of special interest to this paper), made frequent allusions to concepts from the mathematical sciences. These allusions have been aggressively criticised by practicing scientists and analytic philosophers of science, resulting in the eruption of the so-called science wars in the 1990s. In this paper I want to begin an exploration of number and geometry in Deleuze, focusing on the discussion in the Nomadology. My approach, however, will be broader; I shall argue that insights into the nature of mathematics found in Deleuze and Derrida are not only based upon a mature understanding of mathematical practice (contra their critics), but in fact are entirely consistent with contemporary approaches within algebraic logic and algebraic geometry as fundamental elements of mathematical practice in the 21st century.

I shall begin with a sketch of the emergence of synthetic differential geometry with a view to establishing two central premises. The first premise (based on the work of Rotman) is that category theory can be understood as a demonstration of the importance of the gestural sign within mathematical semiotics. The second (based on the work of Lawvere) is that algebraic logic and algebraic geometry (articulated in the language of category theory) exhibit a transcendental limit at which the one cannot be understood independently of that which constitutes the other. This limiting (paradoxical) relationship between logic (set theory, arithmetic, number) and geometry (topology, space, territory) is precisely what constitutes the tensions for both Derrida and Deleuze between their treatment of number and their treatment of space. In Derrida that tension remains implicit and appears as a conflict between his early reading of Husserl and his later work on the ideal literary text (Brubaker). For Deleuze it is articulated more explicitly, at least in the Nomadology, as territorializing and deterritorializing dispositions within the war machine.

What I hope to show in general through this analysis of the possibility of synthetic geometry is that Deleuze does not merely make allusion to the mathematical sciences in his work. On the contrary, there is an irreducible relationship between his science and his philosophy that is elucidated in a particularly clear way by his appropriations from mathematical practice.
In 1979 Foucault proclaimed that in regard to the new regimes of power one had to imagine the whole as a complex consisting in a machine and a flux. This statement alluded quite obviously to Anti-Oedipus. Almost two decades later Rancière presents his aesthetical regime of art. Interestingly enough there are a lot of correspondences between his way of thinking and that of Deleuze and Guattari, although in various texts he refuses any strong similarity.

In my lecture I want to sketch in how far Rancière’s aesthetical regime as much as a certain Spinozism in Deleuze/Guattari both participate in an episteme related to the appearance of neoliberalism and biopolitics in 18th century, as proclaimed by Foucault.

Then a new paradigm displaces the different fields of knowledge: The paradigm of production and productivity. Indeed “life itself” then is no longer understood as a passive outside but becomes an active agent within culture. What enters culture together with “life” is the very chaos it consists of. Art, science, and philosophy are distinguished and yet united at this point. What they have in common is production: Connecting, continuing, and creating machines and fluxes.
This paper focuses on Deleuze’s persistent interest in the work of expressionist artist Paul Klee (1879-1940) and the provocative connections among the three creative domains of thought – art, science, and philosophy – in their deeply resonating theories of creativity. I suggest in particular that Deleuze shares with Klee an underlying ontological concern and that the relationship between nature and art articulated in both the philosopher’s and the artist’s written works contribute to a compelling (eco)critical theory of creativity.

Klee studied the natural world and likened artistic creation to the organic processes of genesis in nature. Like Deleuze, he regarded the created and the creative world as being fundamentally related through “movement,” “expression,” and “becoming.” What is notably Deleuzean about Klee’s visual and written work is that the movement that underlies creative processes gives rise to a constant critical negotiation between the natural, “given,” or created world, and the creative, the new, and the possible.

My paper draws upon Klee’s published diaries, personal letters, and theoretically rich pedagogical notebooks in which he proposes “a philosophy that rested on empathy with the created world” (Moholy-Nagy 8). I demonstrate how Klee’s declaration that art must “render visible” the “nonvisible forces” of creation can contribute to a Deleuzean (eco)critical theory of creativity (Klee qtd. in Deleuze and Guattari 342).
Digital assemblages: the rhythmic dynamics of art, science and philosophy

The digital hype of the last two decades was widely adopted and reproduced by cybercultural theory as a celebration of the disembodied, immaterial and probabilistic properties of information. Against this Cartesian disposition, digital philosophers have suggested that digitization empowers the human body as sensory perception is capable of converting disembodied data (code) into embodied, corporeal images. This paper attempts to occupy a middle space in-between the technological determinism of postmodern theory and the phenomenological materialism of new media philosophy. In particular, it proposes to consider a rhythmic potential in digital assemblages of art, science, and philosophy to generate change. Following Deleuze and Guattari, the paper elaborates a philosophy of rhythm as an appropriate transdisciplinary mode of analysis for revisiting connections between the disciplines. In this context, it proposes an account of temporal agency active at a micro-perceptual rhythmic level.

The paper investigates a selection of digital media artworks concerned with the underlying conditions in which perception and experience might differently be produced in contemporary media environments. In the first place, these examples open a way of thinking the digital through a more dynamic materialist ontology. Additionally, they point to a ‘nonsensuous’, or rhythmic, quality of experience detached from the active participation of human perception. Crucially, they help suggest that the participation of virtual dimensions is immanent to the emergence of actual digital assemblages of philosophical, aesthetic and scientific combination.

The notion of problem in Gilles Deleuze's philosophy

The notion of problem is essential in Deleuze’s philosophy; based on a close reading of Bergson’s methodology, it is also a strong epistemological choice in the field of the history of science. Between two modes of formalisation in mathematic, the axiomatic and the problematic, Deleuze choose the problematic as his own epistemological tool. With such thinkers as Canguilhem, Bouligand, Bachelard, Vuillemin and Lautman, Deleuze also found in the French epistemological tradition a deep concern about the importance of the problems formalisation in science. His own work is a broad extension of the notion of problem in the field of philosophy and Social Sciences. Especially in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari propose a new epistemological reform for the entire field of the Social Sciences. In this paper our goal is to show the link between the problematical formalisation analysed in the history of science by Deleuze, a history less official and more discreet than the axiomatic (theorematic) one, and his problematic epistemology developed in philosophy (Difference and repetition) and Social Sciences; how does the encounter with a subterranean scientific tradition can regenerate and reconfigure the Humanities? (« Methodological interfaces between science and the Humanities »).
The myth of Apollo flaying the skin off the Satyr Marsyas presents us with the image of exposing the inner bodily senses, the turning of the skin inside out to expose the nerve ending as such—the BwO as ‘creative skin’ in the context of this presentation. This is the creative canvas on which an artist’s work. The Korean sense of han, the suffering and trauma of a people due to its historical circumstances (the residual of a history of (neo)colonization by China, Japan and the West as well as the repression of the persistent divided state of North versus south Korea) is staged through the films of Kim Ki-Duk in such a specific way that has caused him to be both revered and loathed by the Korean populace. As part of the Korean Wave (Hallyu) he presents a stark contrast to the usual melodramas, music hip-hop and other films that have made Korea so revered but also accused as being an exporter of cultural hegemony throughout Southeast Asia. In this presentation I look at a number of specific films (Bow, Time, The Isle) to show how Kim Ki-Duk is flaying the sensibility of the public to raise issues around patriarchy, beauty culture and prostitution that are the repressed of the culture’s neoliberal policies at the high cost of economic growth. Kim Ki-Duk explores the implicit body that tears at the nerves ‘speaking’ its own language—his characters speak very little. His filmography presents an exemplary case of what Deleuze was after when speaking of the performative force of the body after Artaud. I hope to show this through a select number of clips during my presentation.

Etienne Balibar in Reading Capital provides a series of invariants (laborer, means of production and non-laborer) that constitute any given mode of production, this of course within the Althusserian schemata helped partially determine the political sphere. For Balibar the specific configuration of these given invariants constituted any given mode of production, and thus one could leap from one mode of production to another, in a non-teleological manner, through the appropriate reorganization of said elements and the crossing of a ‘threshold’. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in the chapter, ‘Apparatus of Capture’, in A Thousand Plateaus similarly provide an anti-teleological and anti-evolutionist narrative about the shift from a particular mode of production to another, and its relationship to the State-form that together allow for a shift of any given mode of production to another. However, Deleuze and Guattari differentiate between a ‘limit’ and a ‘threshold’. In this paper I seek to examine closely these two anti-teleological narratives about the shift in the mode of production and their particular use of the ‘threshold’.
Assemblages and Consistency in A thousand plateaus : ethology, sociology and

The concept of consistency or consolidation allows to think of a synthesis of the ill-assorted without unification nor addition, and conditions the understanding of the nature of an assemblage in A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze and Guattari borrow this concept to the Belgian philosopher Eugène Dupréel, who elaborated it to propose an original articulation between ethology and sociology in answer to the epistemological problem of the status of the vital phenomenon. Dupréel intends, in his Theory of Consolidation, to build a sociological theory of life by deriving a formal biology from pure sociology, the principles of which he formulates. The consistency supplies the operating schema applicable to all the forms of life.

In the chapter of A Thousand Plateaus entitled “The Refrain,” the consistency of assemblage defines a kind of not finalized individuation through which Deleuze and Guattari substitute to the model of a "beginning which results in a continuation" that of a "frame which fills up" by replacement of elements. We shall examine the way the Deleuzian use of this concept of consistency transforms the relation between ethology and sociology and modifies the border of the vital and the social.

Forget Deleuze

Achille Mbembe leaves the reader of On the Postcolony with some hints of a creative, hopeful future, even in the wake of the institutional and existential violence he has chronicled throughout the book. Despite his demurral elsewhere of Deleuzian influences on this work, it is worth asking what might be creative here. In both there is a concern with place-making, not in the phenomenological or Heideggerian sense but in the sense that actual life moving through and within space creates concepts adequate to their situation; a concern with the life that emerges, that unfolds within the regime of biopower; and with concepts of becoming and death. The intention will not be to show that Mbembe is covertly Deleuzian, nor will it be to “apply” Deleuze to Africa, but rather to walk with both Mbembe and Deleuze. We will not so much find traces of Deleuze in Mbembe, as we will find ways to be creative in Deleuze’s sense. This creativity will become available by remembering the Deleuzian approach to Deleuzian thought: Step One: Learn Deleuze; Step Two: Forget Deleuze; Step Three: Begin. And, it will become available as the central concern for Mbembe is kept in mind, in the midst of the accounts of domination and discipline: given all this, how then can one live?
Between January and June 2009 Paul Jeff and Laura Jenkins along with student volunteers from Swansea Metropolitan University produced a durational art-work based on the universal encounter with the enigmatic pose of the Girl with a Pearl Earring by Jan Vermeer. The work took the form of 18 performative events that were both dynamic and varied in dealing with imaginary aspects of life that could be drawn out of an encounter with the painting. The events were collectively titled The Conversion of Essence into Series evoking both Leibniz and Deleuze, and were based around the loose idea that durational event led participatory art could be generated in a serial manner and with a sense of ‘continual variation’, from intuitive responses to the so called essential qualities of a singular ‘masterpiece’ of representational art. The essence of this masterpiece was then converted (translated) into a work of non-representational art incorporating both multiplicity and proliferation of the pose, and utilising the general concept of difference and repetition. Each performative work generated multiple photographic renderings of the pose in the painting. The series finished in The Hague with a final event in the vicinity of the painting. This presentation ‘documents’ the work whilst also demonstrating how the impulse to document can differ from itself in a Deleuze/Bergsonian sense.
The power of the false: Deleuzian politico-aesthetics

This article examines how art can be conceived as philosophical practice in Gilles Deleuze by means of connecting the notion of “creation” in the domain of art and philosophy. Deleuze defines the task of the philosophy of the future as “overturning Platonism.” In his reading of Sophist and Statesman, Deleuze finds the possibility of this inversion in Plato’s own method of division, specifically in the concept of the simulacra (phantasmata). He points out that the simulacrum undermines the dichotomy of the model and the copy, since it does not bear any degree of resemblance to the model and designates the realm outside of the two. From Plato’s description of the simulacrum as mostly produced by art, which “abandons the truth,” (Sophist, 236a) Deleuze conceives a significant role of art as the power of the false in reversing Platonism.

However, to produce the false images (or claimants) does not suffice the condition of creation in art. The second half of the article investigates under which condition art becomes philosophical practice; it is by means of political act that the creation in philosophy and art can be woven together. This will be exemplified in the analysis of Korean Social-realism art which led the creation of the concept of “Min-Jung (multitude).”

Exception, Rule and Architecture out-of-field

In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari, following Bernard Cache, conceive of architecture as the art of framing. The concept of the frame has a long history in architectural theory, having been used in the late twentieth century in particular for reassessments of modernism. In one of the more notable examples, ‘The Split Wall: Domestic Voyeurism’, Beatriz Colomina shows the domestic interiors of Le Corbusier and Adolf Loos to engage a number of static and dynamic forms of the frame, pointing in the direction of photography and cinema.

This paper questions Colomina’s analysis by addressing the notion of imaging as developed in Deleuze’s cinema books and going beyond what Claire Colebrook terms as the ‘standard’ reading of image as a copy of an actual world – which underlies Colomina’s analysis – to address the architectural frame with the aid of the concept of the cinematic out-of-field.

By looking at the work of artists Karen Mirza and Brad Butler in The Exception and the Rule, itself only one filmic component of The Museum of Non Participation, this paper discusses the connection between the out-of-field, when called upon to elucidate artists’ cinema in urban and architectural contexts, and the notion of architecture as the ‘first art of the frame’.
In this paper, the domains of philosophy, theology and politics are connected. I want to investigate what or who Deleuze’s ‘God’ is, defined as ‘the absolute’ in his thought. One could easily say: Deleuze’s God is Being as difference, and that’s that. But why is Being the absolute for Deleuze, and how does it function as the absolute? In our quest for Deleuze’s idea of God (if there is one), we trace the influences of Spinoza, Leibniz and Duns Scotus. In a second part, we ask what consequences the presence of this God has for the conception of Deleuze’s philosophy in general: do we have to call Deleuze a ‘theologian’? And if so, what kind of theology are we dealing with? What does a theological interpretation of Deleuze mean for his political/ethical thinking?

The paper aims to clarify Deleuze’s use of singularity and show its relevance to postcolonial literature, precisely as a concept that addresses individuation as active engagement with the world. The singular appears in Deleuze less as an ‘absolute self-determining power’ (Hallward), but as the remarkable in relation to the ordinary. Although Hallward is right that questions of individuation – of situating oneself within a world – are at stake, singularity is not the single, or individual. On the contrary, for Deleuze singularity refers to events and unique occurrences that form the predicates of an individual, not its qualifying attributes. Thus, the individual is the effect of singularities, ‘the actualisation of preindividual singularities, and implies no previous determination’. This is of relevance in Mohammed Dib’s ‘Northern Trilogy’. All three protagonists struggle with geographical displacement and forced distance from a loved one. Despite painful struggles – a predicament shared by nomads and migrants – Dib shows them not as escaping toward ‘a space beyond rapport’, but to actively inflect their situation by concentrating and accumulating the singular occurrences they face. The novels dissect the processes that go into the actualization of preindividual singularities and offer an idea of the preliminary and precarious individuation thinkable as singularity.
Deleuze’s theory of humour as the individuating art of intensities in Difference and Repetition would seem to recapitulate some of the defining features of the humoural doctrine in medicine and in literature. We propose to orient the theory of the four bodily humours (as well as its revised forms in contemporary medicine) in relation to the problem of the re-emergent Self, which Deleuze sees arising between the pre-individual and the trans-individual for Simondon in his theory of individuation. The axiomatic of incompatible tensions discovered in the pre-individual, the formal element reconceived as non-relational, non-technological information already contained in the transduction-receiver, the carrying over of the pre-individual remainder of individuation to the psycho-social dimension of the trans-individual collective, and the resulting re-emergence of the Self in Simondon’s theory could all be seen, perhaps, to find their humourous counterpart in Deleuze’s appropriation of humourality. In Deleuze’s theory of individuation a propos the humoural doctrine, humour replaces the differenciated Self, and an asymmetrical synthesis of individuating intensities replaces the symmetrical synthesis of the four humours and their constitutive warm-cold, humid-dry polarities. In addition to some surprising sources from the history of medicine, we will also consider the rôle of humour in Deleuze’s theory of masochism, as well as Ben Jonson’s dramatising of humourality in the genre of the comedy of humours, which he is regarded as having pioneered.

Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) write that ‘the greatness of philosophy is measured by the nature of the events to which its concepts summon us or that it enables us to release in concepts’ (p.34). I find this statement useful in the discussion of the relationship between knowledge and construction of self; in particular how students use books to make connection to their lives in their final term paper writing for a GE course at Hong Kong Institute of Education in Hong Kong. With reference to one of the provocative Deleuze’s (1990/1995) statements about the two different approaches of reading a book – that is, (1) to see book as a box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies, and (2) to see book as a little non-signifying machine, I argue that the adoption of the first approach, which is commonly seen in the current practices of the first year students in the General Education program at Hong Kong Institute of Hong Kong, does not help students to make connection to different disciplines, nor does it help students to make their lives different. Then I illustrate how the second approach can ensure the deep learning of students, and thus make a change of the life of students possible.
How to disappear completely? Disconnecting As an Act of Resistance Against Social

While it is possible to sketch a lengthy history for academic interest in the emergence of ubiquitous internet and its affects during the past two decades the question of disconnecting has remained almost without consideration. This proposed paper uses disconnecting as a method to analyze the media ecological environment that is built around the internet and shows how hard it is to get out from the social networks. In their book Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, p.406) note that, “Machines and technologies are not neutral and independent entities. They are biopolitical tools deployed in specific regimes of production, which facilitate certain practices and prohibit others”. Machines and technologies exceed the limits of their technical definitions towards media ecological assemblages where technical machines are connected to wider system of social machines and to subjects and their desires that are produced in these connections (Deleuze & Guattari 1983; 1987).

Empirically the interest here is on social networks such as Facebook and Twitter. In technical sense they are comprised of software, cables and interconnected computers to name a few. They are environments where social relationships are established and maintained. They are environments where subjects produce an image of themselves but this image is in no way fixed. These environments are in a permanent beta-stage and as the environments also the subjects transform constantly. Moreover Facebook and Twitter are ubiquitous. They are not reduced to computers or web browsers but travel with the user in different mobile devices and video game consoles. The internet is everywhere around us and we are increasingly being connected to these networks. It is inevitable that the internet is also affecting the ways we live our lives.

Now the question of this proposed paper is: are we able to disconnect from these ubiquitous and all-consuming environments and what does disconnecting tell us about these environments? In the proposed paper I will show step by step what happens when one wants to disconnect from these networks and what one needs to do to disappear completely. For example Facebook shows pictures of friends and appeals not to abandon them. I will also elaborate on the cultural and political meaning of services such as MacFreedom, an application that disables networking on Apple computers for up to 8 hours and suicidemachine.org, which “lets you delete all your energy sucking social-networking profiles, kill your fake virtual friends, and completely do away with your Web2.0 alterego”.

On wider theoretical scale the paper is set up between two poles from media ecology (Fuller 2005) to Foucauldian biopolitics. The former gives tools to understand the internet as an environment through different kinds of connections ranging from material to expressive and virtual to actual. The latter provides a background for discussing how life is produced and molded in a certain (technological) environment. Combining empirical observations and theoretical concepts taken into use from the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari the proposed paper aims to study the subtle control mechanisms that are emblematic to media ecologies based on internet and network culture in general. Simultaneously disconnecting is problematized as a form of resistance (Galloway & Thacker 2007) against the limiting and regulated network culture (Zittrain 2008) that takes control over our lives.
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Title paper: 1967, The Dark Precursor
Abstract: This paper examines a series of striking convergences in a number of disparate texts Deleuze wrote or published in 1967. It seeks to map out a structure that traverses “Coldness and Cruelty,” “Michael Tournier and the World without Others,” parts of Difference and Repetition, and an obscure roundtable devoted to Deleuze’s work at a meeting of the Société Française de Philosophie and later published in its bulletin. This structure is simultaneously that of sadism (not masochism), the world without others (not the structure-Other), the Freudian death instinct (not the unconscious), and the third synthesis of time (not the Aion of Logic of Sense). These works share a dark and anethical vision and a high formalism that might appear anathema to the reception of Deleuze, inflected through the joint work with Guattari, as a purely positive thinker.

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Title paper: From Symbol to Structure: Phantasm Originaire and the development
Abstract: This paper will explore the manner in which Deleuze’s view of Freudian psychoanalysis shifts during the 1960s, apparently in response to Laplanche and Pontalis’ 1964 article “Fantasme originaire, fantasmes des origins, origin du fantasme.” In his 1961, while advancing a reading of the unconscious in terms of a Junguan conception of “Symbols,” Deleuze offered criticisms of Freudian psychoanalysis that reflected his conviction that Freud was incapable of dispensing with the reference to actual subjective experience in order to explain fantasies or regressive phenomena characteristic of masochism. By the latter parts of the 1960s, that conviction appears to have disappeared. Even while he remains critical of an excessive literalism in Freud, especially with regard to the death drive, Deleuze has also adopted a more ‘structural’ reading of the unconscious, and of the production of fantasy in particular. Laplanche and Pontalis’ article, which Deleuze repeatedly cites in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, will be considered as a possible source of this change of view, and evaluated in terms of its larger impact on Deleuze’s view of psychoanalysis in the later ‘60s.
Signs of Digital Sexuality: Queering the Cinematic Image, or What Comes after the

This paper will explore the ways in which Deleuze's writings on cinema and his conceptualization of simulacrum challenge our understanding of both cinema in the digital age, and sexuality beyond binary sexual difference, offering a preliminary outline of an image informed by digitality and sexuality.

The emergence of New Queer Cinema in the last decade of the 20th century has indeed enabled new means to understand and represent sexuality on screen. But more importantly, it has created a new kind of image, expressing the role of sexuality in the transformation of the medium: what queerness and cinema share is a digital ontology, or simulacral logic: an anti-representational dis-organization of relations in time and space, which expresses the power to be digital without technology.

New Queer Cinema's proclaimed detachment from the political call for positive representations of sexual minorities has engendered a Pozitive-Image: no longer concerned with the moral sense of a clear-cut differentiation between positive and negative representations, it is an image that affirms an ethics of life; a viral power to open up to change and becoming, that was unleashed by the advent of AIDS. Being a "Poz" (i.e., HIV positive) doesn't mark an end to life, but the initiation of new ways for living; and these are taken up by cinema in new images and corresponding signs, inviting us to consider a digital mode of (sexual) existence.

Imagining Each Other: ethical intersubjectivity in late modernity

In this paper, I will discuss the development of the moral imagination in relation to the existential conditions of late modernity, polyculturism, and the fact the contemporary ethical subject is answerable to multiple sources of authority. I will suggest that, to be effective in a pluriform environment, the action and reflection of the ethical subject should be kenotically transformative. In other words, unlike the philosopher whose aim is to fashion answers in the on-going conversation about truth, meaning and value, the artist (most distinctively, the poet) positions herself in the face of the ordinary, everyday, flow of events to re-imagine things. It is kenotic because the generosity/generativity of poetry coincides with the abandonment of the text to a life of its own. Usefulness is not the intention of its construction. I will argue that, in weighing up our moral practices, rather than measuring them against some imagined, externally-authored Truth, it is ultimately more effective to hone our moral sensibility so that we are better and better able to imagine the lives of others. That is why the weaver of metaphors or the teller of a personal narrative can be more powerfully persuasive than the purveyor of subjective, rational argument.
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Esotericism and the Mediasphere</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>In our day and age, esotericism persists as a perspective and weapon against the mediasphere (the technological Ge-stell constructed in the 1980s). One can portray the mediasphere as a collective mind (with a substantial basis in the internet and massculture), a hive consciousness in a gigantic cosmic slum. Esotericists have always sought to decondition themselves and re-ground their actions in an 'unconditioned' principle, such as the Deleuzian virtual. Esotericists give us principles and techniques that can be used against the collective 'mind' of capitalism. The problem is that cultivating these powers is extremely demanding (it involves a 'faith' in the concrete sense of having to struggle every day) and so the pressing questions are how to reduce these principles to essentials, how to discuss them with others and how to deploy them in groups.</td>
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Desire and Rhizome: Affective literacies in early childhood</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>This contribution to the panel presentation focuses on drawing as an affective and connective literacy for young children and the ways by which children might engage in/with drawing as a thinking and communication tool. Desiring is immersive. As a child encounters, processes and communicates ideas and connections she transforms or ‘becomes’, working outside her conscious, physical body space. Deleuze &amp; Guattari (1972/1983) call this “autoproduction of the unconscious” (p. 26), otherwise described as the loss of a sense of bodily boundaries. The child is fuelled by desire, interacting chaotically with mind, tool, and intention as she draws. She enters into a state of purposeful but immersive delirium (ibid.); the mind, operating as desiring-machine, works with the hand machine, pencil machine, paper machine. The end drawing/document is a by-product, the shed skin of this out-of-body becoming, this continuous chaotic cycle. It is during production where the drawer encounters singularities, encounters chaos, creates responses and momentarily territorialises chaos. As she draws, she constantly makes connections to things that are “fragmentary and fragmented” (ibid. p. 5), turning, breaking, flowing in unpredictable directions. She cannot reach an end, cannot finish completely, nor mimic or perpetuate prior drawings. She is driven by desire to continuously desire to draw, to continuously hook into that without reaching a conclusion.</td>
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The whereabouts of spatialisation. From Bergson to Deleuze

Although he speaks repeatedly of the complimentarity of philosophy and natural sciences, Henri Bergson is unambiguous in his critique of the use of mathematical notation in science: it amounts to a spatialisation of durée and can therefore not encompass its processual nature. According to Bergson, mathematical and other signs are subordinate to a practical function with the aim of making a world in flux manageable. With this pragmatic and conventionalist interpretation of the use of mathematical signs, Bergson can be placed in a historical context that is shared by Nietzsche and Poincaré. However, in Deleuze's re-articulation of durée in his theory of virtuality in Difference and Repetition, one does not find any of such pejorative use of "sign" and "symbol". Furthermore, the concept of intensity rejected by Bergson as spatialisation of the qualitative attains a prominent status in Deleuze. In my paper, I wish to trace the whereabouts and the transformation of spatialisation between Bergson and Deleuze in the context of the history of science. The hypothesis being that in the historically shifting context of natural sciences, mathematics and philosophy, mathematical practice can become for Deleuze a means (among others) to an end, which was Bergson's very project: to exceed the human condition.

Ontologies of the Fold

Is it possible to use Deleuze's often confusing and complex writing to begin to construct a 'Deleuzian Ontology'? What kinds of thinking, knowing and consciousness might this ontology entail? How useful might such an ontology be in approaching fine art practice based research?

In attempting to begin to address these questions, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque will be used as a reference point from which to begin to outline characteristics and conditions of a possible 'Deleuzian ontology'. In The Fold, Deleuze develops Leibniz's monad; the book explores a complicated and reciprocal interrelation between consciousness and the world, an enfolded engagement that challenges established mind and body divisions, as well as separations between subjective and objective states.

The beginnings of an ontology developed through the paper will be discussed within the context of my PhD research and through interrelationships with my studio practice.
Subjectivité qui « s’ajoute » à la matière – Deleuze and the problem of subjectivity

Abstract
One of the notable characters of deleuzian philosophy is the dismissal of the active, the voluntary and the subjective, which clearly appears in his analysis of “thinking”. In Difference and Repetition, he emphasizes the essential passivity of thinking: we do not think; there is something which compels us to think in the world; thinking is what happens to us...

From the metaphysical or philosophical point of view, we can easily realise the reason for which he insists on this notion of thinking. But what does it bring to the domain of political philosophy? In this case, the validity of deleuzian concept of “pensée” is not self-evident. As far as his philosophy underrates the value of the active, the voluntary and the subjective, it may even promote some kind of cynicism.

In my conference, I will try to respond to this question, by reading one part of Cinéma 2, where he defines – surprisingly – new concept of subjectivity: subjectivité qui « s’ajoute » à la matière.

Kafka: Why Structuralism Is Not a Valence of the Dialectic

Abstract
In his recent book Valences of the Dialectic, Fredric Jameson argues that all structuralist (including post-structuralist) thought has always been dialectic (without knowing it). In this paper, I juxtapose Jameson’s argument to Gilles Deleuze’s extensive definitions and descriptions of structuralism, as offered particularly in his work around the years 1967-1969, to argue, against Jameson, that there is a major difference between dialectical and structuralist modes of thought. The matrix for my comparison is offered by the central definitions of the “dialectic” and “sense” (in its structuralist conceptualization), as offered by Jameson and Deleuze, respectively. Specifically, Jameson (in the aftermath of Adorno and Zizek) distills the dialectic to the following tripartite movement: “Stupid first impression as the appearance; ingenious correction in the name of some underlying reality or ‘essence’; but finally, after all, a return to the reality of the appearance. It was the appearance that was ‘true’ after all” (Valences, 57). Deleuze, on the other hand, begins with the observation that sense is marked by the “paradox of regress or indefinite proliferation”—“for each one of its names, language must contain a name for the sense of this name,” and so on, indefinitely—to arrive at the thesis that, in spite of this indefinite regress, the whole structure of sense requires for its expression four terms: “the name of what [something] really is; the name denoting this reality” or “represent[ing] what [this something] is called”; the sense of this name, which forms a new name or a new reality; and the name which denotes this reality” (The Logic of Sense, 28 and 31). I compare these two models while arguing that they allow for two distinct types of literary analysis, which I exemplify by reading one short story by Franz Kafka. My paper shows that these two distinct philosophical lines of thought and modes of literary analysis lead to two disparate conclusions as to what is (Jamesonian) truth or (Deleuzean) sense—i.e., what the relation between things and propositions is.
Taking as a point of departure the contemporary proliferation of biodatabases that took off after the implementation of the Human Genome Project, this paper will attempt to map out the passage from taxonomic to turbulent modes of data organisation in relation to the individualisation of biological systems. The main argument centres upon the fact that the discreteness of traditional models of taxonomically closed homeostatic diagrams is transforming into epigenetically open continuous systems of fractal interactions, a movement which crucially coincides to the passage from disciplinary to control society. Escaping the rigid taxonomic variables of disciplinary forms and functions, bioinformatics is currently regulating the becoming of global milieus through the turbulent modulation of aleatory events by means of what Deleuze has referred to as “inseparable variations.” While analytic efforts to understand the new form of power have drawn attention to the importance of the ubiquity of digital technologies and networked computers, media-focused readings of control society often obviate Deleuze’s ontological drive for a mathematically conceptualisation of control.

In order to propose a creative connection between Deleuze’s ontological uses of mathematics and control as the contemporary technology of governmentality mimicking the immanent process of becoming, this paper aims to selectively superpose a variety of sources. The latter include the Riemannian notions of discrete and continuous manifold, the Bergsonian method of division as a political philosophy toward emancipation, and, lastly, Deleuze’s own mathematical reading of Michel Foucault’s works, with a special focus on the recently translated lecture series at the Collège de France, “Society Must Be Defended,” “Security, Territory, Population” and “The Birth of Biopolitics.” The “nomadic” mathematics of the problematic (as opposed to the State axiomatic model) will be considered as a way out of the ostensible structural coupling of the preemptive power of control and immanent process of becoming.
The last decade artistic research has grown to be a serious discipline within art institutions and universities. This new direction in the arts seems to be instigated by both the institutions and artists working in all kind of disciplines. I want to question this new form of art in its process and its presentation. Is it just a way of repositioning art in society in a new form or is it something artists and audiences are truly in need of? As an artist myself I have a strong interest in theory. However, I question artistic research being part of scientific or philosophical research. Deleuze and Guattari argued philosophy creates ‘concepts’, art ‘sensible aggregates’, but that they are at the same time inseparable and mutually resonating [Deleuze, Guattari. 1991]. In my artistic practice, I am struggling with this combination of theory and practice, in other words with simultaneously working with concepts, percepts and affects. What comes first, the theory or the practice, the percept, the affect or the concept? Is a theory used to reflect or is a theory tested or visualized in a work of art? Can I be an artist, philosopher and scientist at the same time, or is this multitasking and self-judging just a way to make art works more interesting or even useful in terms of knowledge acquisition? In my presentation, I will reflect on the difference between artistic knowledge, scientific and philosophical knowledge. Is the combination of these fields of research beneficial to the separate research fields themselves and to the artwork in particular?

Social science normally takes the human as both its constitution and its limit. A Deleuzian perspective, by contrast, which is to say a metaphysical perspective, begins with Bergson’s call for philosophy “to go beyond the human state” (2002: 277). The individual, on this view, is not constituted by the human condition, but something else. From a Deleuzian perspective the human is not a limit that is given to thought. Indeed, what is important here is not what the given is, but that by which the given is given (Deleuze, 1994: 140; see also Bryant, 2008). In this paper, we argue that Deleuze’s philosophy is a science in the sense proposed by Duns Scotus (1987: 2): a science of the transcendental. This kind of science is concerned with what is beyond the humanism and anthropomorphism of social science (see also Colebrook, 2004). Deleuze’s philosophy offers social science a transcendental empiricism that does not refer to an image of man but to an image of thought. The transcendental condition should not be sought in the fully constituted individual (Deleuze, 1994: 38) but rather in the problematic forms in which the individual is constituted.
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Title paper Multiplicity and the Logic of Capital
Abstract The final paper concludes with an analysis of state-capitalism as a dialectical structure of relative displacement. Addressing the meta-political import of Deleuzian Noology (the study of the historicity of images of thought), the paper argues that in order to truly critique capital, one must also criticize how thought internalizes the image of the state-form. Philosophy registers in thought a break with this logic of capital, the author suggests, by internalizing the antagonism between two concepts of the multiple: one produced by capital’s deterritorializing movement that decodes as it axiomatizes, and one that can be isolated from this movement.

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Title paper Reading Sites in Experience:
Abstract This paper introduces and explores the idea of an “affective survey”, as a notion that brings together intellectual analysis and haptic exploration in an effort to reformulate a landscape architecture approach to site starting from experience. I present this with reference to my praxis, and via an experiment conceived as a 18’20” sound walk inside Oslo city infrastructure. The project consists of a participatory sound walk where each participant is equipped with a set of binaural headphones. In this performative and temporally mediated urban experiment, the actual experience of the place on site is interchanged with a series of recordings played back through the headphones, which frame a further immersive environment for sonorous aspects to be problematized on site. Suggesting that this work ultimately actualizes a reformulation of site survey, I explain how its formulation in theory is defined through a productive application of the deleuzian concept of ‘affect’– the inherent capacity of perception to open from a singular event to the possibility of an enlarged imagination – to space. Consequently, I also explain how aurality – a fine topology of perceptual events rather than object – has become the chosen valid domain for testing a survey of the affective type in practice.
In human sexuality, remarkably, the determination of the other person would appear as a means to satisfying a craving or desire that originates in the ego and depends on the other’s subordination. The other acquiesces and satisfies my desire, which is as impersonal as it is unconscious as an act. Even the act of mutual satisfaction betrays the essential impersonality of a desire that does not aim to encounter the Other person as another independent consciousness, but to slip away to the hither side of consciousness where self and other are two poles mapped onto a body without organs.

In this sense, Levinas is right in recognizing that sensuality and proximity express a passivity more passive than consciousness, which turn ego’s own relationship to the other into an obsession. This character of obsession is most clearly revealed in the relationship between lovers, but is sublimated or repressed in the relationship between friends. Perhaps this is why Deleuze says that the Greeks placed between friends the idea of the Entity, or the Thing, as a form of protection from the obsessive and passive character of impersonal desire. Following Deleuze, perhaps another way of approaching the obsessive character of impersonal desire is to recognize in its nature something that is fundamentally machinic, which opens a dimension of what Deleuze calls “the non-human sex” in human kind. Very early on, Deleuze was interested in an analysis of sexuality that was purely functional, premised on the production of “real desiring machines”; thus, masochism was viewed from the perspective of the particular kind of desiring machine it produces in relation to the big social machines and technological machines. Later, with Guattari, he goes on to explore other kinds of desiring machines providing that they were also real (real paranoid machines, real schizophrenic machines, etc.) and not reduced to psychoanalytic interpretation. Certainly, the “non-human sex” in sexuality can be recognized as its tendency to function more or less impersonally in combining bodies, statements, feelings, even qualities of pleasure and pain, into an assemblage that “works” by determining the prevalence of certain desiring machines that function socially and politically as well. What Deleuze and Guattari call “Oedipus” is just one desiring machine among others; consequently, the question of ethics in Deleuze and Guattari’s work becomes the following: “What are your particular desiring machines?” “How do they work?”
Abstract
The paper will point to a number of productive resonances between the work of Gilles Deleuze and Derek Parfit on the (non)metaphysical status of social and personal identities, and will conclude with a discussion of some important political and ethical implications that follow from this encounter "between two."

Working from within separate and often oppositional intellectual traditions, both Deleuze and Parfit have developed ontologies of becoming consistent with complex systems theory, where the entities and categories of classical philosophy are replaced by "the rich patterns" of functional relations and dynamic encounters between agents (Cilliers 7). Parfit argues that questions about personal identity are metaphysically "empty" (213), but that neither are they "what matter" (216-217). What matters for Parfit is "Relation R with any cause" (Parfit 216-217, 282), that is, the dynamic connections between and among what Deleuze has termed "singularities" (Deleuze 2ff), whether these describe moments of a single life or encounters between different lives (where a life traces a temporal continuity of singular events).
Abstract
The anorexic has been critically and clinically read as a disembodied isolationist, fleeing all that is ‘natural.’ Contra these understandings, my essay employs a Deleuzian nomadic eco-philosophy to explore anorexia’s multiple belongings. Developing anorexia-in-relation, I propose an ecology of anorexia that takes up Rosi Braidotti’s call to a ‘sustainable nomadic ethics’ of intensities, inter-connections and involutions. I contend that it behoves us feminists to pursue what anorexic bodies do: How do they interact with space? With environment? With animals? And with political movements about food, agriculture, and ethics?

Traditional feminist appraisals of eating disorders have focused on the ways patriarchy and capitalism direct women’s body images; these readings have pursued anorexic aetiologies without considering anorexic practices. I argue that anorexic ontology, considered as active and involved, is simultaneously illness, art, philosophy and science. To approach the transdisciplinarity of disordered eating, Deleuze’s nomadic eco-philosophy offers an exciting connective node between anorexic artistry (the pro-ana movement, memoirs, biographies, and fictions developed by anorexic women) and scientific interpretations of anorexic embodiment. For example, evolutionary biologist Shan Guisinger argues that anorexic bodies are biologically activated tools for the nomadism required of our ancestors: she understands the anorexic (human) animal as tapped into a natural ecology of self-starvation and hyperactivity. This sense of an anorexic ethology fuelled by becomings-animal is supported by the literature written by and about anorexic women. Rather than depicting anorexia as a recoil from the body, this literature often represents disordered eating as a way of intensifying the body’s sensory, experiential, and affective interactions with its surrounding environments. Building on the dominant psychological and aetiological accounts of eating disorders, this essay experiments with a Deleuzian-feminist sustainable ethics of disordered eating. To pursue anorexia as radical immanence is not to validate a dangerous illness, but to understand the visceral complexities that compel and reinforce the practices of millions of women.
Making Sense of territory: the painting event as a territorial gesture

This presentation combines three components of making and thinking about art and territory. Firstly, Lorna Collins will give a presentation which explores why and how art helps us think about territory, using the painting event as a territorial gesture, drawing on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and the paintings of Xéna Lee. Secondly, Xéna Lee will produce a painting in response to this presentation. Xéna’s painting will be made on a scroll of paper on the wall using charcoal and pastel. Thirdly, we will invite the audience to make an artwork in response to both the presentation and the painting. The audience will be asked to observe, reflect, and consider what mark they will make in response to the presentation, the painting, and the territory which arises from this encounter, with a coloured marker on a small piece of transparency (approx. 4”x 6” each). This mark can be a dot, a line, a curve, or a shape, but the audience is asked to summarise their response into a simple mark at the end. These transparencies will then be collected. After the talk, Xéna’s large drawing will be removed and then fixed onto another wall. The transparencies will then be arranged in a composition over three projectors and be projected onto Xéna’s composition on paper.

All three components of this presentation then meet in this installation, which forms an encounter with territory joined by rhizomatic connections across three plateaus of participation (audience, speaker, painter) and method (presentation, painting, collective artwork). Together we begin to make sense of the haecceity of territory and art through geophilosophy.

The Guattarian Otherness: A Pharmakon for the Deleuzian Studies?

Is it possible to read Gilles Deleuze as a singular author? Or must one always include, as Toni Negri once suggested, the mark of the link with Félix Guattari with a hyphen: Gilles-felix. However, Negri adds: one says Gilles-felix as well as one would say Arabia-felix. Felix is an adjective, an accessory, it provides the meaning of happiness into the expression « Happy Gilles ».

The current reception of Deleuze seems to consider « Félix Guattari » as an inevitable addition for the reflection on Deleuze, but makes of it a kind of crutch in order to understand Deleuze. Using a Derridian notion, we could say he stands for a sort of pharmakon: Guattari is always a supplement of Deleuze, whether as a good addition (in Antonioli, Negri or Mengue), or as a bad one (in Badiou or Žižek). This paper will try to question this phenomenon of the reception through the semiotical, philosophical and political fields.
THE SUBJECT OF NOMADIC POLITICS

Abstract
In the last decade or so there has been an exponential increase in Deleuzian interventions into the realm of politics, and not only in political activism but in areas generally under the rubric of political science. As this nomadic politics begins to permeate areas such as security studies, international relations, and traditional realms of political theory, it is worth pausing to investigate the nature of the political subject. Just what kind of political subject would a Deleuzian intervention entail? Such an investigation may shed light on recent Deleuzian deployments in terrorism-security studies, as well as on controversial readings of Deleuze as upholding liberal democratic theory. Drawing heavily on Difference and Repetition and The Fold; Leibniz and the Baroque, this paper argues that as we move with Deleuze into the realm of political theory (and practice), the boundary between systems and subject breaks down, leaving a kind of individual political agent far removed from the political subjectivity that persists—despite decades of heightened attack from various fronts—in modern and increasingly globalized political thought. This paper asks what this folded subject is capable of and readdresses the role of value in politics.

Claiming the Event: Deleuze, Foucault, and Digital Video

Abstract
The paper that I’m proposing to deliver at the third Deleuze International Conference is concerned with the last chapter of Deleuze’s L’Image-temps and its discussion of “electronic images,” “will to art,” and cinema’s “internal struggle with informatics.” I will expand on Deleuze’s suggestive remarks on both future image-making practices and Michel Foucault’s 1980s writings and seminars on subjectivation, truth, and authenticity, in Foucault and in his collection Pourparlers, 1972-1990, in order to evaluate the impact of the digital video (DV) camera as a digital technology of the self that uniquely reveals how cinematic art can be a philosophical practice as well. Deleuze would have been intrigued by Foucault’s recently published Collège de France seminars, Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres (2008) and Le Courage de la vérité (2009), which greatly challenge the monolithic depiction of his ethical turn. Rather, Foucault’s 1980s writings, interviews, and seminars surprisingly provide us with invaluable concepts to make sense of the controversial productions that have characterized the DV camera’s journey so far. Predicated on confessional and autobiographical modes of address that are meant to reveal truth, authenticity, and reality, the DV productions of high-profile filmmakers and so-called amateurs demonstrate that thinking digital cinema and its “will to art” does not have to be limited to CGI or motion capture. The paper will be illustrated using key scenes from Thomas Vinterberg’s The Celebration, Lars von Trier’s The Idiots, and Abbas Kiarostami’s Ten, three productions shot on DV that exemplify a passion for reality depending on the DV camera as both a technological event and a digital technology of the self.
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Title paper: "Fruit Flower Inside Out”. Nomadic thought of PJ Harvey.
Abstract: "Fruit Flower Inside Out”. Nomadic thought of PJ Harvey.

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Title paper: Provoking Instrumentality: an Encounter between Architecture and Music(ology)
Abstract: 'Thought is primarily trespass and violence,... . Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter.’ Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 1968 This paper takes ‘instrumentality’ as a concept in the center of an interdisciplinary exploration in Architecture, Music(ology) and Philosophy. The paper focuses on the shifting of understandings and subsequent applications of this concept in Architecture and Music, through a series of interdisciplinary discussions. Deleuze’s quote above is considered to be the firm spine of this paper. ‘Instrumentality’ seen in the light of ‘Encounter’, opens up a consideration of Architecture and Music beyond the commonly envisaged. Architecture no longer merely functioning as a problem solving practice biased by functionality or as a closed image, unidirectional from author to user. Music no longer functioning as a perfected product that situates interpretations only in the individual’s mind. This paper argues that there is a strong potential for Architecture and Music to be actualized by a Deleuzian inspired consideration of instrumentality, in which they are regarded as continuously shifting and negotiating processes rather than closed results, enabling encounters of interpretations, negotiations and differences, provoking thought to raise up, becoming critical vehicles.
Most audiences have whole-heartedly embraced both the fantasy world so vividly portrayed in the film Avatar and the 3-D technology which makes possible the introduction of new sensuous experiences to the process of movie viewing. This paper will nevertheless take instead as its focus another technology which gives the movie its title and which brings our attention to certain world of forces that eventually suggests a possible way of formulating the body of “the superman” which supersedes the biological notion of organism consisting exclusively of the material of carbon. In addition to the other attractions, Avatar provides a picture beyond the human condition by exploring the new compound of the forces within the Man-form and the new forces of genetic codes as well as silicon and thereby liberates certain inorganic life within the human. Instead of fitting into a well-defined, natural organism, the organs of the body of the Avatar are dispersed among the heterogeneous couplings of genetic codes as well as those between the so-called bios and inorganic matter. The body of Avatar, as those of a wide variety of cyborgs, therefore brings forth a challenge to which Gilles Deleuze’s notion of life philosophy should respond in an age in which new technologies have arisen as a new force which changes traditional configurations of what we call life and body. Finally, as suggested by its title, all types of transversal communication involved in shaping the body of the Avatar follows the movement of doubling. One of the greatest contributions Avatar might make to the agenda of the new body in an age of highly-developed technologies will be how to legitimize the so-called unnatural copies of human bodies by looking into the processes of folding and unfolding which disrupts the discourse arguing for the divide between natural/genuine and artificial/fake in the domains of life and body.
Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) work brings a creative and interdisciplinary approach to philosophy that allows for new understandings of subjectivity and the Unconscious. One way of knowing converts into another; knowledges are interpretations of each other. In the predator-prey relationship between spider and fly, we see how the ‘transcodes’ – which we can read as Spinoza’s ‘idea’ – in an evolution of feedback and response: desire-fear-appetitescape-capture-. indwell not just the particular creatures at either territory-pole of the relationship, but configure the space between them: a webbed-and-winged space, becoming-unbecoming neither spider nor fly. A sensing-knowing permeates the distance and difference between, the emptiness slowly becoming configured as each creature ‘images’ – prehends – the other, echolocating the unknown and unseen. Comparatively, the term ‘perception’ is flaccid with passive receptivity, and once replaced with the more toothed ‘prehension’ – brings back the primal carnality of the process of ‘knowing’ as a grasping i.e., learning. Thus, from within, we are drawn (with)out. Our grasping humaninstrumentality is the tensile-prehensile medium that actively reconstructs the anarmorphic and amorphous space – deterritorialization – between the polarized, ever-vanishing points of within and without, known and unknown, intimate and ultimate, self and other, conscious Mind & the Unconscious.

Since becoming city dwellers and farmers, humans have heavily modified and manipulated environments, creating the regulated striated spaces associated with state systems. Deleuze and Guattari oppose this condition to the smooth space systems of nomadic societies, many of who have been eliminated or displaced by the forces of urbanization and agriculture. Functioning ecological landscapes, typically not those heavily altered by humans, tend to operate more like smooth space, with its emphasis on flow, connectivity, and continual territorial reorganization. Cities and farms have always existed together, often in an uneasy relationship. With increasing pressure on cities to become more ecologically effective, it is imperative that cities, and the lands that surround them, become more integrated. This was a stated objective of the influential Garden City movement developed in Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth century. This study, drawing from Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblage, with its emphasis on productive and innovative relationships between material (objects, organisms, etc.), content (expression) and territoriality, will examine how farms and farmers can be agents of ecological integration and transformation. Or, how can agricultural practices trigger the forces of deterritorialization and reterritorialization to restructure the ecological functioning of striated land?
Entre-temps: Two (and always more) intermezzi between the Deleuzo-Guattarian

Abstract

Amongst the numerous musical influences upon Deleuze and Guattari’s writings, if the “refrain” plays a key role in their discussion of territorialization, it is the “intermezzo” which inaugurates a markedly different inquiry into the nature of force. Integral (as a unit of a series) and divertissement: the intermezzo identifies a zone of potential flight and a structural surplus/lack which refuses assimilation into a linear thematic whole. But to begin by thinking of the intermezzo as a unified concept overlooks an essential heterogeneity – an intrinsic variability – which marks its occurrence, forestalling ready systematization. For elucidation of this problem, this paper turns to two musical works, two intermezzic compositions of starkly contrasting formal import, by the English composer Brian Ferneyhough: Funérailles (1977/1978) and Études Transcendantales (1985). Formal interpretation of these works, each of which advances multiple qualifications to the traditional notion of “intermezzo,” serves as a commencement for a recasting of the dynamics of nomadism/sedentarity and as a site to which the later Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the “entre-temps” (from What is Philosophy?) will be joined. Thus reconfigured, an enriched conception of “nomadic science” emerges defined by its relation not merely to “time” but to the a-temporality of “event.”

Molar resistances on the molecular plane

Abstract

In contemporary digital design, current thinking on the processes of individuation (re)invokes the biological paradigm, which arguably hovers ambivalently between human authors and technological automata, and between human crafted objects and computationally generated ones possessing their own ‘internal resonances.’ This paper is concerned with the shape of creative human citizenship within such a techno-biological milieu. The philosophical task here, if it is one that takes seriously the implications of the biological appropriation — the latter already synonymous with Deleuzian inflections in design, think Manual deLanda’s famous essay “Deleuze and the Use of the Genetic Algorithm in Architecture” — is to seriously place the process of human individuation in contiguity with that of technological objects and processes. The paper will use biology to explain the transduction of information and affect from the human to the machinic in order to posit a resistance to the molecularization of entities as a priori to the processes of individuation upon plane of immanence. Deleuzian molecular thinking has the tendency to homogenize, and thus depoliticise, notions of both difference and continuity between the biological and the technological. Individuation of technological objects with human beings requires another biological analogy, one that comes from rehearsing the work of Dorion Sagan and Lynn Margulis on bacterial molarity, and Georges Canguilhem and Gilbert Simondon’s theorizations of relations between information and endosymbiosis.
From Anarchy to Schizoanalysis: The Philosophical Evolution of Ivan Puni’s

In 1956 the Russian artist Ivan Puni painted his last picture. The product of this final labor is a disturbing image of a harlequin, whose body seems to have become so hopelessly entangled with the platform of his performance that we can be certain the clown will never turn another trick. Disquieting though it is, Dying Harlequin is also the most politically and philosophically sophisticated painting in Puni’s oeuvre. Using work of Deleuze and Guattari as a methodological framework for my analysis of Puni’s paintings, I argue that the artist’s radical Futurist, Suprematist, and Dadaist experiments, as well as his direct involvement in the Bolshevik Revolution, led him to formulate a political philosophy of the visual that culminates in Dying Harlequin. Puni’s formal evolution suggests that in order for painting to be politically emancipatory, it must, first and foremost, stimulate a multitude of new sense experiences, experiences that challenge that viewer’s perception of herself as a finite subject within a coherent body. Dying Harlequin creates just such a haptic surface. However, the haptic “lines of flight” that Puni’s work offers, are distinct from those described by Deleuze in his analysis of Francis Bacon’s paintings. In the final section of this paper, I complicate and expand upon Deleuze’s theory of haptic painting by situating my analysis of Dying Harlequin in dialogue with his examination of Bacon’s work.

The Creativity of Universal History

This paper will examine the nature of creativity in Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of universal history. It will argue that interpretations which overly emphasise the aspect of ‘reversivity’ risk inappropriately aligning Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history of contingency with the State apparatus. However, by reiterating the ‘autocritical’ capacity of universal history, this configuration can be avoided. In the process, history becomes universal-contingent not just because it is put in the services of a present or future power (pouvoir), but because history itself exudes a power of ongoing creativity (puissance). If this gives rise to a notion of history that evades Deleuze and Guattari’s image of State history, then this, I will argue, is precisely the point of their universal history: the positing of a form of history that is nonlinear, contingent and creative, in contrast to the historicism they criticise. By advocating this creative form of history, it is hoped that Philosophy and History will be brought into a productive relation that is coordinate with Deleuze and Guattari’s stated program: “connect, conjugate, continue”.

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Title paper:
From Anarchy to Schizoanalysis: The Philosophical Evolution of Ivan Puni’s

Abstract
In 1956 the Russian artist Ivan Puni painted his last picture. The product of this final labor is a disturbing image of a harlequin, whose body seems to have become so hopelessly entangled with the platform of his performance that we can be certain the clown will never turn another trick. Disquieting though it is, Dying Harlequin is also the most politically and philosophically sophisticated painting in Puni’s oeuvre. Using work of Deleuze and Guattari as a methodological framework for my analysis of Puni’s paintings, I argue that the artist’s radical Futurist, Suprematist, and Dadaist experiments, as well as his direct involvement in the Bolshevik Revolution, led him to formulate a political philosophy of the visual that culminates in Dying Harlequin. Puni’s formal evolution suggests that in order for painting to be politically emancipatory, it must, first and foremost, stimulate a multitude of new sense experiences, experiences that challenge that viewer’s perception of herself as a finite subject within a coherent body. Dying Harlequin creates just such a haptic surface. However, the haptic “lines of flight” that Puni’s work offers, are distinct from those described by Deleuze in his analysis of Francis Bacon’s paintings. In the final section of this paper, I complicate and expand upon Deleuze’s theory of haptic painting by situating my analysis of Dying Harlequin in dialogue with his examination of Bacon’s work.

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Abstract
This paper will examine the nature of creativity in Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of universal history. It will argue that interpretations which overly emphasise the aspect of ‘reversivity’ risk inappropriately aligning Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history of contingency with the State apparatus. However, by reiterating the ‘autocritical’ capacity of universal history, this configuration can be avoided. In the process, history becomes universal-contingent not just because it is put in the services of a present or future power (pouvoir), but because history itself exudes a power of ongoing creativity (puissance). If this gives rise to a notion of history that evades Deleuze and Guattari’s image of State history, then this, I will argue, is precisely the point of their universal history: the positing of a form of history that is nonlinear, contingent and creative, in contrast to the historicism they criticise. By advocating this creative form of history, it is hoped that Philosophy and History will be brought into a productive relation that is coordinate with Deleuze and Guattari’s stated program: “connect, conjugate, continue”.

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A Case-Study of the Three Visual Representations of the American Political

The Web “lost its pivot” with the introduction of Web 2.0.: “This time the principal root has aborted, or its tip has been destroyed; an immediate, indefinite multiplicity of secondary roots grafts onto it and undergoes a flourishing development.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)

Despite the fact that the concept of the rhizome as a mode of knowledge was introduced by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus in 1987, it can be still applied to the 21st-century visual representations of the on-line social networks which did not exist back then. Through the presentation of three colourful 3-D maps of the American politicosphere, and the analysis of those, I will discuss in what ways the demonstrated visual representations correspond to the six characteristics of the rhizome as introduced in 1987 by Deleuze and Guattari. This study of the interactive visual representations of the American politicosphere is related to my PhD thesis about the role of the American politicosphere in the 2008 Presidential elections.

Music and creation in (Deleuze's) Thought: an application

Deleuze’s published analyses of some arts (Cinema, Painting and Literature) surpass in length any of the passages dedicated to music. They are also treated differently than the analyses of some musical aspects (TP 10, 11, courses, PV) Deleuze constructs. Nevertheless music is very important to him, and if we take his conception of art, his descriptions of music, use his theory of Sense and his descriptions of creation, it is possible to understand the way music transverses his thought. It seems that, although he is not silent about music, he is very sober to express its significance for his thought. Maybe because music is too close to it he cannot really justify through concepts what it means. This communication will be divided in two parts. The first part will construct a set of preliminaries to a theory of music according to the mentioned themes in Deleuze. The second part will portray how and why music is interwoven with Deleuze’s thought: music creations recall their Aion of creation; aspect needed for a better understanding of creation in thought. A conclusive part will outline how his thought can be understood through modes of application.
To eat, to speak, to skirt:

Abstract

The ideal little girl, Deleuze tells us in Logique du Sens, is incorporeal and anorexic. Against the commonly obsessive orality of language disorders where everything is brought into the mouth, she brings bodies to the surface, and in so doing destroys their depth, and hers. In eating only words, writes Deleuze, she puts the entirety of language productively at risk, approaching the surface of sense. A schizophrenic little girl, on the other hand, goes the way of Artaud: skirting the terror of what Deleuze and David-Ménard both call an abyss that threatens to consume, the schizophrenic girl experiences the anguish of a language in depth carved, as language, into her very body. She herself constitutes a splitting in language, an involution rather than a bulimic surfacing of expression.

For the conference, I propose an installed performance that explores the meeting of these two figures as a mobile point of schizophrenization. Like a kiss turned Möbius strip, the ideal and the schizophrenic little girl touch to form the tipping point of surface-depth distinctions. The kiss variably bends into depth, compromising ideality and confirming consumption, and flexes into flatness, enabling the production of sense; in its mobile struggle, this threshold kiss approaches pure surface as health-in-becoming.

The ‘Becoming Human’ of Buffalo Boy and Belle Sauvage

Abstract

Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘becoming animal,’ elaborated in a Thousand Plateaus, suggests a shift from macro politics and social structures to micro politics and human relationality. Becoming animal is a concept that counters subjectivity but embraces nomadic communitarianism. Deleuze and Guattari’s engagement with theories that resemble Anishinaabe (First Nations) conceptions of intersubjectivity offer a fruitful site for dialogue; yet in some respects disconcertingly miss the mark. In this paper I contrast the demarcation and ramifications of becoming animal for Western political and disciplinary schemas with Anishinaabe conceptions of intersubjectivity and interrelationality. I critique the concept of becoming animal with reference to performance works by Adrian Stimson (Siksika) and Lori Blondeau (Cree/Saulteaux/Metis). These artists explore the objectification and de-humanization of First Nations peoples in the spectacle of Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show, through the personas ‘Buffalo Boy’ and ‘Belle Sauvage’ (respectively). These performances rupture the seam between art and philosophy and counter discourses between the West and its others in their redeployment of the imaginary native America ‘Indian’ as the menacingly diffident and lascivious curiosity: the becoming animal of the “Indian” is unveiled as the becoming of Western hegemony.
This paper reconsiders Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the movement-image, analysing Deleuze’s engagement with Henri Bergson’s philosophy in Cinema 1 and subsequent emphasis on montage when defining the movement-image, in relation to Film Studies scholarship on early silent cinema. In light of debates surrounding the spectacular nature of the early silent cinema initiated by scholars like Tom Gunning, in particular its relationship to its context of production and consumption, this direction offers a more nuanced understanding of the role of montage in so-called “primitive” cinema to that theorised by Deleuze.

Using early silent trick films by Georges Méliès, this paper reconsiders Deleuze’s conceptual starting point in Cinema 1. Deleuze’s ideas are seen to be conditioned by a human-centrism that unwittingly “silences” the different form of movement-image found in early silent cinema. In contrast to the organic whole of the classical US continuity form, early silent cinema constructed a non-continuous expression of the whole. This non-continuous form of montage relies upon a mix of continuity of framing (continuous space) and discontinuity of editing (non-continuous time), to produce a spectacle or trick that, unlike classical narrative editing, relies precisely upon the exposure of the edit. This is the early silent movement-image, or “attraction-image.”
There are in the work of Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari several instances that demonstrate the importance of transdisciplinarity. With the conference theme on connect, continue and create, it is the aim of this presentation to connect the fields of humanities, science and social sciences, specifically, math, art, and language arts in an empirical study. The research studies how children conceptualize writing systems in math, language and art classes through a lens of Multiple Literacies Theory (MLT) which itself is influenced by concepts from Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari. Literacies are conceptualized as processes in becoming other while reading, reading the world and self. Children were observed during math, art and language arts classes and interviewed afterwards. Rhizoanalysis was the methodological lens that explored the relationship of reading, reading the world and self and children’s conceptualization of writing systems in these classes. The analysis calls upon MLT and concepts of becoming, affects and percepts, virtual and actual, and differences in becoming other in order to understand children’s conceptualization of writing systems across disciplines. In addition, given that this study took place in classrooms, significant consideration is given to smooth and striated spaces. Rhizoanalysis deterritorializes conventional methodology under the guise of transgressive data and transcendental empiricism. What are the implications for the role of Deleuzean nomadic methodology in multiple literacies research?
Masochism is both a gifted suffering and an ethics of ecstasy. In What is Philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari state art makes us inhuman. This paper will extend the concept of ‘art’, in a perverse extension of Kantian ethics, toward all practices of self and relations with the outside. The outside encounter, always within and inflecting without the self that reflects the self with the outside, creates an almost unbearable contract of desire, glimpses of the already gone and never arrived. Through experiences of pleasure as despotic encounters the human subject suffers the pain which gives expression to inhuman ecstasy. Such ecstasy should and does hurt. Cruelty can be understood as an ethics of threshold being, the necessary sacrifice of self that is gifted to the unforeseeable and imperceptible contract with the other(s). Far from negotiating this practice as a sacrifice, we can reinterpret Deleuze and Guattari, with Bataille, Blanchot and Serres, as a jubilant slaughter and jouissant masochism. Deleuze’s exploration of the contract of masochism creates a body gripped within an intensity of waiting. For Deleuze and Guattari the masochist’s is a body that quivers with the anticipation of that to come which nonetheless never arrives. While this suggests masochism deals with the not yet and afterwards, thinking desire in between and beyond this configuration of the time been and the time to come is an encounter of ecstasy. They emphasise becomings have neither genesis nor destination. Thus far from waiting for an external object, the ecstatic’s body is in a perpetual state of suspension and immanence, an ecstasy which takes the body outside of time into a space without background or foreground, object or subject. In Deleuze’s work on the baroque, desire is a pleating which constitutes its own planes of consistency. The encounter is present in the suspension which is not of but which is pleasure and desire simultaneously, an undifferentiated want, an overwhelming fold, a ‘too-much’ and ‘not-enough’. Guattari’s third and most important register of ecosophy requires the reconfiguration of subjectivity and so ecstasy can be conceived as a sexual ethic. Ecstasy, while including masochism and becomings, affirms the inevitable impossibility of self in events of encounters with desire, art and thought. These ideas will contextualise Deleuze and Guattari with other continental philosophies of ecstasy, including ecstasy as a kind of grace (cf Serres), an encounter with the outside (Foucault), a ‘going under’ (Blanchot) ‘use Me’ (Lyotard) and a vitalistic sacrifice (Bataille). These theories will be worked through examples such as extreme body modification – the body to come; baroque art – the a-semiosis to come; perversion – the practise to come and Deleuze and Guattari’s sorcery – a demonological ethics to come.

This paper will create new connections between these philosophers and the delirium of inhuman ecstasy which, rather than seeing the event of masochism as a discrete encounter of desire or contract, creates an ethical and pleasurable imperative to form contracts with infinite potentialities of self and emergent others as events of art. While the masochist traditionally exists in suspended waiting for the pleasure that never arrives, inhuman ecstasies encounter the beyond through a going under and spilling over that is already too present and voluminously corporeal.
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<tr>
<td>Title paper</td>
<td>The glorified body: A reterritorialization of death</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>In the later part of the Grundrisse manuscripts, Marx considers the relation of fixed capital as the means of labor to living labor. As a consequence of the capitalists’ drive to overcome time by time, the means of labor undergo a metamorphosis culminating in the machine, or in an entire ‘system of machinery’. In the interface of machines and living labor, each undergoes modification in relation to the other. Living labor at first appears as a mere “conscious organ” scattered at numerous points in the mechanical system. With the accumulation of knowledge, skill and the “general productive forces of the social intellect,” machines themselves “come alive” consisting of “numerous mechanical and intellectual organs.” Likewise, machines alter the physiological, emotional and psychological make-up of living labor. In final sections of the Grundrisse, Marx adumbrates ways machines will alter both the human and the social organism. Marx’s concept of a ‘system of machinery’ is integral to Deleuze and Guattari’s unique conception of historical materialism. For Deleuze and Guattari, the machine is a locus of desire and production, of desire in production as social production and of production in desire as desiring-production. Desire and production thus form a single realm populated by machines. Deleuze and Guattari build on Marx’s analysis of the machine/human interface in a synthesis with Freudian libidinal economy. In this paper, I use concepts gleaned from Deleuze and Guattari’s historical materialism to offer a critique of nanotechnology. Specifically, I use the concepts of territoriality, deterritorialization and reterritorialization in tracing the reemergence of medieval notions of the “glorified body” in contemporary reflections on the ultimate consequences of advances in nanotechnology and the human/machine interface. I conclude the paper by drawing a comparison between Deleuze and Guattari’s work and on the work of Paul Virilio in a discussion of how the application of nanotechnologies involves a radical recoding of the human as a consequence of the realization of the simultaneity or instantaneity of the point of departure and return of circulating capital.</td>
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This paper will examine the notion of “shock to thought” as expressed in writing of Gilles Deleuze in relation to the emergent formation of image-making within process of painting. It will trace Deleuze’s term back to its source in classical philosophical aesthetics of Kantian sublime whereby the mind recoils when confronted with the immensity of uncontrollable power (sublime), sending thought into a shock.

While Deleuze developed this notion in order to address the aesthetics of image present in post-war cinema, in this paper I will argue the importance of ‘shock to thought’ in mapping out the potentiality inherent within painting as means of overcoming conceptual stasis; not ‘turning affects into concepts’ (Deleuze and Guattari) but rather opening multiple lines or trajectories in order to explore new interventions and readings within painting.

The question is, how does painting arrive at this incessant open movement, and what does it do with it? Ultimately, such potential in forming images without closure, suggests a working practice that is concurrently affective and conceptual, figurative and abstract. This remains a radical moment which painting, the paper argues, must inhabit in order to deal with the ‘perpetuation of catastrophe’ (Deleuze) as a way of affirming its vitality.

This article aims to delineate cuts on the lines of forces that crosses on vestiments flows appropriated by Art. Taking the zigzag movement punctuated by the philosopher Gilles Deleuze as a research method and a writing strategy, our journey tries to cover concepts as well as ressonating body, line of flight, becoming, event and territory. We present five works selected in the art field that cross the questions delineated (Chandelier, Steven Cohen, Joanesburgo, 2002; Procuro-me, Lenora de Barros, São Paulo, 2001; A-Z Six Month Seasonal Uniforms, Andrea Zittel, New York, 1991-2002; Sem título: mochila, Marcelo Cidade, São Paulo, 2005 and Desapego, Marilá Dardot, São Paulo, 2005). The article explores ways of relation and production of senses in the field of encounters constituted by clothes in Art. The journey is also pervaded by the theories of the psychoanalyst Felix Guattari's and by other voices, as Suely Rolnik e Luis Orlandi, among others.
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Title paper: The Crackle and the Pop – Texture, noise and haptic listening in vinyl  
Abstract: This paper uses a combination of music theory, media theory and philosophy to show how audible irregularities in vinyl records, the so called crackles and pops, have a diagrammatic function, that is: they push and pull the listener’s attention back and forth between two different levels of experience. Instead of working only as a transparent window on music (melody, form, rhythm, lyrics), vinyl also provides for an affective relationship between the listener and the medium itself (its materiality, body, texture, noise). Building on the difference between qualities and intensities, the analogue and the digital, immediacy and hypermediacy, and the haptic and the optic, this paper explores the notion of ‘haptic listening’ as a unique form of touch that can reveal itself in the everyday experience of mediated music.

Surname: Minissale  
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Title paper: Unpacking a Body without Organs: Marcel Duchamp’s La Boîte-en-Valise  
Abstract: Recent research in neuroscience has attempted to fix the organ of the brain and its neural pathways at the centre of the self, the body and the body of art. As an arborescent structure this places constraints on the productivity of a Body without Organs. It extends the philosophical and scientific traditions of specialisation and discipline held over the body and what it can do. Rather than creating new concepts about how the brain and mental life are connected to a living diversity of social contexts, we are restricted to the empirical procedures of science and logic and their universalizing rubrics. However, instead of using this hierarchical model of bottom-up or top-down neural processes to explain art and causality, a multi-directional and transversal connectivity between neuroscience, art and philosophy is possible. I intend here to show how Deleuze and Guattari’s Body without Organs and Marcel Duchamp’s La Boîte-en-Valise (Box in a Suitcase) 1935-41 are mutually productive. Duchamp’s box, placed in a nomadic suitcase, contains replicas of many of his own works of art. It is possible to hold, unpack and repack his artistic corpus. Each object is an intensity which forms a multiplicity of durations creating new connectivities both inside and outside the box. This is a becoming of a distributed system of parts: brain-body-world, but without the causal hierarchies of neuroscience, or the phenomenological first person. Perhaps most surprisingly, the work acts as a fold between sensation, percept and concept and helps us to better understand how this fold connects neuroscience, art and philosophy.
In the following paper I investigate Guattari’s notion of transversality in terms of the relation between a process of heterogenesis – i.e. a generative unfolding of and from the point of view of the different, and virtual conditions of enunciation.

I depict the connection between a complex becoming and different levels of expression as a multidimensional space-time interface, and investigate it in detail onto three different levels:

1) At the level of the emergence of the individual in terms of individuation, as theorized by Gilbert Simondon and the early Deleuze.

2) At the level of the emergence of collective behavior of divergent entities by investigating basic mechanisms of Prigogine’s theory of dissipative structures.

3) At the level of re-composition of the former two stages within the neural activity in the brain, by exploring insights of contemporary neurophysiological research.

I will attempt to discuss a possible interrelation between these various dimensions in terms of the formation of what Guattari calls an ecosophic cartography.

This paper approaches the relation of literature to politics from the perspective of ‘vague concepts’ presented in the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari characterize vagueness as ‘neither inexact like sensible things nor exact like ideal essences;’ rather, they are ‘anexact yet rigorous’ (367). In What is Philosophy? they characterize vague concepts this way: “It is true that the concept is fuzzy or vague not because it lacks an outline but because it is vagabond; it is made up of inseparable variations that pass thru zones of indiscernability and change its outline” (143).

This paper moves by means of two gestures; the first gesture traces not an exact outline, but follows the variable and shifting anexact outlines of delirium as it appears in Essays Critical and Clinical in order to argue that Deleuze uses delirium as a vague concept. Deleuze’s Essays is the only book he devoted primarily to literature; how is the vague concept specifically productive when applied to the literary domain? The second gesture, then, situates the vagueness of delirium in terms of the social and political dimensions of literature. Cultural studies critics are keen to create and maintain the political relevance of literature. I argue that many assumptions in their ‘aesthetic’ approach severely limit the potential for how literature may be viewed as political. It is precisely the vagueness of the concept of delirium that opens the potential to see literature as ‘directly political,’ in ways that aesthetic readings of literature cannot.
G. Deleuze and F. Guattari developed a system of semiotics which maps institutional situations, adding to L. Hjemslev’s categories of expression and content and their subsequent triple division into matter, substance and form, two further dimensions of a-semiotically formed matter (meaning as the material of expression) and the continuum of material fluxes as the material of content. Though the institution of psychiatry has always remained in the foreground of their concerns, a less noticed fragment of “A Thousand Plateaus” achieves an application of this semiotic model to Foucault’s analysis of the prison: this shows the lucrative effects of such an approach when analyzing other types of institutions.

Appropriating this tool, the proposed paper is concerned with an analysis of the art institution. It aims to meet the question of the conditions and possibilities of a new type of institutional critique within the art institution. It will also engage with contemporary reflections on its present state such as Hito Steyerl’s conclusion that critique is nowadays symbolically integrated on the surface of the institution without any material consequences within it, or Andrea Fraser’s view that the (art) institution has progressively grown inside of us, for which reason any exterior critique is impossible.
DELEUZE AND ARTAUD: THE CHASMS OF THE 'BODY

Abstract

Gilles Deleuze’s work is sometimes most indebted to Antonin Artaud (d. 1948) when he is not cited or mentioned at all, as in the discussion of the “doubling” of consciousness in Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 2004, 273-4). Deleuze, in partnership with Félix Guattari, has given us detailed lineaments of the “body without organs” (Deleuze and Guattari 1977, 1987; Deleuze 1989) that remains even more mysterious and Tantric and “impossible” in its originator, Artaud. Although philosopher Christian Kerslake terms A Thousand Plateaus a “late modern occult treatise” (Kerslake 2007), both Deleuze and Guattari were frequently dismissive of anything smacking of mysticism, despite the invocation of sorcery, Taoism and Zen in different parts of their A Thousand Plateaus, and the links of the “body without organs” to Buddhist philosophy especially (Berardi 2008, 98-101).

In the “body without organs” they put into play a term that seems to go far beyond simply a body loosing its conditioning, going beyond what William Burroughs called the body’s “algebra of need” (Burroughs 1959). It partakes of the “virtual” (another term we owe in this respect to Artaud) and the indeterminacy of any process of subjectivation. It is the project of this paper to explore Artaud’s use of this term, beginning in 1946, that was the awesome and ferocious culmination of Artaud’s reconstitution in and despite nine years of asylum confinement, and a continuation of his commitment to a ‘Theater of cruelty’ that he was hoping to re-stage in a more extreme version within months of his death. The “projection of the true body” was the object of Artaud’s prodigious series of writings, drawings, gris gris, and notebook entries (some more than 30,000 pages), the quantity of which in just a two-and-a-half year period dwarfs his output during his to date still better known period roughly 1924-37 that contains his work with the Paris Surrealist group. This “later” Artaud is when Artaud produced some of his most honed work, his most complete statements on the “new body” and the theater in texts like “Theater and Science” (Artaud 2004, 1544-48), and the radio broadcasts, that Artaud felt had provided a “model in miniature” of what the ‘Theater of cruelty’ could be (Artaud XIII, 1974, 127). The extremity of Artaud’s vision has rarely been matched, and one can see the entirety of Artaud’s later work as another sort, or spell, such as those that Artaud sent from Ireland beginning in 1937 (Barber 2008). What all this work revolves around is the projection of the “true body” into a kind of immortality despite the demonic assaults that surround and harm it. Japanese Butoh in its early performances test the extension of the body in similar ways that suggests Artaud yet even here there is a question of what could actually approach Artaud’s radicality.

To compare Artaud’s abysmal apocalyptic notion of the “body without organs” with Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari’s brilliant elaboration of it, is to describe the chasm and gap between the two versions, while illuminating what pragmatics and currency, if any, this idea continues to have.
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title paper</strong></td>
<td>Deleuze – Towards a minor (neuro) aesthetics</td>
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<td><strong>Abstract</strong></td>
<td>With the discovery of the autonomy of the cinematographic image as a brain materialized on the screen in his books on Cinema, Deleuze adopts what we can call a neurological conception of aesthetics or a pan-psychic concept of Nature. The brain is an immanent life at the same time as inorganic life (a pure image in contemplation of itself), and what art produces as the most impersonal, pre- and a-subjective life: microbrains present in all Nature, or, as Deleuze says, the “collective brain” of the small species like plants. This vitalism essential to all form of existence, from human brain to plants, is condensed in What is Philosophy? by Deleuze in one expression: the inorganic life of things. “Not every organism has a brain, and not all life is organic, but everywhere there are forces that constitute microbrains, or an inorganic life of things”. Art is both a cerebral experimentation like thought (instead of faculties, Deleuze proposes the microbrain), and an artistic creation of a life as immanence of the sensation. Art is then a transcendental empiricism of the sensation as an inorganic exercise of the brain. Can we see in Deleuze some contributions to neuroaesthetics?</td>
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<td><strong>Title paper</strong></td>
<td>Deleuze and Citizenship: From Migration to Nomadism</td>
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<td><strong>Abstract</strong></td>
<td>The second paper then examines the political implications of Deleuze’s vision of social transformation in the concrete case of non-status migrant struggles. It argues that Deleuze and Guattari have been unduly neglected by border theory, in part, because of an underdevelopment and misunderstanding of their concept of nomadism. By rejecting the popular and unhelpful misconception of this notion of nomadism as simply “an assembly of deterritorialized flows without borders,” it builds off the previous paper in order to rethink this conception of transformation as a sustained institutional process able to support a new political condition, an assembly of concrete elements, and a new form of political subjectivity (all frequently neglected dimensions of the concept of nomadism).</td>
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Title paper: The Outlaw Collective: Skateboarding & Rhizomatic Countermapping  
Abstract: As I am pursuing a critico-theoretical exploration of skateboarding (recently, the political potentiality that may be inherent in skateboarding), this is an attempt at outlining the ways Deleuze & Guattari's concepts of the 'rhizome' and the 'map' are integral to an understanding of skateboarding's movement through, interaction with, and refiguring/reimagining of the spaces of urbanity. Skateboarding offers a modus operandi from which one is able to question and edit the built elements of architecture as well as the spaces of urban planning. Deleuze & Guattari offer a theoretization from which actions inherent to the culture of skateboarding are politically active and socially significant. This inherent politicality suggests new avenues, lines of flight, points of pursuance in political resistance.

Surname: Nigianni  
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Title paper: The Gaze that is Touching:  
Abstract: This paper will argue for a rethinking of the concept of ‘resonance’ as a relating-without-a-relationship, thus attempting a critical reversal of its definition in Deleuze’s work The Logic of Sense. Starting from the cinematic thinking of Chantal Akerman’s film Toute Une Nuit, the paper will revisit critically debates about the Singular and the Whole, the Multiple and the One, suggesting a new ethics of relating as it occurs in this cinematic event: a relating that produces an Oneness as an ephemeral Whole, where the Intimate and the Anonymous participate together in the creation of a multiple subjectivity organised as ‘succession without distinction’ (Bergson 1888); a desiring and desired subjectivity that hesitates between dis/appearing, always caught between a “too early” and a “too late” presence.

Akerman’s image does not depict or represent desire, even less it talks about it. It constitutes a desiring image by itself, where desire in this case is defined as “the freedom to be sexual, that is, to be something else at the same time.” (Guattari, 1996, 56) The Akermanian image is static though not fixed; you might say instead that it has been caught appearing, appearing still, being suspended between different temporalities. The image breathes out a zero time as the ultimate time of vitality: an image that stops clock time only to affirm temporality as desire; no longer a linear time but a serial fragmented time of density, intensity, implosions. By losing its normative orientation, Akerman’s desire fails to culminate, dramatising instead the contractile abilities of feelings and affects. It thus produces another affective economy of a gaze that is touching rather than grasping, comprehending, possessing. An erotic gaze that invites us: “to love the anonymous individual elements. In their crowding, as distinct from the crowd. Time again. Still time”. (Masumi 2006)
Provoking Instrumentality: an Encounter between Architecture and Music(ology)

Abstract

'Thought is primarily trespass and violence, ... Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter.' Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 1968

This paper takes ‘instrumentality’ as a concept in the center of an interdisciplinary exploration in Architecture, Music(ology) and Philosophy. The paper focuses on the shifting of understandings and subsequent applications of this concept in Architecture and Music, through a series of interdisciplinary discussions. Deleuze’s quote above is considered to be the firm spine of this paper. ‘Instrumentality’ seen in the light of ‘Encounter’, opens up a consideration of Architecture and Music beyond the commonly envisaged. Architecture no longer merely functioning as a problem solving practice biased by functionality or as a closed image, unidirectional from author to user. Music no longer functioning as a perfected product that situates interpretations only in the individual’s mind. This paper argues that there is a strong potential for Architecture and Music to be actualized by a Deleuzian inspired consideration of instrumentality, in which they are regarded as continuously shifting and negotiating processes rather than closed results, enabling encounters of interpretations, negotiations and differences, provoking thought to raise up, becoming critical vehicles.

Wilhelm Reich's Body Without Organs

Abstract

While exploring the writings of Gilles Deleuze it is easy to get struck by some of his more peculiar interests. I aim to make sense of a certain attraction he feels towards the cast away psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich and the Beat Generation that worshipped him.

What could a philosopher have to learn from a company of junkies, drunks and a paranoid schizophrenic? I have chosen Reich’s concept of “orgastic potency”, which is crucial in understanding his work, to be my guide in search for answers. As expected these answers will help us to better understand Deleuze’s critique of traditional psychoanalysis. The early Reich equated mental health with orgastic potency, defined as the unhindered flow of libidinal energy. Reich’s later work expanded this model to the entire universe. My paper explores how Reich’s paranoid schizophrenia allowed him this deterritorialization of sexuality. Reich’s pathology did not crumble him, nor did it cloud his vision, it merely helped him to see even better what had always been his obsession, namely the orgasm. I believe that Deleuze’s fascination with Reich lies, at least in part, in Reich’s mysticism: Reich’s ontology became sexual and his sexuality became the constitution of an intensive body without organs.
As a work of art, The Wire can also be regarded as a sociological study. Here I like extend this to be a form of “science”. Of course, The Wire is not natural science, but it is science in the sense that it, if not creates, at least traces and illuminates social and institutional functions. In this way it is representational and aims for sociological and political realism (albeit, as Toscano & Kinkle suggests, with a certain “epistemological reflexivity”).

The line “What, they gonna study our study?” from The Wire seems like a jab at sociologist that would later study the study that is The Wire itself. The jab implies that a scientific study of the show would be tautological, since the latter already is a scientific study (of social functions). But what if the study was to be dealt with through philosophy in the Deleuzean sense? Doing this I will contrast this art/science with a philosophical conceptualization of the (unconscious) overall temporality that the show, on a level of art, expresses through basing itself explicitly on (the vicious circles of) Greek tragedy. I will then conclude that “a study of their study” might be more but tautological.

In this paper I explore a number of interrelated concerns that have to do, on the one hand, with the recent “speculative turn” (or so-called speculative realism) in non-analytic/non-continental philosophy; and with how Gilles Deleuze’s ontology, on the other, complements many of these speculative orientations, but does so in a way that, far from rejecting Kant’s transcendentalism as promoting correlationism (as is commonly suggested), embraces it in a revised form. Indeed, following much of the recent debate over Kant’s legacy for realist ontologies (Shaviro, Bryant, et al.), there is a sense in which Deleuze, especially when read alongside A.N. Whitehead, preserves the “thing-in-itself” as the virtual being of objects. This gesture, instead of privileging subject-object relations, as is generally submitted by anti-correlationists, is extended in Deleuze to the entire universe insofar as all objects (in their virtuality) withdraw from their (cognitive) relations with other objects, irrespective of human concern for them. What I submit, however, is that this reinvigoration of Kant (via Deleuze) for the so-called “speculative turn” sparks, as Steven Shaviro has noted, a new series of questions surrounding access to the being of objects; which is to say, pace Graham Harman, the Deleuzian contribution to speculative metaphysics lies, among other places, in exploring notions of non-cognitive access to objects, that is, their potential to affect and be affected by other objects.
The controversial, fake essay, written by the physicist Alan Sokal and published in 1996 by the cultural studies journal, Social Text, begins with a statement that is no hoax but that rings true for many, if not most, researchers in the natural sciences. The statement is that “there are many natural scientists, and especially physicists, who continue to reject the notion that the disciplines concerned with social and cultural criticism can have anything to contribute, except perhaps peripherally, to their research.” This view is affirmed by Nobel prize winner in physics, Steven Weinberg, in comments appearing in The New York Review of Books. Admitting that he found the news of Sokal’s hoax amusing, Weinberg goes on to confirm Sokal’s position. “Those who seek extrascientific messages in what they think they understand about modern physics are digging dry wells. I think that… the results of research in physics (as opposed, say, to psychology) have no legitimate implications whatever for culture or politics or philosophy.”

Nevertheless, it can be shocking to philosophy and the social sciences when a theoretical physicist claims that philosophy and social science bear little relation to research in the natural sciences and that their practitioners should avoid making claims based on their interpretation of those changes. Philosophers, historians and social scientists have linked changes in natural scientific methods and theories to changes in worldview, where the latter is defined as “a system of beliefs that are intertwined, inter-related, interconnected.” Of course, it is precisely what scientists have called “radical claims in popular books,” implying that “fundamental flaws have been found in the scientific worldview and that one has to rethink the notion of law of nature” that has apparently aroused the fury of natural scientists. Whether or not the development of a worldview based on a dominant scientific paradigm is an error, such worldviews have been and continue to be posited, it is important that we ask ourselves what the consequences of each worldview might be, beginning, for purposes of this analysis, with the classical model of nature, which arose along with classical physics.

Sir Isaac Newton was the first scientist able to prove that the motions of bodies on Earth and the motions of heavenly bodies are governed by the same set of natural laws. Describing the three laws of motion and universal gravitation, Newton made possible classical mechanics, the science capable of predicting the motion of bodies deterministically (according to unchanging rules) and with certainty. Using the new mathematics, developed simultaneously by Newton and Gottfried Leibniz, the calculus of infinitesimals, it was possible to track instantaneous changes in the motions of bodies. The laws of physics are expressed in the language of differential equations. This is true for the equations governing the flow of heat, air and water; for the laws of electricity and magnetism; even for the unfamiliar and often counterintuitive atomic realm where quantum mechanics reigns. The laws of physics are expressed as differential equations and physicists are engaged in the creative and constructive search for the right differential equations for every process, for every flow.

The differential equations of calculus measure quantities subject to change, where the quantity changes continuously. Differential equations describe growth, development and decay; when processes in the physical world are translated into mathematical terms, they form a continuum, “a set of ‘points’—real numbers—arranged in a line that stretches out to infinity in both directions,” and “numerical measurements of time and of physical quantities, such as length, temperature, weight, velocity, are assumed to be ‘points’ on the continuum.” Processes taking place along the continuum can move forward or backward, as the calculations hold in either direction. A significant
philosophical problem for these methods is that human communication arises out of the past; it is part of the endless steam of prior knowledge, and, like thermodynamics, communication cannot be considered time reversible, for only in the course of time can a genuine goal be pursued and only in the course of time can freedom confirm itself, manifesting itself in its outcomes.

To utilize and expand on the possibilities offered by differential calculus, Gilles Deleuze proposes what may be called a sublime Idea, an Idea in the Kantian sense, insofar as it arises from and regulates its field immanently. “Already Leibniz had shown that calculus . . . expressed problems which could not hitherto be solved or, indeed, even posed (transcendent problems),” problems such as the complete determination of a species of curve or, problems characterized by the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise.

But what if we wish to make determinations beyond a single curve? Is there a means to make “a complete determination with regard to the existence and distribution of . . . [regular and singular] points which depends upon a completely different instance,” an instance characterized in terms of a field of vectors? The goal here is to explicitly link differential equations and vector fields. A vector field is defined, by Deleuze, in Difference and Repetition, as the complete determination of a problem given in terms of the existence, number and distribution of points that are its condition. This corresponds fairly well to the more or less standard mathematical definition where a vector field is defined as associating a vector to every point in the field space. Vector fields are used in physics to model observations, such as the movement of a fluid, which include a direction for each point of the observed space. Let us try to flesh this out.

If, as Deleuze claimed, it is the condition of a problem, that it would be the object of a synthesis of the Idea, then what is this Idea? The problem, which has been set out here, is that of the existence, number and distribution of points. This problem would be the object of a certain Idea, initially no more than the abstract Idea of a vector field, a model consisting of vectors (in physics, an abstract entity that has magnitude and direction in a plane or in three-dimensional space, or in a space of four or more dimensions) in vector space, from which may be projected an infinity of possible trajectories in space-time. In mathematics (specifically linear algebra), the rules of association, commutation and distribution define vector space without reference to magnitude or directions, thus they may be utilized in a variety of fields whose terms are not material or physical. The rules of association, commutation and distribution are the least restrictive set of linear rules that remain commutative, that is, for binary operations, any order is possible. They are also the rules governing Kantian practical reason, that is, they tell us what actions are universal in their application.

What is significant about Deleuze’s use of these rules is that, like Kant, Deleuze argues that the rules for vector space apply to nature. This means that the rules have ontological effects and that nature is associative, commutative, and distributive. Thus, mere association, as opposed to unity, means that the laws of nature distribute parts which cannot be totalized, and that nature is conjunctive, expressing itself as this and that, this or that, rather than as Being, One or Whole. Following Kant’s transcendental Ideas, the claim is that we can never have knowledge of nature as a whole. Divine power is manifest in relation of disjunction, in diverse parts (places, species, lands and waters) organized in a system in relation to an idea; each self is not identical to any other but is represented by the categorical relation of that self with an idea; and every body comprising the world consists of diverse matter, manifest in the hypothetical or
causal relation between an idea and that diversity. As such, nature is associative, commutative and distributive and our knowledge of nature is limited to its immanent, regulative functions. If nature’s immanent, regulative functions are associative, commutative and distributive, each of these, as mathematical or logical operations reflects a view of nature as the power of things to exist one by one without any possibility of them being gathered together in a unity. Following these rules, whatever has been added together can be taken apart and reformulated. Thus, becoming seems to be everywhere, nowhere is anything gathered together into a totality. How then, if nothing is gathered together, how is it possible to have a world or a concept of a world? Examining this question will be the goal of the rest of this essay.

Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism and a new science of coordination dynamics.

Inna Semetsky, University of Newcastle, Australia

When Deleuze (and Guattari) claimed that science and philosophy take opposed paths (in WIP), they had in mind a reductive model of mechanistic science grounded in linear causality and a strict separation between the observing “subject” and the observed “object” as per “scientific method”. However, contemporary advances across both natural and human sciences brought to the front a new science, the so-called science of coordination dynamics (Kelso and Engstrom 2006) according to which subject and object are not detached from each other but together form a complementary relation.
This paper suggests a reading of the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the ‘ritournelle’ in literature as a literary device to create a ‘memoryspace.’ The ritournelle, as explained in A Thousand Plateaus, in the initial passages of “1837: Of The Refrain,” has three aspects: it might be a fragile point of order, a fragile circle of control (territorial refrain), and a line of flight to the outside (cosmic refrain). My argument is that these aspects might appear in the form of mental images in a work of literature to create a ‘memory-space.’ A memory-space involves an element of the past (a rhythm, a melody, a room, or even an old cupboard, or the face of the beloved) deterritorialised in the present and the affect/effect generated from this encounter. The element of the past reappears in the present as deterritorialised and changes the ethos of the territory, which is experienced by the character both somatically and mentally. Hereby is created an extensive space, where the past, the present, and the future takes on a new meaning. In Tanpinar’s novel Huzur (A Mind at Peace), the protagonist has such encounters at numerous instances. Sometimes an antique piece of furniture, sometimes an old song, sometimes a boat trip to the islands, sometimes the image of the Bosphorus appears and reappears in the novel each time deterritorialised, and generates an extensive memory-space where the past, the present, and the future takes on a new meaning. These instances will be analysed to offer an interpretation of the ritournelle as a literary device to give memory experiences. A novel which takes its problematic as negotiating the old and the new, the past and present, the memory and the lived moment, Huzur is penned by Tanpinar in 1948 with inspirations drawn from Proust, and Bergson’s theory of time and memory.
Temporality, Creativity, and Affective Expression in South Indian Cinema

Relying upon ethnographic work on location with a south Indian film director shooting two successive commercial films, in relation to the cinematographic writings of Gilles Deleuze, Henri Bergson, and Andre Bazin, this paper explores a cinematic experience of time as a creative duration of emergence. I seek to suggest that such a texture of time is essential to such filmmaking as a process of affective expression. If modern cinema allows for an intuition of time in flux, that is, its capacity to do so may often depend upon the inhabitation of such time on the part of its makers. Closely attending to the cinematic thought and working practice of one director, the paper focuses on the various ways in which practices of shooting on location may be taken to extend the virtual horizons of one’s perceptions, actions, and affections. Each of these three domains of experience, in other words – perception, action, and affection – are proposed as means by which time itself is encountered as creative in nature. To scout, shoot, and inhabit such a milieu to make oneself open to what it might yet become as it is filmed: to move along with the flow of its emergent potential. The paper argues for ethnographic engagement with film production practices as a crucial means of engaging the contingent and uncertain “happening” of cinema, seeking thereby to encourage a broader shift in anthropological examinations of creativity and expression: from the subjective intentions of creators, to the immanent potential of the situations in which they come to encounter newness.
The conventional reading of the films of the artist James Benning is either phenomenological (because they teach us to see and hear) or formalist (because they are structural films). In either case, the experience of the viewer or the aesthetics of the form are separated from the material relations at work in the pro-filmic environment. By contrast, this paper argues that the emphasis on seeing and hearing encourages a reading of the documentary as a part of the environment it looks at and listens to. This paper finds that thinking of documentary in ecological terms will encourage addressing the diverse referential and causal relations at work and deterritorialize the Cartesian set-up of the filmmaker-camera either observing a world that is separated from the viewer or presenting a world that only matters in relation to the subjective experience of the filmmaker. In contrast to phenomenological interpretations of Benning’s documentaries, this paper suggests a documentary cinema that moves beyond the ‘referential totality’ of subjective approaches. Documentaries such as Benning’s California Trilogy encourage the viewer to develop a complex economical, ecological, biological, geological and material relational topography between the human and non-human world such as those suggested by Deleuze and Guattari’s eco-philosophies. As Guattari writes in The Three Ecologies, ‘ecologies are governed by a different logic from that of ordinary communication between speakers and listeners,’ an eco-logic. The ‘looking into’ allows for a depth of relations and ‘vectors of subjectification’ (Guattari, Ecologies) to unravel where the human is neither a separated onlooker nor everything that happens relates to the human subject behind the camera. We look and listen in a deterritorialized, eco-logical context. (This paper will also explore the differences between Robert Smithson’s Land Art and what I call Land Film.)
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Does Software have Affects, or, What Can a Digital Body of Code Do?</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Can software as a non-human constellation be said to have “affects”? The talk argues that as much as we need mapping of the various affects of organic bodies-in-relation in order to understand the modes of control, power and production in the age of networks, we need a mapping of the biopolitics of software and code too. If we adopt a Deleuze-Spinozian approach to software we can focus on the body of code as a collection of algorithms to bodies interacting and affecting each other. What defines a computational event? The affects it is capable of. In a parallel sense as the tick is defined through its affects and potentials for interaction, software is not only a stable body of code, but an affordance, an affect, a potentiality for entering into relations. This marks moving from the metaphoric 1990s cyberdiscourse that adopted Deleuzian terms like the rhizome into a different regime of critique that works through immanent critique on the level of software. This talk works through software art to demonstrate the potentials in thinking software not as abstract piece of information but as processes of individuation (Simondon) and interaction (Deleuze-Spinoza). A look at software practices and discourses around net art and related fields offers a way of approaching the language of software as a stuttering of a kind (Jaromil). Here dysfunctionalities turn into tactical machines that reveal the complex networks software are embedded in. Software spreads and connects into economics, politics and logics of control society as an immanent force of information understood in the Simondonian sense. The affects of software do not interact solely on the level of programming, but act in multiscalar ecologies of media which are harnessed in various hacktivist and artist discourses concerning the politics of the Internet and software.</td>
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Deleuze’s Transcendental Science of Philosophy</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Social science normally takes the human as both its constitution and its limit. A Deleuzian perspective, by contrast, which is to say a metaphysical perspective, begins with Bergson’s call for philosophy “to go beyond the human state” (2002: 277). The individual, on this view, is not constituted by the human condition, but something else. From a Deleuzian perspective the human is not a limit that is given to thought. Indeed, what is important here is not what the given is, but that by which the given is given (Deleuze, 1994: 140; see also Bryant, 2008). In this paper, we argue that Deleuze’s philosophy is a science in the sense proposed by Duns Scotus (1987: 2): a science of the transcendental. This kind of science is concerned with what is beyond the humanism and anthropomorphism of social science (see also Colebrook, 2004). Deleuze’s philosophy offers social science a transcendental empiricism that does not refer to an image of man but to an image of thought. The transcendental condition should not be sought in the fully constituted individual (Deleuze, 1994: 38) but rather in the problematic forms in which the individual is constituted.</td>
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<td>Personal Identity of a Werewolf</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Werewolf stories recently became increasingly popular again in mainstream circulation, introducing themselves to a new generation with original stories and remakes of the classical films. The werewolf is a myth and an ageless fictional character known to almost all forms of storytelling from the ancient past. Each medium shifted the emphasis of the story within its limits and another dimension of the werewolf identity was brought to the fore. The filmic medium typically underlined the transition scene as a key aspect of the story. The shift from the man to the beast became more and more important and poses an intriguing question about personal identity. The werewolf transformation differs from that of many other shape shifters who have psychological continuity and execute their shift consciously. As the man and wolf are rarely responsible for each other’s actions, it becomes difficult to acknowledge the man and beast as one entity. Indeed, both wolf and man have completely different body forms, personal traits, and have access to different memories. The key moments of these films therefore work to clarify the sameness and difference of the man and the beast at the same time. The transition happens onscreen, mostly out of control; constituting a spatiotemporal continuity connecting the man and the beast. The development in CGI technology is one of the main reasons behind these remakes. The filmic medium is capable of performing any transition imaginable. At the same time, this shift is a literal and intense visual example of a Deleuze-Guattarian becoming-animal even when the character is not an embodiment of the concept. In this paper I intend to question personal identity in line with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-animal using the fictional werewolf characters in various interpretations of the werewolf myth.</td>
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On the Structural Question: Deleuze contra Levi-Strauss

Abstract

Focusing on the structural question, this paper illustrates the affinities and differences between Levi-Strauss’ and Deleuze’s views on artistic and scientific thought. Presenting mythical thought, art, and modern science as disparate but parallel forms of ordering universe, Levi-Strauss proposes the interplay of structure and event to account for their differences. Grounded in necessary structures, scientific operators open up their existing sets to novel and unforeseen phenomena. In contrast, mythic operators build structured sets by reorganizing contingent events. Therefore, science creates events by means of structures and myths create structures by means of events.

Situated halfway between science and myth, art involves the integration of structure and event, considered respectively as a set of permutations and particular solutions offered to this set. Furthermore, Levi-Strauss argues, while magical/mythical thought and art operate at the level of sensible qualities immediately present to senses, scientific thought operates at the level of abstract correlations between intelligible phenomena. Deleuze disagrees with Levi-Strauss’ idea of structure as a table of permutations through which conceptually determined possibles are realized in actual relations.

Against Levi-Strauss’ imposition of a formal system facilitating the transmission of thought within systems of signification/representation, Deleuze considers the creative act to bear the non-conceptual and indeterminate character of Ideas from which both sensible and intelligible relations originate immanently. Critiquing the conceptual grid of the real and the possible, Deleuze proposes the notion of virtual multiplicities to conceive of the structural problem with regard to the sub-representative realm of differential relations and singularities.
Abstract

Topology, or ‘the science of self-varying motion’, is a mathematical discipline often associated with ideas of ‘continuity’, the vision of continuously varying forms, the continuous germination of life, as if a geometric figure could acquire a life or a living body of its own. When associated to specific creative forms (such as movement and dance), this topological conceptualization relates their expressive potential to an embodied aesthetics aiming at the exploration of the human species and of the sensory potentials of the living organism. But what is a topological figure? By antagonistically opposing itself to the limits of the empirical sciences, to their metric dissections and measurements, topology affirms the reality of non-Euclidean intensities, of shared continuities ‘abstracted’ from particular events. This vision, often associated to Henri Bergson’s philosophical notion of continuous intensive differentiation, leaves us with some perplexity. In fact, the topological notion of continuity specifically refers to what is shared between two figures, what is invariant or, in other words, does not change and returns, in the passage from one to the other. A return of what stays the same across differences, rather than a return of difference itself (as Gilles Deleuze, after Nietzsche, would put it). From a topological point of view, difference only appears by interrupting the repetition and continuation of the same, and by constituting a discontinuity between objects and their forms. How do we therefore deal with this basic ontological aporia, with the fundamental oscillation of scientific topology between the continuities of material objects and the necessity of reducing them to abstract mappable points of dis-continuous differentiation?

This paper will try to delve into, rather than solve, the topological dilemma, by drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the ‘differential’, and by relating it with Alfred N. Whitehead’s ‘mereotopology’. Reading these theories along the analysis of dance, it will try to propose a particular conception of movement as an autonomous and malleable topological object endowed with a material potential of transformability that goes beyond the organism’s life.
This paper emerges from preparatory work for my current project, Deleuzefilm a documentary showcasing Deleuzian-inflected work with moving images. By giving visual form to concepts expressed in words, my featured artists practice creative interference by materialising ideas in the language of affect. The projected film, an assemblage of talking heads; interview footage and extracts from creative work will explore the relations of ‘three planes thrown across chaos’ and their implications for Deleuzian practice. Here, my focus is Italian video artist Mattia Casalegno. His work, inspired by Deleuze’s concepts of affect and bodies-without-organs, combines generative and improvisational material designed for installations and live performances. Casalegno’s ‘Complexities’ collection features audiovisual experiments in emergence and complexity as an analogue EEG reader transfers neuronal brain ‘waves’ into visual imaging. Unstable Empathy is an interactive installation expressing the fluctuations of empathy between game players. Sounds of Empathy uses EEG to chart neuronal discharges in audible frequencies viewable as visual trajectories. Strutture Dissipative reworks Prigogine’s studies of complex systems (applicable to deep ecologies of equilibrium). Via real-time processing software, these conceptually generated affective images are synchronised with music as improvisational and generative works in live media performance.
Gilles Deleuze considered Immanuel Kant the founder of phenomenology. For Kant the phenomenon was no longer defined as appearance of its essence, but as apparition. In contrast to the classical thought, which was readily embraced by Christianity, the disjunctive couple of appearance/essence was substituted by the conjunctive couple of apparition/conditions of apparition. It was not long before bad essentialism gave way to the bizarre poststructuralist search for the conditions of the conditions of conditions...

The ‘reversed ontology’ of trying to account for the possible rather than actual experience was taken up by Karl Popper in his 1948 essay ‘The Bucket and the Searchlight: Two Theories of Knowledge’. It seemed but inevitable for the contemporary neuro-cognitive sciences to eventually abandon the endo-reductive ‘bucket theory of the mind’ in favour of the enactive, embedded, embodied, extended and affective 'searchlight' approach where stasis is a special case of movement and not vice versa.

This paper addresses the ecological approach to perception by psychologist J.J. Gibson and his (unknowing) affiliation with the Deleuzean radical anti-representationalist thought. Gibson’s concepts of the optic array, affordance and occlusion are related with the akin Deleuzean concepts of percept, affect and differen(t)ciation, in pursuit of a non-hylemorphic design approach.

The monist philosophy of Gilles Deleuze appears to be a great inspiration for new materialist philosophers like Rosi Braidotti or Manuel DeLanda, as van der Tuin and Dolphijn suggest. Although Karen Barad (another representative of New Materialism) almost does not refer to Deleuze, it is tempting to point out the moments in her new-materialist account that converge with Deleuzian immanent thought. In this paper I will attempt to investigate the resonances and convergences between Barad’s and Deleuze’s thought, while focusing on several concepts, which appear constantly in both authors (such as matter, time, space, and their methods).
What refugees and migrants, but also victims of extreme violence such as rape, often experience is a form of pause in their familiar forms of expression. It is an experience of stuttering and hesitation. This kind of numbness, whether perceived as an excuse to exclude such victims from political arena or as a moral instrument to show mercy, has often been looked upon as a form of passivity. In this paper I wish to appeal to another form of politics, in which pausing is not seen as a negation of language but as the act that dynamically envisions the most characteristic element of language. However, if hesitation and stuttering are part of the game, and the rules change every time we speak, how can we communicate? Agamben, and also Deleuze and Guattari, suggest that in order to do so, we need to deterritorialize the structure of our thought and experience language as a pure means, as a means as such. It is pure communicability, being into language. But what is the politics of a communicability that is willing to speak while knowing that we cannot communicate fully and clearly? How can we comprehend incomprehension? How to become minority?

Addiction may be understood as dangerous deterritorialization, a collapse of the social bond and erosion of meaningful symbolization. In my paper, I will attempt to think about audiovisual presentations of addiction - images and sounds, movements and durations through which addiction themes are narrated in fiction film – in terms of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Deriving from Deleuzian film studies, I discuss film scenes of addiction films by asking, how the cinematic images of addiction effect: how they evoke both pleasure and danger, fascination and anxiety. Might it be said that they produce reterritorializations of addiction processes by arranging the sensory materials depicting “a nameless desire” in culturally meaningful
Abstract

This paper explores the methodological processes of connecting, continuing, and creating that emerged in a transdisciplinary encounter between Deleuzian philosophy and the field of mathematics education. Specifically, this paper addresses the methodological limits and possibilities entailed in a particular investigation into the ways in which “problems” have been thought in mathematics education. Questions addressed include the following: In the context of this particular investigation, how could Deleuze's noncommonsensical notions of knowledge, power, and self produce novel concepts and problems when brought to bear on the contemporary landscape of thought related to “problem-solving,” “problem-posing,” and “problems” in the field of mathematics education? What deterritorializations and reterritorializations occurred in the investigation? Finally, what are the methodological and political implications of mapping the landscape of thought in mathematics education through Deleuze's ideas in a world that is increasingly globally linked and technologically mediated, yet consists of relations of forces that differentially affect different regions of the world?

Abstract

thinking continuity as the main frame of a changing reality is one of the most important issues on Deleuze's philosophy, particularly with Bergson and Leibniz. I sustain through this paper that the concepts of relation and relationship are the basis to conceive the changing reality with regard to a continuous and non-dualistic world. In order to achieve this aim, I will explore the general claim Deleuze states towards Pragmatism. Accordingly, I intend both to inspect the pragmatic definitions Peirce sets forth concerning relation and relationship and to compare them with Deleuze's definitions for natural and philosophical relations. Peirce defines relation and relationship on the basis of his logic of relatives, which establishes relation as sustaining an individual subject. But, he also defines a different kind of relation, which he calls relationship, whose subject is continuous, it means non individualistic. Deleuze, by his turn, begins with the Humean distinction between natural and philosophical relations and goes on with the same distinction between individual and non individualistic subject. I illustrated this Peircean-Deleuzean pragmatic link around logical definitions for relation with the example of identity conceived in reflationary terms.
'Further than the Longest Leap': the presence of Kierkegaard in Difference and

Abstract

Taking as a point of departure the contemporary proliferation of biodatabases that took off after the implementation of the Human Genome Project, this paper will attempt to map out the passage from taxonomic to turbulent modes of data organisation in relation to the individualisation of biological systems. The main argument centres upon the fact that the discreteness of traditional models of taxonomically closed homeostatic diagrams is transforming into epigenetically open continuous systems of fractal interactions, a movement which crucially coincides to the passage from disciplinary to control society. Escaping the rigid taxonomic variables of disciplinary forms and functions, bioinformatics is currently regulating the becomings of global milieus through the turbulent modulation of aleatory events by means of what Deleuze has referred to as “inseparable variations.” While analytic efforts to understand the new form of power have drawn attention to the importance of the ubiquity of digital technologies and networked computers, media - focused readings of control society often obviate Deleuze’s ontologico - mathematically driven conceptualisation of control.

In order to propose a creative connection between Deleuze’s ontological uses of mathematics and control as the contemporary technology of governmentality mimicking the immanent process of becoming, this paper aims to selectively superpose a variety of sources. The latter include the Riemannian notions of discrete and continuous manifold, the Bergsonian method of division as a political philosophy toward emancipation, and, lastly, Deleuze’s own mathematical reading of Michel Foucault’s works, with a special focus on the recently translated lecture series at the Collège de France, “Society Must Be Defended,” “Security, Territory, Population” and “The Birth of Biopolitics.” The “nomadic” mathematics of the problematic (as opposed to the State axiomatic model)
Below the Threshold of Perception: Paul Sharits and “Not-Seen” Colours

Massumi suggests, “the body is radically open, absorbing impulses quicker than they can be perceived.” If we experience sensations more rapidly than we can perceive them, what are the implications of this discrepancy? This discrepancy is of particular importance in Paul Sharits’ films, such as Ray Gun Virus (1966), because they consist of rapidly changing full-frame colour-fields, with each colour-field appearing for only one film frame. The rapid colour changes mean that there are potentially thousands of colours that are felt but not necessarily perceived in Sharits’ films. I will argue that these “not-seen” colours in Sharits’ films play a significant role in the incipiency of perception. Elaborating on Deleuze’s notion of “microperceptions,” I will demonstrate that “not-seen” colours are sensations which can only be felt through their relations and which have the potential to emerge into perception. Then, extrapolating on Whitehead’s notion of “non-sensuous” perception, I will argue that those “not-seen” colours that fail to emerge into perception can persist as “knowledge” of the immediate past which we sensuously experience as taking place in the present. Because non-sensuous “not-seen” colours are felt in the present, I will demonstrate that they have the potential to enter into relations with the microperceptual “not-seen” colours and thereby contribute to the incipiency of perception. I believe that Sharits’ films enable us to rethink how visual experience is activated below the threshold of perception.

Cinematic Assemblages: Deleuze, Feminism and the Viewing Experience

This paper explores a new way of thinking about the cinematic viewing experience and spectatorship. This experience under went intense theorisation by feminist film theorists in the 1970s and 80s from a psychoanalytical perspective. This paper builds on this work by using Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s concept of the assemblage to re-theorise the relationship between film and viewer. Psychoanalytic approaches have primarily focused on film as a system of representation with complex meaning structures. By theorising film viewing in terms of a cinematic assemblage this paper proposes a new approach that does not privilege what a film represents or means but focuses on affective and intensive connections between film and viewer and what these connections enable. This approach does not deny that films operate on a representational plane but argues that the affective aspects of film viewing have been subordinated by an over emphasis on representation. The concept of the assemblage offers a way of thinking about structures that takes into account the formal relationship between different elements, technologies, participants and affective bodily connections. Applied to film viewing, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the assemblage focuses on affective connections between film and viewer—interactions in which the body of the viewer undergoes changes, metamorphosis and becomings.
In current Deleuze Studies too little work has been done on Deleuze’s relation to phenomenology. Yet, scattered throughout Deleuze’s work one finds constant references to a generic ‘phenomenology’. These references are often highly compressed, unwaveringly critical and usually dismissive: “The whole of Phenomenology is an epiphenomenology” (DR:52). Such remarks suggest that phenomenology appears too late on the philosophical scene, dealing with phenomena and special functions that appear only after it has ‘denatured immanence’ and reinstated a figure of transcendence in the field of immanence. In this sense, for Deleuze, phenomenology is the latest in a long line of movements that are “inseparable from the long history of an illusion” (WiP: 47).

However, when individual phenomenological thinkers are identified – and those referred to most often are Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty – similar criticisms are leveled but Deleuze’s discussions are more nuanced and even appreciative. For example, in two texts, separated by 22 years, Deleuze credits Sartre with uncovering an impersonal transcendental field liberated from the ego, even as he (Sartre) remained more or less trapped in the verb ‘to be’. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze & Guattari claim that Husserl “brought thought a decisive step forward, when he discovered a region of vague and material essences” (ATP:407) even as they say that Husserl remained a “man of the State”, maintaining the privilege and primacy of royal science. On two crucial insights for Deleuze’s own philosophy – first a transcendental field without a subject and, second, a transcendental field made up of pre-individual singularities – he borrows from phenomenologists.

What I want to do in this paper is offer an assessment of Deleuze’s overall relation to phenomenology taking in both his criticisms and his borrowings. If Heidegger radicalized phenomenology by turning it toward ontology then Deleuze’s work can be thought of as radicalizing phenomenology by taking it beyond ontology and back to life, a ‘life-world’ without subject or being composed of events, singularities and affects: a para-phenomenological thinking with ‘And’ instead of ‘Is,” “it is quite an extraordinary thought, and yet it is life” (Dialogues, 57).
We are all five o’clock in the evening”: Deleuze’s persistent engagement with a

Starting from Deleuze’s remarks on jurisprudence in a short text entitled ‘Response to a Question on the Subject’ this paper investigates the connection between Deleuze and the work of John Duns Scotus. It will do so through the principle of univocity and the Scotian concept of haecceities. Starting from the hypothesis that Deleuze’s philosophical output makes perfect sense once one sees it as a persistent and consistent elaboration of the medieval principle of the univocity of being. A principle sometimes perceived as something of a ‘flashing meteor’ in his work, taking centre stage in Spinoza et le problème de l'expression, Différence et Répétition and Logique du sens, and subsisting in that “great Nietzsche-Spinoza equation” underpinning of Deleuze’s thought. In light of this we will retrace Deleuze’s engagement with John Duns Scotus through the notion of haecceities in particular. We will seek to understand how that medieval idea of haecceities relates to “what we’re uncovering right now, …, a world packed with impersonal individuations, or even pre-individual singularities.” A whole new world that Deleuze, together with Gilbert Simondon, opposes to the notion that there is no alternative between “either you are a person or individuals, or you sink back into an undifferentiated sea of anonymity.” And how “conversely, a philosophy without the subject presents a conception of law founded on jurisprudence.”
In past work I have explored the resonances between the vocabulary of Arakawa and Gins and that of the cognitive scientist Francisco Varela, as well as the utility of Varela's work in modeling embodied as well as distributed cognitive processes during jazz improvisation. In this paper, I would like to compare more closely recent research on top-down and bottom-up cognitive processes of jazz improvisers through fMRI, with the ways in which Arakawa and Gins deploy their theoretical term "Approximative-Rigorous Abstractions" to describe the "biotopology" of the "organism-that-persons" as it apprehends "landing sites," and the specific attempts by Varela and his colleagues to map "the reciprocal causality" of top-down and bottom-up cognitive processes that make up what his team calls "The Nagel Effect" of emergent sentence or "subjectivity-making." I'm particularly interested in this comparison with respect to Varela's modeling with phase space diagrams of dynamic interactions among identifiable cognitive processes, and the deployment of these diagrams in research by him and his team of specific cognitive responses to external stimuli by interpreting EEG and fMRI snapshots of the brain in action. For, with reference to research on music and the brain by Daniel Levitin and many others—and specifically on the embodied and distributed cognition of jazz improvisers, Arakawa and Gins's theorizing about the fragile contingency of embodied cognition, with which they engage through "architectural procedures," and Francisco Varela's examination of the implications of cognitive styles, the question of cognitive expertise, or "know-how," leads in turn to further questions concerning ethics and human evolution addressed in philosophy of Gilles Deleuze.

In this paper I will consider how the concept of non-oppositional difference as the generative component of Saussurean linguistics should be recognized as a concept of significant socio-political fertility and as one that is more central to Deleuzian social theory than has been generally recognized. By way of a close engagement with Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition and critical responses to that text, I will argue that as a post-dialectical formation, non-oppositional difference implies untranscendable alterity, while recognizing that relationships of alterity can be either dynamic or destabilizing. In the fashioning of a Deleuzian social politics I will consider how dynamic deterritorialization leads to the establishing of productive connections, whereas destabilizing deterritorialization leads to the kinds of “anarchy” that have too often been reductively marketed as the inevitable telos of Deleuzian and other forms of poststructuralist social theory. I will consider how, from a Deleuzian perspective, when a relationship of difference has been rendered or revealed to be non-oppositional, in order to maintain a territory forces must be generated or put in place that can prevent that relationship of difference from following its inevitable path of becoming either dynamic or destabilizing.
Almost thirty years on, the time is right to reassess the main target of the Anti-Oedipus. This paper will map some of the tensions and contagions between psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis, insofar as they afford laying bare the complexities of racial desires. Though much indebted to psychoanalysis, the schizoanalysis of Deleuze and Guattari departs from it on a number of fronts. First, schizoanalysis denounces the dialectical and Kantian philosophical framework which in recent years has been firmly integrated with psychoanalysis. Second, schizoanalysis enlarges the scope of examination provided by Freud, Klein and Lacan from the intersubjective and language to capitalism, global history and ecology. Third, the politics of schizoanalysis is more clearly geared towards a revolutionary becoming that breaks with the entrapments of bourgeois subjectivity. The famous case of the schizophrenic judge Schreber is revisited to argue that schizoanalysis builds a materialist theory of race which first deals with populations (hordes, tribes, classes), in order to then understand variously pathological individuals.

Digital technologies are revolutionizing the process of audiovisual production, exhibition and distribution, bringing us several tools to real time creation and interaction. In the present picture of decentralized communication practices, new bodily agency is promoted by discrete mobile devices. In this perspective, a significant part of the contemporary audiovisual production is presented as performance, where interactivity and chance are fundamental elements. We find in the field of Performance Studies, overall in the works of Butler, Phelan and Mckenzie, critical concepts to the analysis of contemporary arts: performativity, iterability, citationality. Although performance is not mentioned, we also find in the works of Deleuze, specially in Image-Movement, Image-Time and A Thousand Plateaus, other critical concepts to the thought on the body in the audiovisual arts: affection, body-without-organs, rhizome. Having as a guideline the analysis of some key works of live-cinema, vjing and new media art, this communication will explore the contribution of the works of Deleuze to the conceptualizing of the contemporary audiovisual performative arts.
Becoming-pedagogue

Gilles Deleuze invented, mostly together with Félix Guattari, three pedagogies. The pedagogy of perception is Deleuze’s first or oldest one. Deleuze elaborates the pedagogy of perception in the early 1980s as pedagogy of the cinema in the cinema books, mainly in Cinema 2. The pedagogy of the concept repeats its structure. At the end of the introduction to What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari formulate the task of the pedagogy of the concept and the urgency of practising it. Following the conclusion to What is Philosophy?, there has to be a third pedagogy beside the pedagogy of the concept and the pedagogy of perception, which I call the pedagogy of minor science and that Deleuze and Guattari formulate in A Thousand Plateaus and Deleuze in The Fold. These three pedagogies—this is my first thesis—structure the later works or even the late work by Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari since 1975. Then, I will argue that Guattari or the collaboration with him turn the philosopher Deleuze into a pedagogue. This becoming-pedagogue is setting Deleuze in contact with the non-philosophical.

Deleuze in Colour

My paper will address the primary conference theme, Connect, Continue, Create, through a focus on the specific topic of Art as Philosophical Practice. I will argue that the relation between a theoretical perspective on the nature of colour, and the expressive use of it in the creative process, which can be seen as a fundamental contributing factor in the Deleuzean concept of the 'catastrophe', represents an undeniable connection between art, science and philosophy.

I will draw primarily on Deleuze's references to the importance of colour in the work of William Turner and Francis Bacon, (Anti Oedipus (with Felix Guattari) and The Logic of Sensation), and on the theoretical work of John Gage (Colour and Meaning), and Johannes Itten (The Elements of Colour). The latter's constructions of the colour circle, and the colour star, in turn based on Runge's colour sphere, create the basis for an analysis of the manner in which expression, in terms of colour, relates science to sensation through the vehicle of Deleuze's connection between the actual and the potential.
Thinkers like Locke and Tocqueville once recognized that the successful functioning of a limited government depends on the presence of citizens who are not excessively impulsive and individualistic. Such self-moderating citizens, able and willing to place self-restraint over different forms of self-indulgence, were once formed through what Norbert Elias described as a prolonged “civilizing process.” In a less optimistic vein, Michael Foucault described the mass manufacturing of self-disciplined individuals within large-scale modern institutions. As Herbert Marcuse and Gilles Deleuze made clear, in the 20th century those processes went into reverse, and new mechanisms of social domination and control involved the breakdown of social norms encouraging perseverance and delayed gratification. Both the acceleration of the “civilizing process” posited by Elias and its more recent reversal have probably entailed shifts in patterns of brain wiring in masses of individuals induced by new social tasks, pressures, and expectations. As a result of the advance of information technologies and the chaotic complexity and pace of modern life, the social, psychological, and neural trends linked to the erosion of self-restraint have accelerated and reached new geographic regions. In the context of such fundamental shifts in human motivation, the perceived legitimacy of modern democratic institutions may come under severe strain.
Title paper: The texture of the real: Deleuze, Sedgwick and the molecular realism of A. L. Kennedy

Abstract: One of the most productive challenges of Deleuzean philosophy lies in the ways it makes us rethink notions of “the real”. It is productive and challenging because it eschews both the view that the real is objective and ultimately unproblematic and the contrary thesis that it forever eludes our grasp and that all we ever reach are socio-cultural constructions. According to Deleuze, the real is everywhere, but not in the form of a homogeneous objectivity. It is a huge “plane of immanence” where everything coexists and connects in unhierarchized and unpredictable ways. The present paper will bring this Deleuzean real in conjunction with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s thinking about texture. For Sedgwick, the notion of texture allows for a haptic probing of the world which undermines the common deadlocks of subject(ivity)-object(ivity) binarisms. The difficult question is what concept of realism might emerge from such theorizing. A tentative answer will be given by offering a reading of some works by A. L. Kennedy. Kennedy has developed a literary realism which is based on the rendering of the molecular and mercurial nature of everyday affects, on a (Deleuzean) renouncement of transcendence and a (Sedgwickian) sense for the realities of touch leading to a literature in touch with reality.

Title paper: CONCEPTUAL PERSONA – PHILOSOPHY AND ART

Abstract: Although Deleuze and Guattari write in What is Philosophy? that none of the modes of thought, the philosophical, scientific or artistic, has hierarchical privilege over the other, some have argued for the primacy of one discipline based on this clear, “classical” differentiation between the “creative domains of thought”. In a paradigmatic example of the case argued against such a hierarchisation, J. de Bloois works out another more fundamental level beneath this “superficial differentiation” where art and philosophy are inextricably linked with each other. In his essay on Bartleby he comes to the conclusion that the conceptual personae transform the philosopher into an author, criticizing Deleuze and Guattari that they in the end subordinate their “philosophical project” to “modern aesthetics” thus limiting the critical potential of philosophy through its lack of autonomy, in this way failing to clearly demarcate the “domain” of philosophy. In my presentation, I will take up the central question of the conference of how and where philosophy and art intersect and create together (in this presentation leaving out the question of science); I will present my interpretation of the conceptual persona where I see art and philosophy in a relationship that is not overly distinct, without at the same time blurring or obfuscating the differences.
Without introducing the political event of a revolution (Badiou, Zizek) that is beyond any form of representation, I attempt to show how, at the most basic level of coexistence, interpersonal interactions cause the disruption of an existing social-cultural field, which subsequently develops in a way not laid down in advance or thought possible. This approach is best expressed by the concepts ‘molar’ and ‘molecular’ in the work of Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze demonstrates that besides the issue of structure, there is always a second issue at hand. More than on the structural level of order and stability, which Deleuze terms 'molar', this involves a 'molecular' level, which has a very different rhythm and speed. This level is not necessarily manifest or noticeable. Conversely, it does have the potential to break open and transform a social-cultural field. I will show how the molecular level forms the molar level, while it is formed by that molar level at the same time. Far more than defining the molar in isolation, therefore, I will look at its connection with the molecular level and the results thereof. For even when everything appears to function well, the smallest of actions and passions may have unexpected consequences.
“Art begins not with the flesh but with the house. That is why architecture is the first of the arts (Deleuze and Guattari 1997:186). This paper addresses two questions: the influence of gender in architectural design, and how we move beyond that potentially sterile debate. Much of the literature on women’s roles in architecture addresses their under-representation in the profession (Ruedi, Sarah et al. 1996; Wright 2000; Anthony 2001 Brown 2005). Research into how architectural design has or might in future change as a process or outcome of achieving more equal representation is almost entirely lacking. This begs wider questions: whether architecture is a gendered art/profession; the defining characteristics of a “masculine” hegemony in design; the extent to which designs by female architects reproduce or depart from a male mainstream influence; and – of most importance here – whether a focus on the increasingly problematic duality of gender provides an adequate basis of enquiry into influences in architectural design. In a recent (unpublished) paper entitled “The Labyrinth and the Female Work of Art” I addressed the first and second of these questions – exploring the masculine hegemony in art generally, and architecture specifically, via a deconstructive reading of Heidegger’s “The Origins of the Work of Art”. This essay takes on the third and fourth questions, initially by analysing the gender aesthetic characteristics of important architecture, historical and contemporary, then proceeds to consider a series of designs by the renowned, Deleuzian-influenced architectural firm of Zaha Hadid. In the process I shall demonstrate that a radical heterogeneity of influences, including but not privileging gender, can be found in contemporary architectural design that is neither idealist nor abstract, but incorporates political, capitalist and environmental critiques on a spectacular scale, proving that post-structuralist architecture can be radically active in shaping how we conceive and enact our place in the world.
Officially promoted by a number of transdisciplinary collaborations, the convergence of nanotechnology and the cognitive sciences is no longer in need of conceptual justification. Although purely electromechanical nanomachines are yet to be implemented, neither do scientists relinquish the idea of integrating nanotech and AI nor are they strangers to the larger ontological concerns this endeavour generates. Suspicion of panpsychist (mis)interpretations marring the credibility of the entire project has swelled as the drama of artificial thought is being rehearsed in a rapid glissando from the macroscopic to the microscopic and back. Focusing on the promised transposition of mental coordinates onto turbulent nanotopologies, this paper will attempt to draw a tangential line through the synergies between atomically precise technologies and AI in relation to Deleuze’s philosophy and the doctrine of panpsychism. What is argued is that with the imminent ‘eventualisation’ of synthetic thought onto the imperceptible stratum as a vastly potent space of experimentation, the molecular components of engineered nanosystems already become present examples of the Deleuzian redefinition of thought as differential and ontogenetic. They pertain to the operations of an abstract machine of thought on a level that has been typically excluded from the privilege of intelligence: the stratum of inorganic composition. To investigate the scalability and dynamics of thought as it moves through the various inorganic and organic stratic formations, the paper will intersect Deleuze’s concept of the virtual and Whitehead’s metaphysics of experience. The proposed intersection aspires at suggesting that the rehabilitation of certain aspects of panpsychism triggered by the implementation of nanoscale artificial systems is a project inseparable from the articulation of an ethics capable of addressing the new aesthetic paradigm of expressive machinic phyla.
Peter Hallward’s critical and creative reading of Deleuze in his Out of this World: Deleuze and Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation presents Deleuze’s philosophy as bordering on mystical and as such devoid of possible political implications at the level of socio-cultural reality. In this paper I will challenge the second thesis while affirming and clarifying the first. Deleuze’s mysticism is deeply practical (Lovat & Semetsky 2009; Semetsky 2009; in print a, b) and the “magical” transformation of society is indeed possible. I will outline the conditions of possibility for such transformation, starting with the transformation of the self as “becoming-other” and drawing from such Deleuze’s works as The Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition. I will analyze the paradoxical structure of esoteric languages, grounded in Deleuze’s greater ontology, and will present an example of one particular esoteric language as a system of signs (Semetsky 2006).

This is the expressive language of Tarot “cartograms”, from “The Fool” to “The World”, which embody the folds of human experiences across times, places, and cultures. The paper’s conclusion is that the pictures’ unfolding meanings manifest in practical life; with life itself becoming, in Deleuze’s words, a work of art. Applying this ancient art at the level of our actions and decisions will enable us to witness the creative power of this esoteric language and to connect in practice the spiritual and material planes hence ultimately to enrich society with spiritual values as part of its [r]evolutionary transformation and learning.

Viewer participation in contemporary art gets more and more important in a manner of speaking about presenting the artwork in contemporary world. The art audience is the one who experiences the artwork on a multi-dimensional reality, face-to-face, by using all his or her senses as possible as the artwork enables one to do so. On the other hand, to think about an artwork is to think of it as a rhizome, as a line-of-flight and finally as a deterritorializing force that forms percepts and affects which mediate and create the compositions themselves according to Deleuze. The property of “flow” in interactive artworks – either digital or not, let these works be a part of composition of becoming. The aim of this study is to endeavour this century’s non-conventional artworks and movements without any modern hierarchical frameworks that inhibit “becoming” and the “flow” of the artistic composition. It will present the contribution of Deleuzian heterogenic concepts over the viewer participation in the works of art by looking through the production of multiplicities.
When we seek novelty, difference, or change itself, why is quality often preferred over quantity? We shall examine how Bergson thinks of change, first, in terms of the natural tendency to conceive change quantitatively, and second, how a positive view requires a new image of thought (intuition) to bring out qualitative differences. What needs to be clarified is how intuition can reveal qualities via philosophical precision and how to think the nature of these qualities as continuities or tendencies. However, does the intuition of life in terms of tendencies require their qualitative differentiation? Furthermore, can intuition be compared to Deleuze’s view that thought is an encounter, something taking hold of us, occupying us: a contingent, non-teleological repetition forcing thought? Given these suggestions, intuition could take us further such that change becomes the expression/affirmation of a novel and irreducible quantitative variation, making the real issue the avoidance of quantitative equalization where quantity merely implies identity or unity. We shall explore this through Deleuze’s discussion of intensive quantities, i.e., quantities that cannot change without changing in nature—ex., speed or tempo—to disrupt Bergson’s romantic tendency to attribute all change to seemingly teleological qualities such as durée or the élan vital.

Deleuze organises his 'Essays Critical and Clinical' around a set of problems, the first of which is the problem of writing. However, this paper proposes that any attempt to use Deleuze’s work for literary criticism must firstly be organised around the problem of reading. This problem is double edged — that is, it is concerned both with how to read Deleuze and how to read with Deleuze. What will be required, as this paper will argue, is a politics of reading. Fortunately, Deleuze’s explorations of literary texts and what he describes as the problem of writing can provide the analytical framework for examining these politics as well as distinctive ways of reading in which politics are fore-grounded. This paper will explore a series of questions about these politics of reading by creating a dialogue between Deleuze’s ideas and the work of the ‘Language’ poet Charles Bernstein.
Nowhere is the constantly vibrating dynamic of the fold more visible and palpable than in the pleats, creases, draperies, furrows, bows and ribbons of fashion. The fluid, flowing, flexible materials of silk in the pleated ‘Delphos’ dress by Mariano Fortuny (1910s) or ‘Pleats Please’ dresses by Issey Miyake (1996-1998) reveal a constantly opening up of the body to the world. While in art history the fold is connected to the expression of e-motion (pathos), in fashion the fold is engaged in a game of concealing and revealing the body in-motion (eros), for example in the Flowerbomb dresses made of ribbons by Viktor & Rolf (2005). Where the flexible fold can be understood as positioning the body differently in time through movement, the stiff fold of sculptured forms through high-tech fabrics deterritorialise the body by folding inside out and outside in, for example in the work of the Japanese (Rei Kawakubo and Yohji Yamamoto) and Belgian deconstructionists (Ann Demeulemeester and Martin Margiela). This paper will argue that the relational notion of the fold can help us understand the sensation of fashion as a curvature of space containing nothing but sheer movement.
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>Thinking Complexity - Noology or the theory of thought as a complex system</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>In What Is Philosophy? three domains of thought struggle with chaos of pure becoming on the one, and fixation of the doxa on the other side. What is at stake here is not only the creative potential of thought as such but also our possibility to propose formulae of action which do not rely on clichés. It is because every social, political, scientific, or aesthetic strategy is always in danger of degenerating back to the level of banality that thinking has to be always approached as a problem for thought. Throughout Deleuze and Guattari’s oeuvre, noology continues to resurface attempting to address this very difficulty. From its perspective the notion of the interdisciplinary becomes an issue of rethinking thought as such i.e. asking about the image of thought that determines our theoretical practice and, consequentially, forms of life it makes possible. As Manuel DeLanda’s works have shown, conceptual genealogy of D&amp;G’s texts elucidates a rich reservoir of connections between metaphysics and complexity theory. I propose to use an analogous approach to noology, redefining the problem of the humanities-science relationship in terms of morphogenesis of thought.</td>
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<td>Hölderlin and the Concept of Difference</td>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>The aim of this paper is to show how the seeds of two of the key responses to Kant’s critical philosophy, the dialectical thought of Hegel and the transcendental empiricist thought of Gilles Deleuze, are already present in Hölderlin’s fragment, Judgement and Being. I argue that both Hegel and Deleuze’s philosophies can be seen as emerging from attempts to remedy the inadequacies of Hölderlin’s attempt to provide a ground for judgement: Hegel in terms of the dialectical integration of judgement and being into one ontological plane, and Deleuze in terms of introducing a moment of difference into this ground.</td>
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Abstract
Childbirth is a powerful rite of passage that produces bodily sensations which a woman may or may not be capable of controlling. While many Deleuzian scholars are invested in studying mental illness and states of altered consciousness as fields of creative and revolutionary potentiality, none is yet discussed about the mind-boggling process of labor and childbirth. A cocktail of “excitement” hormones – oxytocin, dimethyltryptamine, catecholamines and endorphins – flood the mother’s circulation and induce a shift in consciousness. Although birth is a common event causing an altered state, Deleuzian scholars prefer to study “what the body can do” via the schizophrenic experience. Just as schizoanalysis emerges from Deluzian jargon and is useful in breaking down malevolent molar formations, so is childbirth compatible with the Deleuzian concepts of becoming-BwO, -imperceptible, -woman and is useful in evaluating an experience of the female body commonly ignored by obstetrics and feminism. My project presents observations about the capabilities of the body by looking at what it does and the forces that traverse it during labor and birth.

Most feminist thinkers working with Deleuze struggle to extract empowering positions for the female mode of existence from a philosophy which disavows the formation of a subject in favor of molecular identity. Stripped of its essence, the Deleuzian body is attractive to feminism as it moves in constant interpretation of its corporeality, organization and sexuality. The laboring and birthing body undergoes precisely such multi-layered reassembling in its desire to deliver. My aim is to re-instate the birthing body and its otherworldly experience in feminist discourse beyond debates on physiological essence and reproductive necessity. Using texts by Toi Derricotte, Adrienne Rich, Arthur Janov, Della Pollock and Margaret Atwood, I will connect birth with the Deleuzian concepts of becoming and medical studies on hormonal changes occurring during altered states. This attempt at interdisciplinarity hopes to broaden the topics explored by Deleuzian feminists and the scope of perinatal care in contemporary obstetrics.
Gilles Deleuze’s forceful critique of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s dialectic has for a long time obstructed readers to deal with some obvious affinities between Deleuze and Theodor W. Adorno, who draws extensively from Hegel’s philosophy - while at the same time subjecting it to great revisions. For both art plays an eminent role as a source of conceptual inspiration and as a field of actualization of highly advanced thought - be it in twelve-tone music in the case of Adorno or in the cinema of the time-image for Deleuze. The former even thinks of art as the only realm capable of embodying the aspect of the utopian, and the latter - surely not by accident - most comprehensively deals with post-theological questions in his film-philosophy asking what it means that we need reasons to believe in this world. The avant-garde conception of art that they share is developed against a background of the fatality of the standardized and stereotyped - in the form of the culture industry for Adorno and as representational thinking active in art, philosophy, and the sciences for Deleuze - so the modern artwork, clamped between chaos and cliché, necessitates highly complex strategies of production. To exceed a mere analogizing of obviously quite different philosophies I would like to approach the abovementioned ideas via a close look at the different ontological conceptions of the two thinkers. This examination will have to describe the notion of ‘difference’ Deleuze maps out in ‘Difference and Repetition’ (1968) and its affinity to Adorno’s concept of the ‘non-identical’ described at length in his ‘Negative Dialectics’ (1966). Although methodologically highly distinct from another their projects resonate with each other as they both aim at a critique of representational thinking as the application of general rules exterior to the singular, both mean to explicate the potentials of an Other in the given, but to which extend can the operation of ‘determined negation’ as the backdrop for the unleashing of the ‘non-identical’ be compared to difference as the source of multiplicity and virtuality? After trying to answer this question that lies at the core of a possible confrontation of the two thinkers I will try and explicate its consequences by contrasting the two key concepts of ‘dissonance’ (Adorno) and the ‘powers of the false’ (Deleuze) as two of the abovementioned complex strategies that inject what one could term an ‘anomaly’ in the artwork. The ‘powers of the false’ as a destabilization of the indexing of film-images render possible the destruction of the unambiguousness and the mobilization of the virtual against it. Not dissimilarly, the concept of ‘dissonance’ for Adorno implies the expression of an unrepresentable through the shards of a fragmented reality and by this makes the artwork an ‘apparition kat exochén’. In doing so I hope to elucidate aspects of the resonances between the two thinkers as well as between art and philosophy.
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Title paper  Intermittences: Deleuze's Style and Stuttering through Proust
Abstract  As readers of Deleuze know well, Deleuze cites Proust regarding the concept of style as inventing a new, a foreign language within a language, and also discusses on several occasions, and regarding various writers, the concept of stuttering in language as a means for a writer to open language to new, transformed becomings. The question I wish to address in my talk is to what extent does Deleuze himself create a foreign language and a kind of stutter via Proust's works. By examining succinctly the different editions and transformation of his Proust et les signes, I propose to consider the movement of Deleuze's own artistic creation, with a hope to address the thorny question of Deleuze's purported infidelity to the literary source itself, the Proustian oeuvre. Instead of viewing Deleuze's creation in such implicitly moralistic terms, I prefer to see how his stylistic becomings function creatively, both for his thought and for Proust's.

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Title paper  Beyond the resisting reader, reading Haasse diffractively
Abstract  This paper addresses the following question: How can the materiality of imagination and literature expand the scope of feminist analyses onto a writer who is often viewed to be in a hesitant relation to feminist issues?

Two related concepts in feminist literature theory will be discussed; the concept of the subject that underlies the resisting reader and the concept that underlies a resisting reading. (Fetterley 1978, Meijer 1988) It will be argued that demands made towards the oeuvre of Haasse by a resisting reading ignore the singularity of literature and the materiality of imagination.

Through a double reading strategy of The Hidden Source (1950) by Hella S. Haasse the practice of resisting reading and the alternative of a material-semiotic reading will be demonstrated. To this end the novella will be read through the lens of the Chronotope (Bakhtin 2005) and reread through a material-semiotic epistemology derived form the ‘teratology of the elements’ by Gaston Bachelard reread in turn, through the Deleuzian Percept.

How can this material semiotic reading provide a ‘diffractive’ method (Barad, 2007, Van der Tuin 2010) that broadens feminist practices and transceeds the identity-political foreclosure of complexity?
The invisible, the unthought, and the impossible: between the Figure and the Synthome

In order to characterize a certain tendency or the movement of enowning of the entity, a line may be outlined; a line that appears in and runs across Gilles Deleuze’s thought, and which strings together and goes through some theoretical positions of Paul Klee about the pictorial fact, to be finally recognized (with the same power as in the former moments), first in opposition to and then with a kind of sympathy for the teaching of Jacques Lacan, as it happens in late Deleuze’s thought. I will start from the notion of the unthought, a central point in every moment of Deleuze’s work, to approach then the invisible, as Klee conceives the act of painting as “making visible the invisible”, and that’s why he should be rather considered in the line of the ontology of forces that subverts the ontology of representation. In this point, Lacan’s conception of the Real as the Impossible makes the line that separates the symptom and the synthome sway (and the line of course, is nothing else but the gothic line, Pollock’s line!). This way, the status of psychoanalysis is questioned one more time, this time because of the problem of the creation of concepts on the one hand and the control dispositive, on the other. But, at the same time we can not only bring closer Francis Bacon and Samuel Beckett works (as it happens in Deleuze), but also catch the echo of James Joyce’s enterprise, Pollock’s paintings, or even Bacon’s works, out of the familiar representation, and rather in the project embodied in the ambiguous, expectant and humorous matter: namely, how to become a body without organs.

EXISTENTIAL/CONCEPTUAL TERRITORIES

: The production of thought in Deleuze and Guattari took place along several registers: the power of conceptual construction, the construction of subjectivity, and the construction of territoriality and movement (nomadism, geophilosophy), to name but a few. This panel will discuss the production of territoriality/movement in terms of the traversal of space in the films of Ousmane Sembebe, neoliberal hybridity, and a Deleuzean structure that shows him to be a thinker of the negative (contrary to the standard reception of his thought.
Philosophy, politics and homage in Wisit Sasanatieng’s Fah talai jone (Tears of the

This paper examines through Deleuze’s movement-image the role of naïve homage in Wisit Sasanatieng’s Fah talai jone (2000), a Thai ‘Western’ which addresses gang crime, revolution and militarism in the 1950s and 1960s. The film follows the tragedy of Rumpoey, caught in a love triangle that mirrors a nation’s political aspirations and the nation states they might create: honour, order or anarchy. Rumpoey represents a trend noted by Sumita Chakravarty in non-Western new cinemas, whereby women ‘bear the brunt of the vicissitudes of history [whilst] it is the men who are actually sacrificed in history’s slaughterhouse.’

At first glance the potentialities represented in Rumpoey’s desire reflect Deleuze and Guattari’s three states of the Body-without-Organs: full, empty and cancerous. However in order to exploit in narrative the political tragedy of such potentialities, Wisit’s film is required to engage with the structures of the cinema of the period he examines - the Westerns of Hawks or the movies of Rattana for instance - rather than simply pastiche them. This suggests that Deleuze’s movement-image philosophy, particularly his SAS and ASA narrative structures, can also facilitate an appropriate and meaningful understanding of the role of homage as a tool of political as well as emotional cinema.

Phallus in the account of the dynamic genesis in Logic of Sense.

Deleuze’s thought about desire, exemplified in his discussions with the psychoanalytic theory, does not form a systematic whole. The most visible rupture occurs between the solo works of the 1960s and the works with Felix Guattari. One of the most visible differences concerns the theme of castration. Deleuze and Guattari almost completely dismiss this idea in their common work. Castration is not a bodily event but a powerful idea in the hands of a priest. This idea is subsequently capable of introducing guilt and lack into the human psyche. The approach of the Logic of Sense is different. Phallus and the castration complex are at the centre of the account of the dynamic genesis. There is no developed psychic structure and no spoken language without the sexual surface of the body. This surface gains strength and triumphs over the depths and height of the previous positions exactly due to the image of the phallus. This image is subsequently shuttered in the castration complex.

In my presentation, I will describe the subsequent stages of the dynamic genesis and will try to explain what Deleuze understands under the sexual position and the castration complex. I will show that account of the genesis allows him go beyond the Freudian understanding of the complex without dismissing the centrality of the human body. Phalus is a reparative organ that allows for the emergence of the category of good intentions and is a precondition for the emergence of the metaphysical surface.
Some of the most interesting secondary research on Deleuze and Guattari in the Anglophone world has various stages focused on the relationship between some of their key concepts and methodological tools and urban geography, from the work of David Clarke and Marcus Doel since the mid-1990s to more recent engagements with this connection, for example Ian Buchanan’s contribution to Deleuze and Space (edited with Gregg Lambert; Edinburgh, 2005). What the work of these various authors and others working on the Deleuze-geography nexus offer future studies is a basis for thinking the city and the urban as machinic. Yet in spite of these contributions the extent to which the machinic has been engaged consistently as a conceptual basis for exploring urban cultural modernity remains somewhat limited, often to a serviceable but somewhat restricted conception of urban ‘flows’.

This paper proposes to develop a more thoroughgoing exploration of Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic concept creation as a basis for thinking urban cultural modernity, with reference to non-philosophical case-based examples from jazz and improvised musical culture in the twentieth century, as a basis for sounding some of the implications of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical machinism and its ongoing value for cultural analysis.

The aim of my presentation is to examine what Ranciere regards Deleuze in terms of the aesthetic dimension. In an interview with Magazine Litteraire, Ranciere argues that Deleuze fulfils the destiny of the aesthetic. The aesthetic in Ranciere’s terminology means the specific regime of art. In this sense, Ranciere sees Deleuze’s philosophy of art as breaking with the representative tradition. The point Ranciere tries to make is likely that Deleuze formulates the new aesthetics of an immanence in which everything is blended together. In my presentation, what I would like to suggest is that Ranciere’s consideration of Deleuze will give us a viewpoint to understand the politics as an aesthetic direction that Deleuze raises in his analyses of cinema, painting, and literature. My intention is to argue that the Ranciere’s conceptualization of an aesthetic dimension seems to be realized in the political of Deleuze’s philosophy rejecting an autonomous sphere of art or the free will of an artist in general.
### Title paper

**A nomadic territorialisation in the Urban by means of the subculture. Graffiti “refrain”**

**Abstract**

The main subject of this research is to study the sub cultural form - graffiti and its appearance in the urban public space as territorialisation. Constituting a territory is not simply to set boundaries; it is a creative act of combining rhythms and milieus, of organising forces and of turning the material into an expressive. The Deleuzean “territory” becomes crucial for the study of the relation between graffiti and the urban. To observe graffiti as territorial marks opens a different approach to understand its appearance and presence in the city. Graffiti might be not officially accepted; it is a “noise” in the urban public space, which turns into a “refrain”. It affects the political and aesthetical city order, constituting new nomadic structures inside of the urban milieu. It implies the mechanism of a deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation in the urban attacking and changing its sign system. Being territorial it is a process of becoming expressive.

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### Title paper

**Cultured Images: The Lazarean Body of the Clone**

**Abstract**

Cultured images emerge between biotechnologies and visual culture; today, media are reproductive technologies and images are increasingly lively. Ambivalently positioned between science fiction and technological fact, cultured images require an “ethico-aesthetical” approach which understands them as creative sites of experimental activity. This might also be described as a pragmatics of sensibility, a sensible flesh. I explore one such cultured image—the clone—as what Deleuze terms the Lazarean body. Death is “the last form of the problematic, the source of problems and questions”, the “exhaustion of a certain state of being that makes way for a new mode of becoming”. A Lazarean body is marked by this problematic of death. Deleuze writes that a character is “Lazarean precisely because he returns from death, from the land of the dead; he has passed through death and is born from death, whose sensory-motor disturbances he retains”; this body is not the smoothly functional body of a new mode of embodiment, nor a simple reanimation of the body as it was. Rather, it bears the marker of a differential embodiment. Clones are doubly embodied as matter and image, troubling their distinction. Thinking about what kind of images clones are tells us about what they might do. I consider clones first in terms of Peirce’s notions of index and icon, and then to suggest that it is a third term, the diagram, which Deleuze and Guattari modify from Peirce’s account, that best fits the potential of the clone as cultured image.
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**Title paper** ‘Difference in Itself’ in Contemporary Feminisms  
**Abstract** That difference has to be thought ‘in itself’ is probably the best known philosophical ‘slogan’ by Deleuze. While at first it might seem that a renewed engagement with this category brings forth merely the very basics of Deleuze, in my paper I claim that there is a considerable need today to again emphasize the centrality of the concept of difference for thought. First, looking at our current times which in most parts suffer from a severe incapacity to live a world of differences, to think difference in itself still has to be seen as ‘the burning issue of all philosophy’. But secondly, and to this aspect the main corpus of my paper will be devoted, in such focus on difference what becomes visible is that the Deleuzian (impossible) demand of thinking difference in itself has found most productive materializations today: in contemporary feminist research. Two exemplary discussions of such productive ways of thinking difference beyond representation, opposition, and recognition shall be presented in my paper: 1) Elizabeth Grosz’ ‘(in)corporeal’ thought of becoming and 2) Donna Haraway’s ‘encounter between species’, both of which produce a thought based on the concept of difference, and thus importantly reshape new ways of relation and experience.

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**Title paper** Anonymous Authorship and the ‘Multiple Single’  
**Abstract** Amidst the affirmation of imperceptibility that opens A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari strike a note of self-consciousness: ‘Why have we kept our own names?’ Their response: ‘Out of habit, purely out of habit’. This paper asks, what would it mean to drop this habit, or, better, to actively affirm anonymity as a strategy of authorship? If Deleuze is reluctant to pursue this path, one of his principle interlocutors, Foucault, takes it up as an explicit, if occasional, theme. This paper extends Foucault’s insights through Marx in order to contribute to a communist politics of anonymity. I do this with attention to specific exercises of anonymous authorship in communist politics, focusing in particular on the collective pseudonym of Luther Blissett and the figure of the ‘multiple single’.
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Title paper: The Image, the Remains: Deleuze, Blanchot and Corpse of Cinema  
Abstract: Deleuze tells us that the cinema of the movement-image was from its very beginning linked historically and essentially to the organization of war: the sensory-motor schemata that organize perception and action into a linear and causal temporal perspective, an indirect image of time, do not merely articulate a structure of action and reaction, but ultimately one of violence and death. Étienne-Jules Marey’s chronophotographic rifle of 1892 is thus a figure for this violence at the heart of the cinema: ‘to see’ is merely a point along a trajectory towards ‘to kill.’ This paper will draw on Maurice Blanchot’s short essay ‘The Image, the Remains’ to explore the aporetic relation between action and the corpse as the ‘vanishing point’ and organising principle of the temporal perspective mapped out by the movement-image, which nonetheless disorders and disrupts all possibility of action, that which withdrawing or detaches the image from ‘practical life and the accomplishment of true tasks’ – or, to put it in Deleuzian terms, the corpse as pure ‘op-sign’ in which the cinema of the movement-image reveals as its principle of organisation the time-image as the disordering of all human possibility.

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Title paper: The Voice as a Rhythmic Object  
Abstract: Various ontological and perceptual powers have been assigned to vocal utterances in existing philosophical accounts of the voice. From the point of overlap between a unique corporeality and the social conventions of language and the preeminent object of Derrida’s critique of metaphysics of presence, the definitions of voice within these accounts have lately extended to Steven Connor’s “voice-body” and an exemplary objet a in Mladen Dolar’s renewed engagements with Lacanian psychoanalysis. In an attempt to venture beyond representational thinking (the voice as a mimetic double of a preexisting self or sensing body), the concept of identity (vocal emissions as enactments of a subject one with her consciousness) and the psychoanalytic tenets of loss and lack, this paper advocates a rhythmic theory of vocal expressions in the wake of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought. Such a theory, I will claim, holds specific importance for articulating 1) the preindividual regions “of occurrent relation” (Massumi) that individuated utterances both emerge from and partly shape and 2) the twofold nature of any utterance as an actual and a virtual object-event. In the first case, the concept of rhythm can be used to think processes of dynamic coordination and mutual affectivity that voices share with heterogeneous other components from technologies to human sensing and perceiving bodies. In the second case, it is the varied kinds of virtual movement imbuing our experiences of actual utterances—half-thoughts and conscious/unconscious memories, sounds glimpsing visions, kinesthetic qualities and touches—that, in my approach, amount to the specific rhythms of the voice. Since theoretical thoughts are never rhythmically self-contained but entangle with diverse further rhythms of reality, the suggestions of this paper will take shape in-between Deleuzian philosophy and the experimental vocal art of Cathy Berberian.
What does Deleuze tell us about limits? What, for him, is the connection between limits and creativity? Between limits and newness? Limits and art? Limits and bodies? My paper will challenge the common interpretation that Deleuze’s is an ontology open to endlessly new potentialities by emphasizing that creative processes are always at once enabled, held captive, and determined by the limits constituted by their relations. The role of limits is one of the least discussed aspects of Deleuze’s ontology of repetitive differentiation. But what defines a body’s capabilities if not its limitations? I will suggest that when Deleuze attempts to identify the “conditions under which something new is created” (Deleuze, 2006, p. 304) he is seeking the determining relations that both limit and generate novelty and change as their effects (Tiessen, 2010). Limits, I will suggest, function as the bulwark against which Deleuze’s bodies – i.e. multiplicities (Deleuze, 1994, p. 182) – discover what they are capable of. That is, limits define the conditions of creativity. As Deleuze explains, while we can certainly imagine that “a being […] ‘leaps over’ […] its limits in going to the limit of what it can do,” going to the limit “still presupposes a limit” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 37).

The “Refrain” plateau in Mille Plateaux, Deleuze’s most extended elaboration on music and trans-aesthetic relations, ends with a single enigmatic pronoun: Schumann. What does Deleuze try to unpack in this last refrain? How does Deleuze orchestrate “Schumann” as a musical monad? Can “Schumann” designate simultaneously a singularity, plane of consistency, “the univocity of Being,” and a black hole of Deleuzian thought? Could it express an inevitable passage to the cosmic and chaos, to which all refrains must return? For one thing, the “Schumann-assemblage” (coined by Guattari) is ubiquitously involved in radical de-territorialization in terms of becoming-child (Kinderszene, Kinderball, Märchenbilder), becoming-woman (Frauenliebe und -leben, Peri, Mignon), becoming-plant (rose and Myrtle), becoming-animal (Papillon and prophet bird), and becoming-Oriental (“Aus den hebräischen Gesaengen” and Bilder aus Osten). As a double tribute to the conference theme and the bi-centennial of the birth of Robert Schumann this year, this paper explores the mad encounter between Schumann’s “polyphonic philosophy” and Deleuze’s “musical musings,” and enacts a counterpoint of music-philosophy as an affective machine. Through mediating and meditating on various moments in Schumann’s musical and critical oeuvre in terms of the multi-planed “constitutive assemblage of desire,” this paper also investigates the ways in which Schumannesque intensities, through which desire-as-ritornello passes and oscillates (rapidly or slowly, but always as intermezzi), ultimately destratify in molecular processes of becoming-imperceptible.
The Filmic Envelope: Hypnosis, Cinema and Rhythmic Attunement

Taking its cue from the period of early film where hypnosis emerged as an effective model for cinema as a type of technology of the self, this paper focuses on cinematic subjectivity from a perspective occluded by linguistically and optically oriented theorizations: the moving image as intense corporeal and attentive rhythms that suspend the individual between movement and immobility, the interior and the exterior, the self and the others. In parallel with hypnotic induction, as it was conceptualized at the turn of the twentieth century, in cinema during its earliest steps the question of experience became how the rhythmic patterns of moving images trigger and attune pre-individual affectivity that the subject contains within itself as potentiality. The purpose of this paper is to analyze this pre-identificatory dimension of cinematic experience, exploring the topic through Deleuze and Guattari in addition to relevant discussions in contemporary psychology and anthropology. With the concepts of rhythm, affectivity and attunement, the paper analyzes how cinema has since its inception produced psychosocial realities that—with varying political consequences—envelop the individual into webs of embracing emotional significance.

From Christ to the Bourgeoisie: Deleuze, Christian Spiritualism and Political Action

Forty-five years before Deleuze and Guattari conceptualised the distinctions and connections between art, science and philosophy, Deleuze considered another triad: religion, science and politics. In “From Christ to the Bourgeoisie”, published in 1946, Deleuze focuses on the subtle lines of affinity that run through these three domains and concludes that they are more than contingently connected.

This early essay critically engages with the Christian spiritualism of thinkers like Mounier and Maritain which, while now largely forgotten, during the 1930s and 1940s had a significant impact on philosophical developments and political thought. Deleuze’s rejection of specific religious positions and their associated scientific and political perspectives informs some of the enduring themes of Deleuze’s work: from the ‘hatred of interiority’ to his insistence on immanence and his method of transcendental empiricism. At the same time it reveals which elements of these domains Deleuze did not reject, and even tentatively embraced. These elements—certain mystical themes, anarchist tendencies and alternative lineages within scientific thought—form an equally important, albeit less explicit, backbone of Deleuze’s thought. A close study of this essay does not only bring into focus some of these latent Deleuzian positions, but also creates new possibilities for linking Deleuze’s philosophy to the field of political action.
Abstract
Starting from Nietzsche’s assumption that art is ‘the great means of making life possible’, this paper explores the transformative power of performance art, or, more specifically, its capacity to re-create and re-connect the potentiality of life itself. Since it became accepted as an artistic medium in its own right during the 1970s, performance art has profoundly challenged traditional hermeneutic aesthetics. The precise implications of this art form for the development of aesthetic and critical theory, however, have hardly been addressed. Existing scholarship generally focuses on what art performances ‘mean’ or ‘represent’, leaving unexplored the sensations they engender in the participants, whose bodily co-presence constitutes the specific mediality of the genre. This paper, in contrast, seeks to grasp what happens during a performance as an ephemeral and singular event.

Creating an encounter between, on the one hand, the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze, Rosi Braidotti, and Elizabeth Grosz, and, on the other, the work of pioneering performance artist Marina Abramović, I will elaborate a ‘nomadic’ perspective on performance as an art of affect and sensation rather than representation and meaning. In order to clarify the potential of performance art to generate material becomings ‘in which life folds over itself to embrace its contact with materiality’ (Grosz, 2008, p. 23), I will examine (my own participation in) Abramović’s durational work The Artist is Present, which will be performed for three months at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in the spring of 2010.

Abstract
This paper argues that new feminist materialism is a third-wave feminism, and that it, as such, enacts an-Oedipality. New feminist materialism’s focus is on the circulation of ideas through the hands of women - a circulation freed from Oedipalisation - instead of on the circulation of women through the hands of men. This makes new feminist materialism qualitatively different from second-wave and post-feminisms, and philosophical in Deleuze’s sense (its focus is on the creation of concepts). The argument of the paper will be substantiated by reading a set of third-wave feminist theorists through one another (most notably Barad and Colebrook), and by focussing on their slogan’s (e.g. Colebrook’s “Postmodernism is a Humanism”) and neologisms (e.g. Barad’s “intra-action”).
Kant’s famous principle and determining ground for aesthetic feelings, such as the beautiful and the sublime, is formulated in the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment under the heading of the idea of purposiveness. The enterprise of the Kantian aesthetics is coordinated by the search for and demarcation of a specific teleological domain that can be distinguished from the purposiveness of reason (morals) and the purposiveness of nature (science). His well known answer is: purposiveness without purpose. The end of Kantian aesthetics can be demarcated on the basis of this principle or, otherwise put, aesthetics can only be superseded when the ‘without purpose’ is erased. I will argue that Deleuze’s essays on Pure Immanence are an exposé of the consequences of such an erasure.
Leibnizian philosophy, Deleuze argues in his lectures from 1987, gives us the key to a problem in painting, under the form: what is mannerism? More specifically, he draws an analogy between Michelangelo’s figures and Leibnizian substances by claiming that neither are essences but rather sources of modifications or manners of being. By putting key passages from The Logic of Sensation, The Fold and What is Philosophy? in resonance with art history, I will explore this parallel between Michelangelo and Leibniz.

My starting point will be Deleuze's mannerist understanding of the painterly Figure, for which the figura serpentinata is the most paradigmatic, since it was with the jarring juxtapositions of bodies in Michelangelo’s Doni Tondo (aka The Holy Family, 1503), he claims, that the Figure was born in its pure state, rendering the pictorial fact in such a way that it constantly escapes from itself and dissipates in multiple becomings. I will then relate Deleuze's brief remarks on Michelangelo to his distinction between conceptual becoming (virtual events or forms of expression) and sensory becoming (possible worlds or matters of expression), of which he says that it was only in The Fold that he was able to “see better” what it comes down to. As he demonstrates there, a work of art embodies a possible world in a compound of affects and percepts by animating matter in non-human and non-individual ways. As a zone of indiscernibility, this compound is a source of endless modifications, always only a fold away from infinity, folding from one bloc of sensations into another, caught up in an abstract flux of entwined bodies (BwO), each of which already contains the germ of another possible world. What I want to argue, via a Leibnizian conception of expressive matter, is that although Deleuze usually prefers to speak in musical terms of refrains and counterpoints by which various blocs of sensation resonate with each other, its equivalent in the visual arts is the rhythmic contraposto (counter-position) of material figures in a serpentine composition. Both for Michelangelo and Deleuze, what the serpentine figure renders visible is sensory becoming as a rhythmic counter-positioning of possible worlds within a single body without organs.

In this paper I will further develop Deleuze's distinction, initially made to characterize Spinoza's naturalistic political philosophy, between legalist accounts of constitution of the social on the one hand and anti-legalist accounts of the composition on the other, by taking this schematic division in the Leibniz reception between transcendentalist and immanenstist approaches as a starting point. This will be done in relation to: (1) the baroque age, by comparing Deleuze's reading of Leibniz as a baroque philosopher to Negri's argumentation in The Savage Anomaly (1981) that Spinoza is not baroque, and (2) the present, drawing from reactualizations of Leibnizian body-politics in the work of neo-monadologists such as Lazzarato or Sloterdijk.
We are going to start from within Deleuze's work, and more specifically from what is called "virtual", "virtuality" in The Fold. It is literally in the actuality, or in the actualization of the virtual that Deleuze set the question of becoming and alterity: the actual as what we become, the Other, our becoming-other. Virtuality and alterity, it is also to think what is strange and stranger, and inhabit the familiar unknowingly, in thought, in art, in life, and here in the very work of the thinker. He says about artists and writers, as in Proust: Listen its own language in stranger. But precisely what does, in the monumental work of Deleuze, beckon as what does not let itself grasp, destabilizes, confuses, astonishes? How goes it always towards an elsewhere, that is to say, in still unthought places, in fringe? Since the reading of this inside, we would be, thus, led to elsewhere, outside. Grasp the meaning of the virtuality through the work-thought of Deleuze, would be then a way of questioning the problem of the event, our assumption being that something enigmatic, in multiple manner, crosses and haunts it. This “thing”, this “territory, stranger to the inside” comes as a sort of secret jingle, associated with excess, with intensity. As Deleuze says, the artist "saw in life something too big". Virtuality and the actualization of the virtual would be, therefore, to hear like what in the work of Deleuze, and according to his work, as stranger, an event of alterity, excesses, divests and astonishes, and herewith brings promise of possibles to come, draws the lines of a becoming-other.
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<tr>
<td>Title paper</td>
<td>The Amazonian in Questions: Monique Wittig or Gilles Deleuze?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>The authors of Anti-Oedipus were wondering: “why a feminine homosexuality has not led women among themselves to form amazonic groups and exchange men?” The philosophic tandem was then following a straight line between sexes by which a masculine homosexuality is the norm for a second sex according to the sexual difference; the pair was speaking in anti-Lacanian accents of protest against a psycho-political group of MLF. But this suggestion does it not assume the same difference which changes sometimes in opposition? In this respect, to question the Deleuzian text which proposes a new reading of Kleist’s Penthesilea is to ask: why becoming an Amazon does not matter in this text, from a philosopher who had a lot to do with the France of the post-May 68 at an Amazonian age? So, the comparison of Monique Wittig’s text with Gilles Deleuze’s one tries to understand what opposes her to the classical thinker of Vincennes: what is it about a controversy concerning a place for minorities in these two texts? What does it mean that to invoke Amazons, a keyword in Wittigian text, if not to call for a liberation of everyone? How deal with the discriminatory notion of difference in regard to a philosophy of non-identity?</td>
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<td>Title paper</td>
<td>From Maimon to Deleuze: The Viewpoint of Internal Genesis and the Concept of</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>In his book Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (1790), Salomon Maimon sets out to prove the validity of Kant’s Critical Philosophy but he ends up with a critique more radical than Kant. Maimon points out the insufficiency of the Kantian method of external conditioning and demands a genetic account for the production of the real. Drawing on developments in geometric analysis, i.e. Leibniz’s invention of differential calculus, Maimon introduces a new term into philosophy: the concept of ‘differentials of consciousness’. By means of his theory of differentials Maimon intends to provide an objective and immanent ground for dynamic synthetic a priori judgments. On first glance Maimon’s rational dogmatism or subjective idealism seem to have little to do with Deleuze. However, I will show that Maimon paved the way for a genetic, material principle of difference, which is the key to understanding Deleuze’s transcendental model of thought as pure creation.</td>
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Abstract
In the Limits of Control (2009), minimalist film director Jim Jarmusch continues to develop a style of filmmaking that experiments with the potentials of what might be dubbed a productive "anti-production". Posed inversely, the Limits of Control populates the visual register with a disruptive secrecy that wards against either hermeneutic or identitarian apprehension. Specifically, Jarmusch’s characters do not assume proper names, plots fail to emerge as motor forces, and desires fail to reterritorialize in any familiar image of identification. In this unconventional filmic scenario, Jarmusch composes a glimpse of the virtual insofar as his filmic style functions to revolt against Deleuze’s notion of the movement-image. Instead, Jarmusch’s peculiar style might be articulated as a thought in the process of becoming, or rather, a strange filmic assemblage caught in the act of its composition. In the course of suspending conventional elements of identification, Jarmusch’s Limits of Control inaugurates a host of sensations from beneath the psychological and teleological tropes of Western cinema. Articulating these sensations, the first task of this presentation will be oriented to articulating the significance of the secret for a style of thinking that fails to reterritorialize in the Deleuzian movement-image. Second, this presentation will begin to inquire into the ways such secrecy returns the filmic device to thought, activating a molecular line that "institutes an encounter with the virtual. It is in this latter vein that this presentation will develop the idea of a productive "anti-production" as a tactical weapon against the evacuation of secrecy in neo-liberal capitalism and modes of identitarian capture intimate to State thought.
My paper will examine Gilles Deleuze's reading of Beckett in "The Exhausted" through the lens of the "double articulation" of the assemblage outlined in A Thousand Plateaus. At stake in my argument will be the relation of the logical to the physiological, or of being to affect. Whereas readers of Beckett tend to link the dissolution of the self to the destruction of the total Work, Deleuze's insight is that the dissolution of the self can go hand in hand with a kind of totalizing endeavor, in which a totality is not given in advance but constructed in experimentation with liminal states. Deleuze reads the physiological state of exhaustion not as the culmination of a progressive negation or "pursuit of the formless" (Blanchot), but as the positive invention of an affect that corresponds to an experimentation in the real, and to productive, intermediate states of thought, image, and language. By doing so, Deleuze breaks with Romantic treatments of language and affect that would see the former as the external expression of an internal experience, analyzing instead a reciprocal organization in which affects have an epistemological function that articulates relations between inner and outer, subject and object, thought and being.

In his Cairo speech of 2009, Barack Obama proposed a new, culturally sensitive US-Islamic hybridity, to replace the old cultural clash model that had guided the previous administration. Using Guattari’s notion of existential territories (Chaosmosis), this paper will argue that Obama was in fact attempting to market a neoliberal version of Islam.
Matthew Barney’s five-part Cremaster cycle (1994-2002, 400 min.) presents a cinematic map of transpositions (Braidotti 2006). Biological processes of sexual differentiation are interrelated with Celtic mythology, symbols of advertising, fashion, layers of geological states, biographical details from the lives of Harry Houdini and his alleged illegitimate son Gary Gilmore, and the creation of The Chrysler Building. Throughout the entire cycle Barney presents himself as an apprentice performing rituals where athletics, sculpture and choreography combine. In the 1980s Gilles Deleuze published two books on cinema to offer a new classification of cinematographic images revolving around two main images: the movement-image (1983), focusing on spatial relations between parts that act and react which typifies classic narrative cinema; and the post-war time-image (1985) of ‘modern cinema’ where time becomes a non-linear sensation also known as duration. In this paper I will attempt to present a new cinematographic image, the ‘performance-image’, distilled from Barney’s Cremaster cycle. Through images of repetition, strengthening, disintegration and resistance, the narrative impulse is transposed into a continuous melting and molding of matter. With the performance-image this paper aims to expand the notions of space and time with the creative sensation of vitalism.
Abstract Machinical Empiricism as a methodological interface in the context of news

Much has been said about the difference between so-called old (television, print, radio) and new (world wide web, social networking, web 2.0) media, but inherently, there are only two main strands of argumentation that make up every contribution on the topic. The first being a technical-deterministic one and the second either being the utopian or dystopian approach. This however, does not seem to suffice to adequately describe what is actually going on in the simultaneous overlapping of these medial forms. Hence, this paper aims to contribute a new angle from which the analysis of this situation might benefit.

The term proposed here is one of abstract machinical empiricism. It owes much to its composition to the notion of the abstract machine that Deleuze puts forward in his works, in short, these abstract machines are machines that regulate and coordinate the relations between all types of Deleuzian machines (Cognition Machines, Desire Machines, etc.). Further, the notion aims to incorporate to what shall be called transcendental empiricism. The latter term hints to the fact that there are a certain amount of empirical notions which opened up a new line of flight in their methodological conception. By example of the Deleuzian abstract machines, they bear a certain empirical heritage which has been theoretically developed further to extend their reach beyond the realm of the empirical.

The paper aims to show that abstract machinical empiricism is what drives the interface between man and (technical) machine, between analogue archives (libraries) and search engines online. It is on the membrane of this concept that human beings receive and process information, therefore making one more link in the chain of data gathering and processing. Due to our non-binary nature, though, man has the unique ability to inject viewpoints and concepts into this flow that digital machines have no concept of –yet. It is this tension which the paper seeks to examine and illuminate.
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Title paper: A Virtual Space of the Populous Desert
Abstract: “Make the desert, the steppe grow; do not depopulate it, quite the contrary” --Gilles Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 417. We will seek to literalize the metaphor of the populous desert in Deleuze’s writings by creating a virtual desert in GoogleMaps, situated in the coastal fjords of Greenland’s northern tundra, as a collaborative space through which a text can grow from the middle through the proliferation of nodes with multiple points of entry for any process of reading. This conceptual desert will serve a space of play for Deleuze’s thought, where the relations between different concepts can be inferred ludically, as the eye and cursor move from one location-node to the next, revealing/concealing a spontaneously reader-constructed narrative of ideas in a rhizomatic flow. This space of play will be collaborative rather than competitive and the presentation at the conference will create a visibility incentive for users to join a virtual community of play to combine and juxtapose Deleuzian concepts and programs, not in theory but in the actual building of virtual pathways; as the fjords bifurcate along the satellite photographs of the melting ice-flows we will situate moments to think the undecidability of a philosophy of pure terms and relations. Drawing on Todd May’s writing on genealogy and employing literal forms of nomadic thought to populate our desert, our presentation will chart the growth of the map itself as it overtakes and yields to the smooth space of becoming even as we are re-assert a meshwork of immobile striation. Our paper will be in the form of this map, our presentation will be a nomadic tracing.

This project will further seek to provoke reflection on the process of visually translating text into a digital map-space through a community of play in order to gauge the possibilities of creating a virtual hypertext-meshwork translation of Capitalism and Schizophrenia onto a GoogleMap or Sid Meier’s Civilization mapspace. This translation would serve as a reflexive bibliography-genealogy, assembling the text’s source-material alongside fragment chunks of the works themselves at different nodes through inter-spliced hyperlinks in non-linear combinations with its progeny; works of art, architecture and textual philosophy inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s writing in these two volumes. Our presentation will thus seek a critical response from panelists and audience members to design and smooth the contours of such a community of play among interested critical academics, artists and activists.
The digital interface is the realm where our contemporary consciousness is being created. Not only is ‘information’ the field of the emerging practices of immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism, but the production and management of affects within the culture industry continues to be a realm of political dispute. This is a conflict fought over the brain, a brain no-longer modelled on the computer, but, as Deleuze famously described it, the brain as the screen. This interfaced brain/screen is constructed by the relations it forms, and that form it. Known as the ‘plasticity’ of the brain within neuro-scientific discourse, this relational brain is bio-politically constructed through its use of digital technology, just as it is continually inventing ways to use digital technology to re-construct the world.

In the realm of science fiction cinema this question has particular importance. On the one hand science fiction cinema explicitly examines the thoughts and behaviour of cybernetic life-forms, while more recent films addressing the digital interface highlight political issues of social control. On the other hand, science fiction cinema is the genre most directly engaged in utilising digital innovations in its production process, making it an example of the interface it ostensibly examines. This means that questions regarding the contemporary interface and the functioning of the brain within it must not only be approached through the content of science fiction films, but as well through their form, through the way such films interface with our own brains to produce compliant sensations, or occasionally break such compliance to launch us into something new. At these moments science fiction cinema begins to think a new future.
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari define two types of multiplicities: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative multiplicities are discreet, numerical, divisible, extensive, molar; qualitative multiplicities, by contrast, are continuous, durational, intensive, molecular, and composed of particles that do not divide without changing in nature. This theoretical distinction helps to define such social and political phenomena as the difference between majority and minority. The majority is composed of quantitative elements, regardless of how many elements it has, while minorities are defined by qualitative elements: Deleuze and Guattari point out that the minorities constitute 'fuzzy', non-denumerable sets, multiplicities of escape and flux, which cannot be counted or integrated into the axiomatic logic of capitalism. In this sense becoming-minoritarian thus necessarily implies the moment of change and transformation. The concept of qualitative multiplicity is echoed in Hardt and Negri’s concept of the multitude. In contrast to such concepts as the people, the crowd, the masses, and the mob, the multitude is composed of a set of singularities which cannot be reduced to sameness or any form of identity. The multitude is conceived as “all those who work under the rule of capital”. Although Hardt and Negri state that the multitude is also a concept involving racial, gender and sexual differences, at the same time they claim that the multitude, creating the experience of “the common”, poses the goal of a world where gender and race do not matter. In my paper I would like to contrast the notions of multiplicity and the multitude and question the experience of “the common” in the context of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming-minoritarian.